Determining tax rates:  Are property tax rates determined on the basis of political factors, by politicians? by Kennedy, William Donald (author) et al.
IXElIütAÆENINKjTnAJCIlATnES: 
j4J%J3]P1t()rTE3t]^ ïrTr/L)C]RjA;riiS I)ISTTEIlAd]]Sn3I) CNN 
TTHDE li/USÜSCWF PCHLITICCLAJL F,ACT()RS,
BY POLITICIANS?
by
William D. Kennedy 
B.Com., University of British Columbia, 1965
TTEEKHS SUBA/CrrinED IN PAIHTAJL injTLFnDLI.AdlEhJT't)!; 
T:t[E;i%IS()IJIEli;AdOEI4TrSlF()It irCE DISOItEE ()]? 
MASTER OF ARTS 
in
POLITICAL SCIENCE
© William D. Kennedy, 2003
IHE LnNTVTEHRSITVlOMF INCIRTlHOEIiN BRTITSH (:C)L,lLnviBI/l
April 2003
All rights reserved. This work may not be 
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy 
or other means, without the permission of the author.
H I
National Library 
of Canada
Acquisitions and 
Bibliographic Services
395 Wellington Street 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada
Bibiiothèqui 
du Canada
e nationale
Acquisitions et 
services bibliographiques
395, rue Wellington 
Ottawa ON K1A0N4 
Canada
OurfUe Notre référence
The author has granted a non­
exclusive licence allowing the 
National Library of Canada to 
reproduce, loan, distribute or sell 
copies o f this thesis in microform, 
paper or electronic formats.
The author retains ownership of the 
copyri^t in this thesis. Neither the 
thesis nor substantial extracts from it 
may be printed or otherwise 
reproduced without the author’s 
permission.
L’auteur a accordé une licence non 
exclusive permettant à la 
Bibhothèque nationale du Canada de 
reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou 
vendre des copies de cette thèse sous 
la forme de microfiche/film, de 
reproduction sur papier ou sur format 
électronique.
L’auteur conserve la propriété du 
droit d’auteur qui protège cette thèse. 
Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels 
de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés 
ou autrement reproduits sans son 
autorisation.
0-612-80659-6
Canada
Name:
Degree:
Thesis Title:
Examining Committee:
William D. Kennedy 
Master of Arts
DETERMINING TAX RATES: ARE PROPERTY TAX 
RATES DETERMINED ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL 
FACTORS, BY POLITICIANS?
Chair: Dr. Robert W. Tait 
Dean of Graduate 
UNBC
S u p e r v i s o r : G r e g
Assistant Professor & Chair, Political Science Program 
UNBC
Committee/Menfber: Dr. Gary Wilson 
Assistant Professor, Political Science Program 
UNBC
Committee Member: Dr. Mary Louise McAllister 
Associate Professor, Environment & Resource Studies 
University of Waterloo
External Examiner: Dr. Tomson Ogwang 
Associate Professor & Chair, Economics Program 
UNBC
Date Approved: A p r i l  14-, . p o o 3
Abstract
British Columbia municipalities may through pursue differential tax treatment of 
different classes of property as a policy objective. This thesis tests the hypothesis 
that the choice of tax rates is based primarily on short-term political considerations 
with local elected officials playing the dominant role in the ultimate decision­
making process with municipal staff playing a supporting role in terms of providing 
technical assistance. As property tax policies have an impact on the economy at the 
local, provincial and national level it is desirable to understand the issues that are 
considered in the course of setting tax rates, the role played by participants in the 
decision-making process, and the decision-making process itself. The literature is 
reviewed and possible explanatory factors are identified. These are tested by way of 
a case study of three municipalities in northern British Columbia. The findings of 
the case study are analyzed and conclusions are offered.
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The Aimg generally raised en 
Chy land b taxes.^
Property taxes are an imposition paid by virtually all property owners. We all, at 
some time, have probably wished that they were lower, and we all have our own 
understanding of why we pay what we do. The factors and processes that are 
involved in the setting of property tax rates, and the policies that govern the 
distribution among the property classes, are not always clear, even to those whose 
professional fate involves participating in the decision making process.^ This study 
is an attempt to explore the decision-making process as it relates to property 
taxation, and to draw some conclusions about the nature of the process and the 
implications for municipal finance in general.
Property taxes are the most important source of municipal revenue; they are 
central to the viability of municipal government. Money raised from property 
taxation comprises over half the annual revenue for local general government in 
Canada.^ Yet the political process by which municipalities determine the level of 
taxation and the distribution of the burden of taxation is not well understood. The 
purpose of this thesis is to expand our understanding of the considerations that are 
taken into account in the processes of choosing tax rates and tax policy objectives.
* Inscription on a wall plague given to the author by an (admiring?) taxpayer.
 ^The author spent over three decades employed in local government, and was intimately involved in 
setting tax rates.
 ^Revenue from Property and related taxes has ranged from 50.6% of total revenue to 52.4% during 
the years 1997 through 2001. Source: Statistics Canada, Local seneral government revenue and 
expenditure. Canada. http://www.statcan.ca/english/Pgdb/govt06a.htm (26/10/20021
and particularly our understanding of the role of local elected and appointed officials 
in the decision-making process.
It is concluded that major factors in the determination of tax rates include 
local economic conditions, community desires for services and facilities, the 
financial requirements of the municipality, and the need for stability and 
predictability in taxation matters. The time frame applied to these factors is 
relatively short term. There is no evidence that long term planning takes place at the 
municipal level with respect to municipal taxation policies. Elected officials play a 
dominant role in the process, although municipal staff are engaged in providing 
technical support. The process is generally incremental, with elements of mutual 
adjustment (as discussed in Chapter Five).
The work begins with the statement of the thesis question, an outline of the 
rationale for and importance of the question, a review of the mechanics of property 
taxation, and a review of literature that is related to the question. The methodology 
employed to address the thesis question is explained in Chapter Two. Chapter Three 
draws on the literature review to enumerate a set of factors that may be considered 
in the course of choosing tax rates and tax policy objectives, as well as expectations 
for the decision-making process and the roles of the various participants. Case 
studies of three municipalities were conducted with the objective of determining 
what factors and processes are used in actual practice. The results of the case 
studies are reported in Chapter Four. Chapter Five summarizes the findings, offers 
conclusions about the hypothesis posed in this thesis, and draws on these
conclusions to make suggestions about the implications of the study for this 
important area of public policy.
Chapter One
Thesis Question and Literature Review 
Thesis Question. Rationale and Importance 
7%e$6 gwatfpf:
Property taxes are a significant source of revenue for local government. In 1996, 
total local government revenue in Canada was $19.3 billion. Some 49.6% of that 
amount ($9.6 billion) was derived from property and related taxes. In British 
Columbia, total local government revenue amounted to $2.2 billion, and 50.1% of 
that was derived from property and related taxes.* Many questions could be asked 
about such a significant amount of taxation, including vfro pays the tax and what the 
revenues are used for. The purpose of this research is to seek to answer the general 
question: What is the basis for the setting of municipal tax rates, and who makes the 
decision? The hypothesis to be tested is that the choice of tax rates is based 
primarily on short-term political considerations with local elected officials playing 
the dominant role in the ultimate decision-making process with municipal staff 
playing a supporting role in terms of providing technical assistance.
In order to test this hypothesis it is necessary to determine what factors drive 
the decision making process used in setting municipal tax rates, including 
identifying the following:
1. the issues that are considered in the course of setting tax rates;
* Karin Treff Karin and David B. Perry, Finances of the Nation 1988, (Toronto: Canadian Tax 
Foundation, 1998), 6:2.
2. the role played by participants in the decision-making process (primarily 
elected members of council, staff, and the public);
3. the decision-making process used by the participants; and
4. factors related to procedure, organizational structure or location that have 
an influence on the issues considered in setting tax rates.
British Columbia is one of the few jurisdictions in Canada where 
municipalities are able to determine, in an open and transparent manner, how the tax 
burden is to be shared among the differing types of property owners in the 
community.^ As such, it provides a setting in which to explore the factors involved 
in tax rate decision-making in more detail than is possible in jurisdictions where the 
apportioning of the tax burden is largely regulated by provincial legislation 
applicable to tax rates or by the proportion of market value that is subject to 
taxation. It also provides a setting in which to explore decision-making in small to 
medium-size municipalities rather than in the urban or metropolitan settings that are 
often the subject of municipal governance research.
Much has been written about the political and economic aspects to be 
considered in the course of determining tax rates and about the role of public 
municipal administrators and their relationship to elected officials. Unfortunately, 
there has been little research into what actually occurs “in the field” where decisions 
on tax rates and tax policy objectives are required to be made within strict time 
constraints, and often with less information than would be desirable. One might ask
 ^Robin W. Boadway and Harry M. Kitchen. Canadian Tax Policy, 3"* ed. (Toronto; Canadian Tax 
Foundation, 1999), 352.
whether elected and appointed officials are aware of, and actually consider, the 
issues that theory suggests are considered in the course of deciding on tax rates.
One might also ask whether the issues concerned are. regarded as highly political 
(with the outcomes largely determined by the elected officials) or whether they are
regarded as highly technical (leaving the administrators as the dominant players, 
working within general political direction).
This research is expected to contribute to our understanding of municipal 
government by:
1. identifying the factors that are actually considered in the process of 
determining local tax rate policies;
2. clarifying whether the process o f tax rate setting is primarily 
established by the elected representatives or by municipal 
administrators; and
3. verifying whether our theoretical expectations about the factors 
considered in the process of determining local tax rate policies are 
correct.
As indicated by the review of literature, there is a paucity of empirical 
studies of administrative decision-making processes in small to medium size 
municipalities, particularly in tiie area of budgeting and taxation. It is hoped that 
this study will contribute to a better understanding of the ways in which these 
municipalities address financial issues.
In the following pages it will be shown that a policy change has taken place since 
1991 at the municipal level with respect to the allocation of the burden of taxation. 
Municipalities have been moderating the taxation of major industrial properties and 
utility properties, while shifting the tax burden slightly to business/other and 
residential properties. There is little explanation in the literature that contributes to 
an understanding of what brought about the change. It may have been triggered by 
changes in provincial policies regarding assessment and taxation of the utility 
property class, or by any number of other factors, or it may simply be the outcome 
of municipal efforts to maintain, as best they could, stability in the amount of taxes 
paid by various types of property owners. Most literature on municipal taxation is 
relatively general in nature, and/or directed to a particular issue in economics, such 
as inter-municipal competition for investment, discussion about the regressive or 
progressive nature of the property tax, and the economic impact of property taxation 
on business and industry. Little published material explicitly addresses tax policy 
decision-making processes.
It is important to consider this topic as municipal tax policies have an impact 
on individuals and businesses at a local level, and on the national, provincial and 
local economies. An understanding of the topic will lead to a better understanding of 
the challenges facing local government, assist in evaluating the way in which they 
have responded to those challenges, and assist in evaluating the legislative and
administrative framework within which they establish policy objectives for 
municipal property taxation.
A better understanding of the way in which tax rates and tax policy 
objectives are set would be of benefit in several areas. At the local level, better 
understanding should make for more informed debate about tax policy and for better 
accountability for the decisions that are made. The ability to pursue differential tax 
treatment of different classes of property means that some taxpayers will be 
privileged over others, depending on the policy goals. For example, in British 
Columbia the effective rate of municipal general taxation on residential property is 
lower than it is on non-residential property. This may mean that residential interests 
are favoured over commercial taxpayers and that short-term political considerations 
drive the decision-making process. In the absence of an imderstanding of factors 
that contribute to property tax policy decisions society is unlikely to clearly 
imderstand the choices that have been made. In addition, since the decision-making 
process will be affected by institutional biases and by the biases of the individual 
participants (local elected and appointed officials), if we do not understand the 
decision-making process and the role of the participants, we cannot be sure how 
local government is defining “the public interest” insofar as it relates to property 
taxation.
At the provincial level, better understanding may better inform provincial 
legislation governing municipal taxation discretion, provincial policies with respect 
to conditional and unconditional grants to municipalities, and provincial
understanding of the financial capacity of municipalities. For example, political 
necessity may require that municipalities impose a disproportionate burden of 
taxation on industrial properties, as appears to be the case in a number of 
municipalities where major industrial tax rates are more than seven times the 
residential tax rate.^ This may be because the municipal councils feel that neither a 
reduction in service levels nor an increase in property taxation is acceptable to their 
electorate, or because they are of the view that commercial property taxation is 
ultimately home by residents outside the municipality. The resulting higher taxation 
may impair provincial policies which seek to reduce taxation on industry to improve 
the province’s competitive position. An uninformed provincial government may fail 
to understand the factors underlying the municipal policy decisions. This could lead 
to regulation to restrict municipal taxation discretion, when the more appropriate 
response may be to increase municipal fiscal capacity by increasing grants or 
making other revenue opportunities available. If municipalities are making property 
tax decisions largely on the basis of local political calculations, and are not 
considering factors relating to efficiency, effectiveness and equity, they may 
continue to increase commercial taxation and unwittingly bring about provincial 
action to limit their discretionary power.
The action taken by the Government of British Columbia in 1995 with 
respect to taxation of utility properties is an instance where a provincial government 
limited municipal taxation jurisdiction. Over the years, several municipalities had
 ^See Table 13, Major Industrial Tax Rates and Multiples.
continuously increased the tax rates applicable to the utility property class (which 
consisted largely of railway properties). The railways (lead by the CPR) were of the 
view that the resulting tax levels were excessive, and were hindering their ability to 
compete effectively with railways in the United States and, as a consequence, 
threatening their economic viability. Although many municipalities were aware of 
the railways’ position, no coordinated action was taken. The railways were 
ultimately able to convince the Provincial Government of the need for action. As a 
result, legislation was introduced which effectively reduced the extent to which 
railway property was assessed, and limited the tax rates that could be applied to the 
utility property class.'*
It is possible that, in addition to the enumeration of the possible reasons for 
the policy change listed above, the decline in the tax burden imposed on industrial 
properties is the result of municipalities becoming sensitive about the possibility of 
other industrial interests successfully pleading their case with the provincial 
government. We cannot know if that is the case without more knowledge of the 
decision-making process.
Limitations and Delimitations
Issues involving economic considerations and organizational behaviour are 
important to our understanding of the tax rate decision-making process and must be 
considered in the course of the study. It is not the intent of this work, however, to
* Province of British Columbia, Miscellaneous Statutes Amendment Act (No. 3), 1995.
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appraise the economic or political suitability of the property tax regime in British 
Columbia, nor is it the intent to develop a prescription for an “ideal” tax regime or 
decision-making model.
As mentioned above, property taxes are levied by the provincial government, 
regional districts and regional hospital districts, and the Assessment Authority and 
Municipal Finance Authority. This thesis is concerned only with the process of 
establishing tax rate for municipal purposes. The setting of tax rates for other 
purposes is not addressed.
Due to limitations of time and resources, the case study included in this 
thesis focuses on the perspective of municipal officials. It would have been useful 
to expand the case study to include the views of others from the community such as 
business leaders, managers of major industrial facilities, reporters, and leaders of 
civic organizations. Other perspectives would have contributed to a richer and more 
nuanced case study. The question of why business properties are taxed more than 
residential properties was not explicitly addressed, for similar reasons. British 
Columbia municipalities tax non-residential properties at much higher rates than 
residential properties, seemingly with relatively little protest.
In recent years, there has been a tendency for municipalities to increase the 
use of user fees and services charges. The revenue derived from user fees has 
enabled municipalities to avoid increases in the property tax that might otherwise 
have taken place. Although a decision to implement user fees is to some extent 
analogous to a decision to allocate the burden of financing municipal services to a
11
particular class or group of citizens, it is not a subject for consideration in this study. 
Factors considered in the course of choosing user fees in place of property taxes to 
finance municipal services are deserving of separate consideration.^
An understanding of the legislative and organizational arrangements 
governing the imposition and collection of municipal property taxes is necessary 
before exploring the issue of property taxation. The following section provides an 
outline of the municipal property taxation system in British Columbia, together with 
comments about the implications for this study.
Property Taxation in British Columbia; Setting the Context 
Property taxation in British Columbia is governed by provincial legislation. A 
number of bodies are financed to some extent by property taxation. These bodies 
include municipalities, regional districts, regional hospital districts, the British 
Columbia Assessment Authority and the Municipal Finance Authority. In addition, 
the provincial government levies property taxes throughout the province to finance 
the school system. The province also levies property taxes on land and 
improvements not included in a municipality, to recover some of the costs of 
providing services. The regional districts, regional hospital districts, the Assessment 
Authority and the Municipal Finance Authority set their own tax rates, using a tax
* For a discussion of user fees and property taxation see C. Richard Tindal, A Citizen’s Guide to 
Government, 2“* edition (Toronto/Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 2000), 189-191.
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rate structure that is established by the provincial government,^ Since this research 
deals only with taxes imposed by municipalities, property taxes imposed for other 
purposes will not be discussed further. This research suggests that municipal tax 
rates are set independently of the tax rates for other bodies. Further discussion of 
property tax rates established for other bodies would not provide any useful 
information that is relevant to the purpose of this study.
British Columbia has established a variable tax rate system that allows 
municipalities to determine not only the level of taxation but also the distribution of 
the burden of taxation among property classes. ’ Municipal councils have sufficient 
autonomy to enable them to establish their own tax rates and policy objectives with 
respect to differential tax treatment of different classes of property (subject to some 
limitations in the case of the utility property class). The determination of tax rates 
and the setting of policy objectives for the distribution of the tax burden may be 
influenced by a number of factors. The purpose of this study is, in part, to identify 
the factors.
Property taxation in British Columbia is based on the actual value of 
property as determined by the British Columbia Assessment Authority pursuant to 
the Assessment Act and related regulations. The British Columbia Assessment 
Authority (established in 1974) has been assigned the responsibility of preparing the 
assessment rolls for all property in the Province. The assessment rolls are prepared
* Strictly speaking, the Regional Districts and Re^onal Hospital Districts set tax rates in Electoral 
Areas. They requisition a sum of money from their member municipalities, who are responsible for
enacting the actual tax rates.
’ Revised Statutes of British Columbia, Local Government Act, c. 323,1996, Parts 10 and 10.1.
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annually, using a variety of assessment techniques to establish the actual value of the 
property. An ^)peal process is available to property owners viio wish to dispute the 
valuation assigned by the Assessment Authority. Properties are assessed at the M l 
actual value, less certain exemptions including a basic $10,000 exemption for 
business and industrial property, $50,000 for farm improvements and a wide variety 
of exemptions for uses such as schools, churches, charitable organizations, etc.* In 
some cases, it is very difficult to establish actual value either because there is no 
market for the property or because property transactions occur infrequently. In such 
cases, the Authority uses rates prescribed by the Assessment Commissioner to 
determine the value of the property. This approach is used in the case of continuous 
structures (pipelines, railway tracts, electrical and telephone lines, and rights-of- 
way), farm land, forest land and major industrial property.^
All property is assigned to one of nine property classes. The classes are:
1. Residential (includes land, improvements, or both used for residential 
purposes, including single-family dwellings, duplexes, multi-family 
residences, condominiums, manufactured homes, etc.);
2. Utilities (includes land, improvements, or both used or held for 
railway transportation, telecommunications, pipelines, and the 
generation and transmission of electricity);
Val Drebet, Val, “Assessment Training,” (paper presented to POLS 260, University ofNorthem 
British Columbia, May 2001X 30.
'Aid., 29.
The system of property classification is established by Province o f British Columbia, B.C. 
Regulation 438/81 deposited November 2,1981, as amended, 
httD://www.QP.gov.bc.ca/statreg/reg/A/Assessment/438 81 .htm (22/01/2003).
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3. Unmanaged Forest Land (land that meets the definition of forest land, 
but is not classed as managed forest land);
4. Major Industry (land, improvements, or both which form part of a 
major industrial plant that was designed and built for purposes such 
as mining, smelting, refining or manufacturing)
5. Light Industry (land, improvements or both which is used for 
extracting, processing, manufacturing or transporting products, but 
which does not qualify for the Major Industry class);
6. Business and Other (any property not included in some other class);
7. Managed Forest Land (forest land that is managed in accordance with 
provincial legislation such as the Forest Practices Code and the 
Forest Act):
8. Recreational Property/Non-Profit Organization (land, improvements 
or both used solely as an outdoor recreation facility for activities such 
as golf, skiing, tennis, waterslides, marinas, etc., and land and 
improvements used as a place of worship or a meeting place for 
fraternal organizations).
Properties with mixed uses may be included in more than one property class.
Each municipality is empowered to set its own tax rates. Tax rates are 
expressed as dollars of taxation per one thousand dollars of assessed value (i.e. 
$3.29 per $1,000). The rates may be different for each class of property. Property 
taxes for individual properties are calculated by determining which property class
15
(or classes) the property is in, and then by multiplying the tax rate for that class or 
classes by the taxable assessed value." If all property classes were taxed at die 
same rate the burden of taxation for each class of property (that is, the proportion of 
total municipal taxation paid by each property class) would be equal to the 
proportion of assessed value in each of the property classes. This allows 
municipalities to shift the burden of taxation between property classes. For 
example, municipalities have the ability to adjust tax rates to offset undesirable 
impacts of changes in market values. They are also able to reflect their own 
community values by increasing or decreasing the proportion of the total tax levy 
paid by a class of property. They cannot, however, use the system to adjust the 
property taxes levied on an individual parcel of property. For the purposes of this 
study, this raises the question of what factors influence the choice of policies 
regarding the incidence of taxation among property classes.
Municipal councils have chosen to set tax rates so that non-residential 
property bears a greater burden of taxation than residential property. This is 
illustrated in Table 1, which shows the percentage of total assessment within the five 
major property classes in the years 1991, 1996 and 2001. The table also shows the 
percentage of the total tax burden imposed on properties in those classes. Municipal 
councils have been moderating the taxation of major industrial properties and utility
" There are exceptions that arise from the use o f legislation that is no longer available to 
municipalities. Seven municipalities use a flat tax, which is a uniform amount of tax per home or 
vacant residential lot, on residential properties only. One municipality (Kitimat) uses a split tax rate 
for residential land in addition to tiie flat tax (a split tax rate involves different tax rates for vacant 
and developed lands), as well as a flat tax. One municipality (Rossland) uses a system of parcel 
taxes. Municipalities using the flat tax are Dawson Creek, Fort St. John, Gold River, Kimberley, and 
Powell River.
16
properties, while shifting the tax burden slightly to business/other and residential 
properties. The implication is that there has been a shift of policy at the municipal 
level with respect to the allocation of the burden of taxation among the property 
classes. These changes in the percentage of assessment in the major property 
classes, and the percentage of the total tax levy paid by each class are illustrated in 
Figures 1 through 5 (below).
Table 1
Comparison of Assessments and Tax Burdens 
In British Columbia Municipalities
Property Class 1991 1996 2001 % Change
1991 - 2001
Residential
% of Total Assessment 78.42 83.14 81.29 +3.7
% of Tax Burden 52.47 55.69 55.62 +6.0
Utilities
% of Total Assessment 0.61 0.44 0.35 -42.6
% ofTax Burden 2.52 2.51 1.86 -26.2
Major Industry
% of Total Assessment 2.62 1.36 1.20 -54.2
% ofTax Burden 9.92 8.14 7.16 -27.8
Light Industry
% of Total Assessment 0.84 0.68 1.00 +19.1
% ofTax Burden 1.99 1.81 2.30 +15.6
Business/Other
% of Total Assessment 16.93 13.86 15.70 -7.3
% ofTax Burden 32.60 31.35 32.56 -0.1
Note: The Managed Forest, Tree Farm, Recreation and Farm Property 
Classes are not included in the above table.
Source: Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Community, Aboriginal 
And Women’s Services, Local Government Statistics.
http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm
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As indicated above, British Columbia is one of the few jurisdictions in 
Canada which allows municipalities to determine how the tax burden is to be shared. 
The following section briefly summarizes the property taxation systems in place in 
other provinces.
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Property Tax Leeklation in Other Provinces
A survey conducted by the International Association of Assessing Officers in 1999 
revealed that, ivhile there are similarities between the various ^ v in c ia l  property tax 
systems, Aere is also remarkable diversity.^
The property tax is utilized in all ten provinces in Canada, and in the
territories.*^ The tax base is set by provincial legislation, and in addition to
including land, buildings and structures, machinery and equipment affixed to the 
land is included in the base in some jurisdictions. Land and improvement values are 
based on the full assessed value, except in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and the 
territories, where either a portion of assessed values or replacement cost is used. 
Municipal tax rates are set by the municipalities, subject to a variety of restrictions.
Differential tax rates may be used in several provinces, with a variety of
restrictions.*'* In the provinces that provide for differential tax rates the provincial 
government establishes the ratios between residential and non-residential tax rates, 
or “fairness ranges.”*^
British Columbia municipalities have a great deal more freedom in the 
establishment of differential tax rates than municipalities in other jurisdictions in 
Canada. Thus, it is important to exercise caution when applying conclusions
Richard R. Almy, “Property Tax Policies and Administrative Practices in Canada and the United 
States: Executive Summary,” Assessment Journal, Vol. 7, Issue 4 (Jul/Aug 2000), 41-58.
Harry M.Kitchen, Property Taxation in Canada, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1992), iii 
" F W , 19-38.
For a detailed discussion of assessment and taxation systems in Canada, see Karin Treff and David 
Perry, Finances o f the Nation 1998, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1998), 6:1 to 6:18.
20
reached with respect to the determination of tax rates in British Columbia to other 
jurisdictions.
Review of Lheratnre
A review of the literature, it is expected, will illuminate three m;^or areas of interest
The first is the characteristics and circumstances of the property tax that influence 
the choice of property taxation policy objectives. The second is procedural and 
organizational factors that influence the decision-making process. The third is the 
political implications of property taxation, as they are dominant factors that will 
influence both the way in which explanatory factors are treated and the decision­
making process. The literature review will be used to gain a better understanding of 
the issues that are considered in the course of setting tax rates, the role played by 
participants in the decision-making process, and the decision-making process itself. 
The literature review will also be used to inform the approach to the case study 
which is to be undertaken as part of this work.
This part includes two sections:
1. a summary and discussion of related literature; and
2. a discussion of the implications of the literature review for the 
proposed study.
This review will discuss both Canadian and American literature. While there 
are differences between municipal government in the two countries, there are also a 
great many similarities. Consideration of the literature fiom both countries expands 
the pool of material that can be examined. Although both the United States of
21
America and Canada have vibrant municipal structures, research on municipal issues 
is limited. For example, about thirty percent of the articles published in Public 
Tfeview over a GAeen-year period were related to ef&ctive local 
government management (an average of 18 per year). About twelve percent of those 
articles (about two per year) dealt with financial analysis and budgeting.*^
This review does not summarize the many papers which analyze the 
economic impact of the property tax, or which identify attributes of the property tax 
(good and bad) and areas of reform. Instead the review limits its focus to issues that 
may be considered in the course of setting tax rates and tax policy objectives and to 
issues about the process and its participants.
Summary and Discussion o f Related Research
This summary is divided into sections dealing with political factors, taxation of 
business, competition, land use, and process, and examines literature in Canada and 
the United States. The tax rate structure in British Columbia, with its relatively 
unfettered fieedom to set local policy for distributing the burden of taxation among 
the property classes, gives British Columbia municipalities considerably more 
freedom in taxation matters than is enjoyed by municipalities in most other 
provinces. British Columbia municipalities are, in this respect, much like 
municipalities in some American jurisdictions which have similar, if not greater.
" Gergory Streib, Bert J. Slotkin and Mark Rivera, “Public Administration Research from a 
Practitioner Perspective,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 61, No. 5 (September/October 2001), 
515-525.
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latitude to set local tax distribution policies. Therefore, American and Canadian 
sources have been dealt with separately, i^ e re  that ^xproach seemed helpful.
Literature relating to British Columbia is separately identified. Comments 
concerning perceived gaps in the literature are offered in a concluding section.
The key themes throughout the literature are fears of the political impact of 
property taxation and use of the property tax by municipalities to compete for new 
investment and new residents. There has been little written about the process of 
setting tax rates, or about the respective roles of elected officials and staff, but a 
review of related literature raises several issues that are relevant to the topic. This 
review begins with a discussion of literature relating to the politics of the property 
tax, and is followed by a discussion of the literature relating to the other themes 
mentioned above.
Political Factors
This section reviews the politics of property taxation. It will be seen that association 
with a highly visible and unpopular tax is a concern to elected officials, and that 
uncertainty about the amount of tax payable from year to year may be responsible 
for at least part of the public’s dislike for the tax. It will also be seen that the 
property tax has been used to cultivate a political base (by shifting the tax away 
fiom existing homeowners) and that municipalities are overwhelmingly concerned 
with avoiding tax increases for fear of political repercussions. Low levels of public 
interest in municipal polifics may, however, be a factor that reduces that concern.
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It is commonly suggested that municipalities keep taxes low, and try to shift 
the burden of taxation to non-residential properties, in order to maintain support of 
the electorate,*’ and that the property tax is not a popular tax,** due to perceived or 
real inequities in assessment, the large single tax bill, and hardship on lower income 
homeowners. As a result, thirty-eight states in the United States have some form of 
tax limitation, eight other states limit assessments, and some require exemptions for 
low-income or elderly homeowners. Policymakers perceive that the public dislikes 
the tax and are hesitant to expand its reach. *^
Reeves has written of the effects of uncertainty about the amount of the 
property tax, indicating that uncertainty may be as much of a political issue as the 
actual amount of the tax. When tax rates are held constant in the face of rapidly 
changing assessed values, property owners will face rapid changes in the amount of 
tax payable. Taxpayer revolts (such as that evidenced by California’s Proposition 
13) have been attributed to the rapid rise of taxes which are accompanied by a 
perception of lack of control over taxes and uncertainty about what will happen 
next.’* Reeves concludes that “[hjistory augurs that leadership should see that there
Donald A.Hicks, “The Property Tax in a New Industrial Era” in The property Tax and Local 
Finance, ed. C. Lowell Harriss, O e^w York: The Academy o f Political Science, 1983), 213.
Kenneth Woodside, “An approach to studying local government autonomy: the Ontario experience,” 
Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer 1990), 211. Harry Kitchen, “Canadian 
Municipalities: Fiscal Trends and Sustainability,” Canadian Tax Journal Vol. 50, No. 1 (2002), 169. 
" Donald J. H. Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in Canada, (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing 
Company, 1986), 93. C. Richard Tindal and Sasan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada, 4* 
ed. (Toronto/Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1995), 217.
David Brunori, “Metropolitan taxation in the 21  ^century,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 53, Issue 3, 
541-551.
“  H. Clyde Reeves, “Leadership for Change” in The Property Tax and Local Finance, ed. C. Lowell 
Harriss, (New York: The Academy o f Political Science, 1983), 3 .
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are no surprises in taxation.” *^ According to Reeves, many local legislators prefer to 
keep tax rates unchanged in times of escalating values, thereby reaping wind611 tax 
revenues. Through lack of understanding, the public often fail to understand that the 
levy could be adjusted by the elected officials, limiting the increase in taxation to 
those owners who had been underpaying.^ Fischel, however, suggests that reaping 
a “windfall” from an increase in assessed values is not as prevalent in smaller 
jurisdictions as it is in larger municipalities.^^
Hicks comments on the role of property tax as a  political tool, pointing out 
that the pattern of incidence of the taxation reveals its use to cultivate a political 
base by shifting the incidence of the tax away fix>m existing homeowners.^^ Fischel 
has proposed that local governments are politically dominated by homeowners 
whose primary motivation is to maximize the value of their homes. They seek to 
have their local governments adopt policies that will stabilize or enhance home 
values, and are concerned about increases in property taxes without improvements in 
services (among other things).^^ Fischel suggests that the combination of service 
and taxation levels is set by elected officials “as i f ’ they had been voted on in a 
plebiscite, to meet the demands of the owner who had the median home value.^
Ibid., 3.
^^Ibid, 6.
^ William A.Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government 
Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
2001), 91.
^JIicks,213.
^ Anthony Downs, “The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government 
Taxation, School Finance and Land-Use Policies,” Journal o f the American Planning Association. 
Vol. 68, No. 4 (Autumn 2002), 456-457.
^Fischel, 87-88.
25
This is influenced, he notes, by the size of the municipality, with smaller 
municipalities being more responsive.^ This implies that the homeowners’ view of 
property taxation is more complex than the view that is implied by Hicks (which 
appears to suggest that homeowners are primarily concerned about the amount of the 
tax or the share of the tax that they pay). Hicks is not alone in seeming to focus on 
the amount of the tax, and the potential adverse reaction of homeowners, as 
evidenced by the following.
Much of the literature relates to the visibility of the property tax and to the 
effects of assessment practices (with particular emphasis on Ontario). Woodside 
observed that “the visibility and non-deductibility of the property tax make changes 
in its rates highly contentious and encourages municipal councillors to avoid 
increases wherever possible.” *^ Slack has noted that “as a consequence of the 
visibility of the property tax...property tax rates have not increased significantly 
over time in Canadian cities. Indeed, in the last few years, many cities have placed a 
freeze on property tax increases so that the rates are not even keeping pace with 
inflation.”^^  Kitchen has also observed the reluctance of municipalities to raise tax 
rates, citing as one of the possible reasons “concern over a possible taxpayers’ 
revolt.”^  He also suggests that municipalities are financially sustainable at the
Ibid.. 90-91.27
“ Woodside, 211.
“  Slack, Enid, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Canadian Municipalities; Current Situation 
and Prospects,” report prepared for the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2002, at 
wvyw.fcm.ca/newfcm/Java/slack.htm.
""Kitchen, 169.
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present time?’ The latter comment implies that there may be less than an urgent 
need for increases in the property tax. However, other data suggest that the situation 
may not be that straightforward. In many municipalities assessments are based on 
market values. When real estate values are increasing (such as in periods of high 
demand) market values increase. If tax rates are left unchanged, the property taxes 
will rise in proportion to the increase in property value. Libin reported that, as a 
result, some municipalities are reaping a windfall.^ Strumpf provides evidence that 
fully informed voters may be led to believe that property taxes are too high and 
unfair where reassessment occurs inftequently. The study also indicated that short 
lags between reassessments increased tax revenues, while longer lags reduced 
revenues.
Bird noted that local and regional taxes levied on business are generally 
higher than can be justified on the basis of arguments about economic efficiency, 
He attributed this to political factors, stating that “it is usually as politically 
attractive as it is economically undesirable to impose taxes on business, both 
because of the common belief that “the rich” pay such taxes and the real possibility 
that non-residents may do so."^ Slack also discusses the fact that taxes on non- 
residential property may be exported to non-residents, and that this reduces
Ami, 169.
Kevin Libin, “Home is where the hit is,” Canadian Business. Vol. 73, Issue 23, 132.
”  Koleman S. Strumpf, “Infiequent Assessments Distort Property Taxes: Theory and Evidence,” 
Journal of Urban Economics, 46 (1999), 169-199.
^ Richard M Bird, “Local Business Taxes,” report prepared for the World Bank Institute, 2002 at
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfinance/documents/fiscalfederalism Russia/Bird tax.pdf. pp. 
5-6.
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efBciency and accountability.^^ Hicks comments on the role of property tax as a 
political tool, and the inevitable tendency to shift the incidence of the property tax 
away 6om homeowners *%>r the political expedience of cultivating a political 
base..."^
Woodside has expressed some scepticism about the responsiveness of 
municipal politics, noting the relatively low turnout at elections, uncontested 
elections, increasingly high cost of elections in larger jurisdictions and the low level 
of voters’ knowledge about municipal politics. In addition, name recognition is 
important in municipal elections, giving high value to incumbency and making it 
easier for incumbents to ignore the concerns of constituents.^’ Woodside’s 
comments suggest that there is at least the possibility that the potential electoral 
consequences of setting tax rates and tax policy objectives may not be as great as 
indicated by others (especially where the tax increase is modest).
Frisken has observed that the property tax “is an instrument of local 
administration that is particularly susceptible to pressures from and changes in the 
economic and social environment” *^ Magnusson points out the recurring presence 
of ‘cutters’ and ‘boosters’ in municipal affairs. The former “cut” spending to relieve
Enid Slack, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Canadian Municipalities”.
^  Hicks, 213.
”  Woodside, 201-202.
^ Frances Frisken, “Local Constraints on Provincial Initiative in a Dynamic Context: The Case of
Property Tax Reform in Ontario,” Canadian Journal o f Political Science, Vol. XXIV (June 1991), 
358.
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the burden on taxpayers while the latter “boost” the economy by offering incentives 
to business and industry and encouraging construction.
Graham, Phillips and Maslove indicate that determining the tax rate is one of 
the more high proGle activities of a municipal council, and that setting the
relationship between tax rates for various classes of property involves “heated 
debates about the overall fairness of the property tax system and its impacts on the 
economic development of the community.”^  They do not, however, explore the 
issue in any detail. In a very thorough review of the property tax, Kitchen simply 
says that municipalities first determine their expenditures, and then determine the 
amount that must be raised from property taxes to balance the budget.'** Slack takes 
the same approach.'*  ^A variety of authors, including Bird and Slack,'*  ^Boadway and 
Kitchen,'*'* Higgins,'*  ^ and Tindal and Tindal,'*  ^ have commented on the reliance of 
municipalities on the property tax.
While property tax is an important source of revenue to municipalities, it is 
not popular. Higgins refers to the property tax as “probably the most unpopular
^ Warren Magnusson, “Introduction: The development o f Canadian urban government,” in City 
Politics in Canada, ed. Warren Magnusson and Andrew Sancton, (Toronto: University o f Toronto 
Press, 1983), 38.
Katherine A. Graham, Susan D. Phillips with Allan M. Maslove, Urban Governance in Canada: 
Representation, Resources, and Restructuring,, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company, Canada, 
1998), 216.
Kitchen, Property Taxation in Canada. 34.
Enid Slack, “Alternative Approaches to Taxing Land and Real Property,” report prepared for the 
World Bank Institute, 2001, at
www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfinance/decentralization/fiscalfederalism Russia.htm.
^ Richard M. Bird, and N. Enid Slack, Urban Public Finance in Canada. 2“* ed., (Toronto: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1993), 79.
^ Boadway, and Kitchen, 343.
^ Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in Canada.
^ Tindal and Tindal, 77-78 and 209.
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form of revenue-raising in the minds of the public” because of its “directness, 
immediacy, inequity, and v is ib ility ....T in d a l and Tindal refer to the property tax
as “the tax we all love to hate.” *^
Vojnovic has suggested that the tax structure should establish a close 
relationship between service benefits and costs. Failure to establish this relationship 
leads to inefficiencies and economic distortions in the urban economy. Establishing 
this relationship also provides information to municipal officials about the standards 
of service desired by residents.'*^
Bird and Slack note that variable tax rates (such as are used in British 
Columbia) can be used to determine the distribution of property tax by property 
classification. This would permit a municipality to allocate the tax on the basis of 
the benefits-received principle of equity. If this was done, business property would 
be taxed at a lower rate, since (according to studies in Ontario) business property 
receives fewer benefits than residential property. In reality, however, the tax rates 
that are applied generally favour residential property.^
Taxation of Business
The situation with respect to taxation of business by municipalities in the United 
States is similar to that in Canada, as most municipalities place a heavy reliance on
^ Higgins. Local and Urban Politics in Canada. 93. 
^Tindal and Tindal, 217.
49 Igor Vojnovic, “Municipal consolidation, regional planning and fiscal accountability: the recent 
experience in two Maritime provinces,” Canadian Journal of Regional Science, vol. 23, no. 1 (spring 
2000), 49 -  72.
“ Birdand Slack, 86.
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non-residaitial property taxes/' Few sources could be located to fully explain this 
situation. Given the importance placed on tax competition, and die privileged 
position of business in democratic policy making, one would expect Aat business 
would receive more favourable tax treatment ^^^iams and Collins suggest that
policy makers and business want to perpetuate policies that will insure continued 
capital accumulation for business and electoral success for politicians. Politicians 
are faced with a tacit threat of disinvestment if their policies are not compatible with 
profitable investment. If disinvestment occurs, they would face political reprisal 
arising from economic stagnation. This is taken to imply that the resulting 
taxation level for non-residential properties is the result of calculating the 
probabilities of adverse political reactions from tax rates that are higher or lower 
than the rates actually selected. There are also attitudes and beliefs about the 
taxation of business that lead to higher taxation of business property. These are 
reviewed in the following paragraphs.
It has been argued that it is fair to charge business and corporations a higher 
rate of taxation, since they are able to pass the tax on to others (such as customers).^^ 
Whether or not this is the case is debatable, and determining the answer is beyond
' Bird, “Local Business Taxes,” 8.
^ John T. Wilson, and Brian K. Collins, “The Political Economy o f Corporate Taxation,” American 
Journal o f Political Science, Vol. 41, Issue 1, (January 1997).
Reeves, 5, and Jack Masson, with Edward C. LeSage Jr., Alberta's Local Governments: Politics 
and Democracy, (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1994), 327.
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the scope of this study. In any case, the perception of the ability of business to pass 
the tax on in a variety of m^rs is a perception with i ^ c h  local ofGcials must deal.^ 
Bird suggests that there is a belief that the areas which are “hosts” to 
economic activity are “entitled” to part of the proceeds of the activity, whether or 
not their services contribute toward its production or i^dKther the oulput is 
consumed within the area. He also comments on the general belief by politicians 
and the public in most countries that taxes on business are the best of all taxes. 
These beliefs are used as a justification for taxation of business. He points out that if 
the political cost of levying taxes on business is low, it may be rational to impose 
such taxes even though the economic cost is high.®^  Bird noted that local and 
regional taxes levied on business are generally higher than can be justified on the 
basis of arguments about economic efficiency. If it is accepted that there is a 
high economic cost resulting from high taxation of business, and if that cost results 
in reduced economic activity, it is presumably detrimental to homeowners. If, as 
asserted by Fischel, homeowners press for policies that maximize property values, 
one would expect moderation in the taxation of business. It may be that the 
detrimental effects are more evident at the national or provincial level, in which case 
decisions by individual municipalities may have only a marginal impact. In that 
case, high taxation of business may be rational. No literature was found that
^ For a discussion of who bears the burden of taxaticm of non-residential property, see Harry 
Kitchen, “Municipal Finance in a New Fiscal Environment,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, No. 
147 (November 2000), 11.
Bird, “Local Business Taxes,” 6 
^Ibid,. 5-6
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discusses this precise point. However, the point is dealt with indirectly by 
Ballentine and Thirsk.
Ballentine and Thirsk showed that 31% of total non-residential municipal tax 
revenue in Ontario came from enterprises which normally sold their output to 
consumers outside the taxing jurisdiction.^’ They also asserted that, if local 
residents are of the belief (albeit mistakenly) that non-residential taxation is borne 
by non-residents, their perception will sway their judgement about the local level of 
expenditure.^* They went on to conclude that the non-residential property tax is 
inefficient (in an economic sense) and that it violates the principle that local taxes 
should rest upon local residents. They suggest that the tax has persisted because it is 
politically attractive to tax non-residents, and that it should be restructured as a 
benefrts tax. ^  They also note that Ae non-residential property tax is likely to be 
borne in part by the workers and landlords of the taxing jurisdiction, and by 
consumers “as if an origin-based sales levy had been imposed.”^
The foregoing suggests that, for a variety of reasons, municipalities tax 
business properties at higher rates than residential properties. In the following 
section it will be seen that competitive forces are thought to lead to either lower 
levels of taxation, or higher levels of service, in an attempt to attract new investment 
to communities.
J. Gregory Ballentine and Wayne R. Thirsk, Taxation without Representation: The Consequences 
o f Taxing Non-residential Property, (Ottawa: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1982), 2. 
9.
''A id , 56.
'"A id, 67.
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Competition
Municipalities are thought by some to compete by using low tax rates as an 
inducement to invest in their community. The following section reviews relevant 
literature on the topic of inter-municipal cooperation. For the purpose of this work, 
the nature of the models of tax competition and the conclusions that can be drawn 
from each are of less importance than the point that economic theory suggests that 
tax competition exists, its existence can (in some cases) be demonstrated, and some 
forms of tax competition are beneficial and may therefore be a factor considered in 
the course of setting tax rates and tax policy objectives.
Municipal Tax Competition in the United States
A substantial literature concerning tax competition by local government has been 
developed in the United States. Its central message is that “independent governments 
engage in wasteful competition for scarce capital through reductions in tax rates and 
public expenditure levels.” *^ Wilson reports that the research was stimulated by 
well-publicized instances of tax competition.*^ There are two broad views of the 
issue. One is that intergovernmental tax competition is wasteful because it tends to 
result in less efficient levels of local services. The other is that competition for 
mobile households is welfare enhancing. In the latter case, it is assumed that the 
government is controlled by landowners who seek to maximize the after-tax value of
John Douglas Wilson, “Theories ofTax Competition,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 52(2) (June 
199,269
^ The following discussion of tax competition is adapted from Wilson, 269 - 304
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their land by arranging for the government to provide public goods to attract 
individuals to reside on the land. Taxes must be kept low enoi%h to induce people
to live in the area, given the level of public services provided. The taxes levied are 
assumed to be efficient, and the tax paid is equal to the marginal cost of providing 
the service. Wasteful tax competition results from a departure from the foregoing 
“idealized” state. Such a departure may result from fiscal externalities (where one 
government’s action adversely affects the budget of another government) or because 
the taxes imposed are inherently inefficient. The general view is that tax 
competition leads to inefficiently low tax rates. In addition to the horizontal tax 
competition described above, there can be vertical competition. Such competition 
exists where governments share the same tax base (i.e. where there is both a 
provincial and municipal property tax, or where there is both federal and provincial 
income tax).
As noted above, a number of authors have addressed these issues, including 
Hoyt, who commented that “concern over the type of strategy governments use may 
have important implications for both the level of government services...and the 
nature of budget determination and adjustment. For example, if governments do 
compete in taxes, we would expect them to respond to budget shortfalls or surpluses 
by adjusting expenditures, not tax rates.”^  Hoyt suggests that policies that limit 
taxes or make it difficult to change taxes are suggestive of tax competition, while 
setting service standards or entitlements is suggestive of service competition. He
“  William H. Hoyt, “Tax Competition, Nash Equilibria, and Residential Mobility,” Journal o f Urban 
Economics, 34 (1993), 360.
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also suggests that while national and state governments may compete in taxes, local
governments are more likely to compete in services, adjusting services to maintain 
standards.
In a study of the Hartford, Connecticut, metropolitan area, Taylor found that 
contrary to expectations based on the literature on market-like incentives for 
efficient local government, the municipalities under spent on highway maintenance 
and repair, and that homeowners would have preferred higher taxes to support those
64services.
Hicks has pointed out that the competition is not simply for industrial 
assessment. He cautions that there is a need “to be especially attentive to the burden 
of taxes on households, since the burden of taxes on workers, more than on business, 
may impede the crucial job-labour matches necessary in the high-technology growth 
sectors. He suggests that the use of the property tax to reflect local preferences 
may no longer be valid in an era where life is lived at greater spacial scales.^
In a study of Ohio school districts. Spry has found that “the dominance of the 
property tax in local tax structures is caused by fiscal competition for mobile 
residents.” ’^ In a study of tax rate increases in Chicago suburban municipalities, 
Chen found that tax competition did not exist ^  Brunori writes that local
^ Lori L. Taylor, “Allocative Inefficiency and Local Government,” Journal o f Urban Economics, 34 
(1995), pp. 201-211.
® Hicks, 216 
AM, 217
John Arthur Spry, “The Political Economy of Local Taxation: The Effects ofTiebout Mobility and 
Referenda on Local Taxes,” (Ph.D. diss.. University of Rochester, 2000), iv.
** Xiao Chen,”Essays on Local Taxation And Urban Development”, (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 
1996).
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government tries to lure taxpayers who will pay more in tax than they consume in 
services, and that they do this either through provision of superior services or by 
setting competitive tax rates (especially in metropolitan areas).^ In his view, 
incentives are offered because local officials think they will work (or are unwilling 
to take the chance that they do not work), and because they desire the immediate 
publicity that arises from securing new development.
The foregoing implies that we may or may not find tax competition between 
municipalities. If tax competition exists, it may take the form of constraints on 
taxation (implying reductions in services in order to sustain or reduce tax rates), or it 
may take the form of improvements in services (accompanied by higher taxation). 
The presence of tax competition may hinder the ability of municipalities to achieve 
their preferred mix of service levels and taxation.
Municipal Tax Competition in Canada
The matter of municipal tax competition has not been given a great deal of attention 
in the political science literature in Canada. Industrial and commercial development 
is highly sought by municipalities. Not only are the effective rates of taxation 
higher on industrial and commercial properties than they are on residential 
properties but, as Woodside has reported, “their low overall demand for municipal 
services also acts as a source of cross-subsidization for residential users.”’® Since 
municipal fiscal strength depends on the tax base, there is ongoing competition
'^Bnmori, 541-551.
™ Woodskk, 205.
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among municipalities to increase their share of commercial and industrial 
assessmait, to achieve the "ideal" of getting 40 per cent o f tax revenue 6om such
sources.’* Brett and Pinkse sought (unsuccessfully) to find evidence of tax 
competition in British Columbia.’  ^ The granting of selective benefits to business 
through assessment abatement was important, according to Woodside, as a means of 
attracting new investment to municipalities in Ontario. This tool was taken away 
from municipalities in Ontario when the province assumed control over assessment 
in 1970.’^
The foregoing implies that tax rate competition may not be found, and that 
municipalities compete for new investment through other means. Of course, it is 
possible that low non-residential tax multiples are, in British Columbia, a substitute 
for the assessment abatements that were important in Ontario.
Land Use
For the purpose of this study, the primary interest is in the possible effect of tax 
increases on development in the community. As a consequence, the large body of 
literature that deals with the possibility of modifying the property tax system to 
make it more suitable as mechanism for providing incentives (or disincentives) for 
particular types or locations of property development has been ignored. The
AW, 205
^ Craig Brett and Joris Pinkse, “The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia,” 
Canadian Journal o f Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3, (August 2000).
^ Woodside, 208.
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obvious general concern is that high taxes discourage development, and this is an 
issue that is referred to in much of the literature discussed in the previous sections.
However, contrary views exist. Zak and Skidmore examined die effect of tax 
increases on the rate of land development. Their results “flatly contradict the 
common assertion that property tax increases “threaten development.” On the 
contrary, increases announced in advance create substantial incentives to build 
before they take effect.”’'*
Process
In this section, the focus is on decision or policy makii^ process literature. It 
reviews literature related to the sequence of decision-making, the types of processes 
used, and the participants. The major areas of interest are the sequence of events, the 
participants and the nature of their interactions, and their role in the process 
(advisor, decision-making, observer, etc.). There has not been a great deal of 
research on these issues (insofar as municipal taxation decisions are concerned), and 
as a result this section includes a few references to European research. Although 
some of the material does not deal specifically with the municipal setting, it is 
possible to draw inferences from the more general literature.
The process of determining tax rates has been discussed by Hicks, who 
asserts that “[t]he size and substance of a local budget are usually determined first.
Jeffrey S. Zak, and Mark Skidmore, “Property Tax Rate Changes and Rates o f Development,' 
Journal o f Urban Economics, 36, (1994) 332.
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and only then is a tax rate calculated that will raise the desired funds.”’  ^ This, he 
says, has led scholars to view the property tax as an independent variable which 
needs to be reformed to achieve greater equity and efficiency. In his view, it should 
be regarded as “a dependent variable whose form, function, and ultimate efficiency 
are the results of other forces at work in our society.”’® Masson and Lessage 
described a similar approach.”  The process has also been discussed by Graham, 
et.al., who take a different approach.’* They indicate that the process often starts 
with the council and/or mayor setting a budget guideline, often explicitly in terms of 
a property tax guideline. Staff prepare a budget that is within the guideline, which is 
the subject of debate and alteration by the elected officials.
Some economic studies have indicated that there is a dynamic 
interrelationship between municipal revenues and expenditures. However, according 
to Dahlberg and Lindstrom there have been very few studies of this issue, possibly 
because of the view that local governments respond passively to changes in 
revenues, and because of the difficulty of such studies. In their study of Swedish 
municipalities, they concluded that most local government spending was determined 
by rational, forward-looking decision makers.’®
Tax competition literature reviewed in previous sections suggests that tax 
legislation is subject to substantial control by legislators and that expenditure
see Hicks 219.
^  AW., 219
^ Masson with LeSage, 326.
^ Graham, Phillips, with Maslove, 222.
^ Matz Dahlberg and Tomas Lindstrôm, “Are Local Governments Governed by Forward Looking 
Decision Makers?” Journal of Urban Economics, 44 (1998), 254-271.
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policies are delegated to the bureaucracy because legislatures cannot deal with the 
numerous specific expenditure decisions that affect the tax base.*®
One of the factors that must be considered is the role of administrators and 
politicians in the decision-making process. Svara has identified two schools of 
thought on this issue. The first involves the separation of policy making and 
administration, and the concentration on “technical-rationality.” The other involves 
the acceptance of the premise that administrators and politicians join together in the 
common pursuit of sound governance. This approach stresses interdependence as 
well as distinct roles within a system of reciprocating values.** This 
interdependence was also noted in research by Hassett and Watson on long-serving 
city managers*^ and by Svara in his exploration of the role of the city council.*^ 
Feldman and Khademian have also examined the respective roles of public 
managers and politicians arguing, contrary to the principal-agent theory, that public 
managers do affect governance structures and that we should think of governance 
structures “as relationship created through the interactions of people in different and 
reciprocal roles that are relatively dynamic.”*^
" WDson, 296-7.
James H. Svara, “The Myth o f the Dichotomy: Complementarity o f Politics and Administration in 
the Past and Future of Public Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 
(March/April 2001), 176-183.
Wendy L. Hassett and Douglas J. Watson, “Longer-Serving City Managers: Practical Application 
of the Adademic Literature,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (September/October,
2002), 622 -  627.
® James H. Svara, “The Roles of the City Council and Implications for the Structure of City 
Government,” National Civic Review, Vol. 91, Issue 1 (Spring 2002), 5 -  24.
^ Martha S. Feldman and Anne M. Khademian, “To Manage is to Govern,” Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (September/October 2002), 541.
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These latter observations suggest that the decision-making system may not, 
in fact, be as straightforward as set out by Hicks at the beginning of this section. 
The literature suggests a more dynamic process in which managers and elected 
officials collaborate in some way.
Higgins has written that the quality of advice given to a municipal council 
will depend on the training and experience of the municipality’s administration, and 
on the lines of communication between administration and council.^^ According to 
Tindal, the nature of the advice may also depend on whether the municipality is 
attempting to follow a “business model.” Where that is the case, the property tax 
may be regarded as the “price” of municipal services, and its determination may be 
seen as a business pricing decision rather than a political decision involving the 
allocation of the burden of financing community services among the members of the 
community.^
In writing about the structure of local decision making, Higgins discussed 
the linkage between policy-making and administration, pointing out that 
conventional wisdom has it that the two should be linked, but that two of the main 
models of local government structure (the council-manager structure and the 
council-commission structure) were designed to minimize the linkage.*’ There are 
two schools of thought on this matter. One approach suggests that by separating 
policy-making from administration, the operation of government can be made more
See Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in Canada\31 -  141.
For a description o f the “business model” approach, see C. Richard Tindal, A Citizen’s Guide to 
Government. 2"® edition (Toronto/Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 2000), 184-185. 
Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in Canada, 123.
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efficient and effective. The other suggests that a close linkage between policy­
making and administration is required. Policy-making, it is argued, is enhanced by 
having a good appreciation of the related administrative issues, while administration 
is enhanced by knowing not only the letter but the spirit of the policies to be 
administered.**
Tindal and Tindal have summarized the municipal policy-making process*^ 
from the perspective of the formal machinery of policy-making as well as the 
broader socio-economic context. He identifies the key players (council, staff, the 
local electorate, local groups, political parties and the mass media) and summarizes 
their roles. He points out the difficulties that are faced by individual councillors and 
by councils as a whole in consistently pursuing policy objectives over a period of 
time, as well as the importance of municipal staff. He notes that senior staff may be 
considered to be too dominant in the process, and that they are key players because 
of their pursuit of their own objectives and priorities and because of the extent of 
their contact with the public. While the electorate ought to be key players, they are 
not, largely because of lack of participation in local elections and because they are 
not able to enforce accountability through the electoral process. They may, 
however, participate through membership in local citizens groups.
In a review of literature on political science and urban governance, Murphy 
pointed out that studies of actual policy-making report a fluid, decentralized and
" A K  123-124.
"  Tindal and Tindal, 281-321.
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political system, where political leadership is important, and where outcomes
depend on the skill with which participants use the resources at their disposal,^
As noted above, the municipal council is required to set the tax rates by
tryktvv, imdfwsanasult can be sai(ltx)lia\MBlbawiiiia(k:tl&e ultimate decisitm. However,
that decision is likely to have been founded on advice from municipal staff. Siegel
describes a three-part policy-making process: policy development, policy adoption,
and policy implementation. The stages are not separate and discrete, and no stage is
the sole preserve any group of actors^*, although it is possible to make general
statements about the roles of the participants. Siegel has written that:
The policy development phase is the most ambiguous phase. Public servants 
probably have the main role in terms of researching available alternatives, 
considering the consequences of each, and refining them into specific 
proposals. However, politicians and interest groups will want to play a 
significant role at this phase. The policy adoption phase is fairly clearly 
dominated by politicians, although interest groups will have some role in 
influencing their actions. The policy implementation phase is dominated by 
the public servants, but wise politicians and interest groups will maintain a 
careful watch on the activities of public servants at this phase.^
Siegel also identifies four ways in which policy development can occur.^^
These include policy initiatives which come directly from members of council, as a
result of initiatives of local citizens’ groups, in response to initiatives from other
orders of government, and by initiatives from public servants. The public servants
have a high degree of involvement in the policy development process, regardless of
^ Russell D.Murphy, “Politics, Political Science, and Urban Governance: A Literature and a 
Legacy. ” Annual Reviews Political Science. 2002.5. 63-85
** David Siegel, “Politics, politicians, and public servants in non-partisan local governments,” 
Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 37, Issue 1 (Spring, 1994), 14-15.
^Ibid, 15
15-16
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the way in which development occurs. However, prime responsibility rests with the 
politicians.^
In providing advice on tax rate policy, municipal staff will of necessity be 
involved in identifying a variety of alternate courses of action for consideration by 
the municipal council. The selection of the courses of action to be analyzed and the 
factors to be considered will be the result of a number of value choices made by 
staff. Many of these choices will (or should) reflect staff’s interpretation of “the 
public interest.” The municipal council will, in turn, take the “public interest” into 
account when making their final determination with respect to their municipality’s 
taxation policy. Kemaghan and Langford have suggested that an appropriate 
process might involve the articulation and reconciliation of relevant values (social, 
political, administrative and personal) and the consideration and reconciliation of the 
interests of those who are not directly involved in the decision-making process. In 
addition, the process should be fair and open and should include an examination of 
the costs and benefits of the possible alternatives.^®
Gould and Baker^ identify three phases of tax policy-making. The process 
begins with design, during which goals and priorities are established and means are 
evaluated in a process that often involves trade-offs among competing principles. 
They note that this phase is generally under-studied, except in developing countries. 
Design is followed by law-making (drafting, debate and enactment of legislation) in
17
95 Kenneth Kemaghan, and John W. Langford, The Responsible Public Servant (Toronto: The 
Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1991), 49-50.
^  Andrew C. Gould and Peter J. Baker, “Democracy and Taxation,” Annual Reviews Political 
& /ewe.2002.5 97-110.
45
a more structured and controlled environment. Finally, implementation occurs. 
They explore the political explanations for taxation, setting out alternate analytical 
structures and research strategies. Although their work is primarily concerned with 
national tax-policy making it does provide a useful re&rence point for analysis of 
tax policy-making at the municipal level.
Tindal and Tindal also review three descriptive theories o f decision-making: 
the rational model, the incremental model, and the penny arcade model.^^ They 
summarize the rational-comprehensive or classical approach to policy making, 
which “accepts that municipal decisions are made by municipal councils, on the 
basis of research and recommendations provided by municipal staff.” *^ They suggest 
that in the real world the process consists largely of attempts to find a plausible 
remedy to a problem. In this regard, they present two alternative views of the real 
world: Lindblom’s incremental model^ and Yates’ penny arcade model.’®® In 
describing the incremental model, the write that “Charles Lindblom argues that our 
problem-solving capacity is too limited to encompass all of the options and potential 
outcomes which might arise, that there is usually insufficient information to assess 
accurately all options, and that comprehensive analysis is both too time-consuming 
and too expensive.”’®’ They go on to say that Lindblom’s view is “that decisicm 
makers recognize the realities and limitations of their world. As a result, they look
^  Tindal and Tindal, 292-301.
^  Ibid., 294.
^  Tindal and Tindal, p. 296, citing Charles E. Lindblom, The Intelligence o f Democracy, New York, 
The Free Press, 1965, pp. 138-143.
Tindal and Tindal, p. 299, citing Douglas Yates, The Ungovernable City, Cambridge, M.I.T. 
Press, 1977.
‘“‘ Tindal and Tindal, p. 296.
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for simpler approaches to problem solving. Rather than attempting to identify every 
possible course of action, they consider those few alternatives which represent only 
small or incremental changes from existing policies.”*®^
The penny arcade model is offered as a contrast to the rational model. It 
“uses a metaphor based on three familiar games found in most penny arcades.”*®^ 
This model involves three aspects. The first is analogous to a shooting gallery, 
where there are far more targets than can be hit, and they keep popping up in 
different places. In this situation, there is a need to react quickly and “the player is 
likely to rely on reflexes more than any considered plan of action.” ®^'* Secondly, the 
“policy maker does not know what kind of problem he will be dealing with from one 
moment to the next, or which of his available policy responses or procedures is 
likely to be relevant or useful.”**^  ^ Finally, a policy decision “may be knocked off 
course by both predictable and unforeseen obstacles” similar to the progress of a ball 
in a pinball machine. Tindal and Tindal also note that municipal issues often do 
not require analytical solutions as much as “subjective assessments and political 
bargaining.” ®^^ This last point is illustrative of the diversity of municipal 
government, and of the diverse approaches to decision-making. The processes 
involved in choosing the location for new sidewalks is, for example, likely to be
Ibid., 297 
297 
Ibid., 299 
299
^^Ibid, 300 
301
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quite different than the process used to choose between constructing an anaerobic or 
an aerobic sewage treatment plant
It appears that there has been little research into the issue of public 
participation in the municipal tax policy development process. A paper by Lando on 
public participation in local government provides some general observations about 
how public participation can be implemented, but does not deal directly with 
taxation decisions.^®* An article by Denhardt and Denhardt on the new public 
service identifies a need (in their view) to provide for deliberation and participation 
in the development of public policy and services,*®  ^ Again, while not specific to 
local government taxation, some general observations about the public process are 
of interest.
Tindal and Higgins discuss public input into the decision making process. A 
variety of ratepayers and residents groups exist, having as their purpose the 
protection of the interests of the property owners. While these groups may not have 
a direct or formal role in the tax rate decision-making process, they do have the 
ability to “catch the ear” of appointed and elected officials, although the influence of 
these groups tends to rise and fall.^ *® Older style ratepayers’ groups had, as their 
main interests, municipal budgets and property taxes. These types of groups have 
been supplanted to a degree by neighbourhood groups whose main concerns are land
*** Tom Lando, “Public Participation in Local Government: Points of View,” National Civic Review, 
Vol. 88, No. 2 (Summer, 1999), 109 -  122.
Robert B. Denhardt. and Janet V. Denhardt, “The New Public Service: Putting Democracy First,” 
National Divio Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Winter, 2001), 391-400.
"“Tindaland Tindal, 270.
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use planning and social issues.” * Phillips and Graham argue that “citizen 
engagement between elections has become one of the underpinnings of our 
democratic life...” and encourages “a process whereby citizens, politicians and 
public servants educate each other and engage in constructive and purpose Ail 
dialogue.””  ^Black explored the role of local newspapers in civic affairs, including a 
case study of three Ontario municipalities which indicated that local newspapers 
influenced what was discussed by decision makers. He found that “the exercise of 
this function depended critically on the community’s established cleavage lines and 
on the relationship each newspaper had to other institutional actors in the local 
political system.”**^  Tindal suggests that in general the media give poor coverage to 
local issues. In the case of tax increases, the prominent and generally negative 
attention given by the media leads councils to “focus almost entirely on mill rate 
considerations and ignore the basic priority setting exercise which should be 
undertaken. Once again, the result is to reduce what should be a very fundamental 
political and policy making process into an administrative exercise, preoccupied 
with juggling and cutting expenditure figures until the resulting mill rate increases 
stay below some predetermined acceptable level.”**"*
Vojnovic suggests (in relation to newly amalgamated municipalities) that the 
tax setting process should include the design of a tax structure that reflects the
Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in Canada, 277.I l l
Susan D. Phillips and Katherine A. Graham, “Conclusion: From Public Participation to Citizen 
Engagement,” in Citizen Engagement: Lessons in Participation from Local Government, ed. 
Katherine A. Graham and Susan D. Phillips (Toronto; The Institute of Public Administration of 
Canada, 1998), 240.
Edwin R. Black, Politics and the News (Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1982), p. 250.
Tindal and Tindal, 290.
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differing costs of providing differing standards of service within a single jurisdiction 
and to associated equity issues."^
Analysis of the decision-making process can also be undertaken from the 
perspective of community power, to determine who has influence in the process. 
This can involve the perspectives of the elite, pluralist, growth machine and regime 
theories.” ®
British Columbia Research
Very little has been written on property taxation in British Columbia. In the early 
1990's, Penny Bruin, (then Treasurer of the City of Vancouver) wrote about the 
need for, and use of, averaging or phasing of land values for the property tax, in the 
face of significant variations in the rate of change in assessed values within 
municipalities such as the City of Vancouver.”  ^ The article provides background 
information on the changes in assessed values in the City of Vancouver which led to 
a need to moderate changes in assessed value (and taxation) from year to year in 
order to maintain stability and certainty in the tax base, yet it is specific to 
Vancouver. Brett and Pinkse have written two articles related to property taxation in 
British Columbia.” * One dealt with spatial independence of tax rates and the other 
with evidence of tax competition. Bish and Clemens devote a chapter of Local
Vojnovic, 49 -  72.
For a discussion of these theories, see Graham and Phillips with Maslove, 23 -  27.
Penny Bruin, “Property Taxation in British Columbia and the City o f Vancouver: Averaging and 
Phasing Options for Land Valuation,” Government Finance Review, April, 1993, 7 - 10
Craig Brett mid Joris Pinkse, “Those Taxes are all over the map: a test far spatial independence of 
municipal tax rates in British Columbia,” International Regional Science Review, 20, 131-151 and 
“The determinants o f municipal tax rates in British Columbia.”
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GovgrwwfM AifMA Co/fWfM to a general description of the property tax system 
in BritWi Columbia. In that wodc, they note that studies in the City of Vancouver
found that in 1995 property taxes on business were set sufficiently high to subsidize 
half of the cost of servicing residential properties."^
Gaps in the Literature
As indicated earlier, the body of literature dealing with municipal property taxation 
is not large. There do not appear to be any published studies that directly address 
the basis for the choice of tax rates and the role of participants in the process. For 
example, there does not appear to be any exploration of issues relating to 
information or policy transfer among local governments with respect to taxation 
practices or policies."” As a result, there is little information on the degree to which 
information is actually shared. Thus, we do not know if municipal councils arrive at 
their choice of actions based only on local experience, or whether they incorporate 
the experience of other jurisdictions in their decision-making.
While there are many studies that analyze the property tax from various 
points of view, there do not appear to be any studies that verify which factors are 
actually taken into account in the process of deciding on tax rates. Many studies 
indicate what should be considered, and others try to determine what the municipal
Robert L. Bish and Eric G. Clemens, Local Government in British Columbia, 3"* ed., (Richmond: 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1999), 155.
For a discussion o f policy transfer among local governments see Harold Wolman and Ed Page, 
“Policy Transfer among Local Governments: An Infonnation-Theory Approach,” Governance: An 
International Journal o f Policy, Administration, and Institutions, Vol. 15, No. 4 (October 2002), 477 
-501
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strategy was by econometric analysis of outcomes. None appear to address the 
question of what is actually considered by councils and staff in the course of their 
deliberations. Do councils and staff take their competitive position into account? 
Do they consider the economic impact of their tax policy choices? Are political 
factors the overwhelming determinants or variables that they are often made out to 
be? Is the objective to maintain stability in tax rates, or the amount of tax paid by 
the typical homeowner, or in the apportionment of taxes among property classes? 
None of these questions is directly answered in the literature.
Similarly, there do not appear to be any studies that examine the decision­
making process. Many scholars seem to be of the view that the budget is set, and 
that the tax rate is simply derived from the municipality’s revenue needs. In recent 
years, scholars seem to be coming to recognize that some type of ‘dynamic’ process 
may be taking place, and that the roles of elected officials and staff may be less well 
defined than previously thought.
Thus, while the literature discusses various aspects of the “ingredients” of 
municipal property tax policy objectives, there is little discussion of the “recipes” 
and preparation methods that are actually used.
Implications of the Literature Review
As noted above, there are substantial gaps in the literature, particularly with respect 
to factors that are considered in the decision-making process, and the process itself. 
The literature, however, does provide some information that can be used in several
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ways to inform the research that is to be undertaken as part of this thesis. Firstly, it 
identlGes a range of issues which might be taken into account by municipal councils 
and their staff in the setting of tax rates. These include the high visibility and 
unpopularity of the property tax, the effects of uncertainty about the amount of tax 
payable from year to year, the possibility of cultivating a political base by shifting 
the tax away from existing homeowners, and concerns about political repercussions 
from tax increases. Municipal councils and their staff may also take into account 
possible benefits to be gained from heavy reliance on taxation of non-residential 
property. They may also consider the use of low tax rates as a means of competing 
for mobile businesses or residents, and the possible effects of tax increases on 
development in the community.
Secondly, the review of the literature provides alternative views of how the 
decision-making process might be structured, and the sequence of events. It 
suggests that the size and substance of a local budget is determined first, followed 
by calculation of the tax rate to raise the desired funds.*^* Alternatively, the process 
may begin with the council and/or mayor setting a budget guideline, often explicitly 
in terms of a property tax guideline. In that case, the budget is developed to keep 
within the established guideline. The process may be one which involves the 
separation of policy making and administration, or one in which administrators and
see Hicks, 219 and Masson with LeSage, 326 
Graham, Phillips, with Maslove, 222
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politicians join together in the common pursuit of sound governance/^ The 
process will be a three part process, involving policy development, policy adoption 
and policy implementation,* '^* and it may be characterized according to a rational- 
comprehensive or incremental model. *^^
As indicated in the preceding section dealing with gaps in the literature, there 
do not appear to be any studies that verify which factors are actually taken into 
account in the process of deciding on tax rates, nor are there studies that examine the 
decision-making process used to establish tax rates. The literature is suggestive of 
many issues that might be considered in the course of setting tax rates, and of 
processes that might be used to set tax rates but it does not provide conclusive 
evidence of which issues and processes are actually considered.
Svara, “The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity of Politics and Administratif in the Past 
and Future of Public Administration,” 176-183 
Siegel, 14-15 and Gould and Baker, 87-110 
Tindal and Tindal, 292-301
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Chapter Two
Methodology
This chapter restates the problem that is the subject of analysis and investigation. It 
describes the study design and variables, the data gathering instruments and 
procedures, and the approach to analyzing the data. Approval under the University’s 
research regulations is noted. The purpose is to test the hypothesis that was set out 
in Chapter One. The study design was derived from Yin.* A multiple-case design 
was used, with three municipalities being selected with the expectation that they will 
produce similar results. The rationale underlying the selection of the three 
municipalities is stated, along with the procedures for gathering data. These 
procedures involved telephone interviews with selected officials at the three 
municipalities.
Problem for Analysis and Investigation
The purpose of this research is to test the hypothesis that the choice of tax rates is 
based primarily on short-term political considerations with local elected officials 
playing the dominant role in the ultimate decision-making process with municipal 
staff engaged in providing technical assistance. Many questions could be asked 
about municipal property taxation, including who pays the tax and what the 
revenues are used for, among others. The purpose of this research is to seek to 
answer the general question: What is the basis for the setting of municipal tax rates.
‘ Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research: Desigyi and Methods, 2“^  Edition, (Thousand Oaks, Ca.; Sage 
Publications, 1994).
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and who makes the decision? Much has been written about the political and 
economic aspects to be considered in the course of determining tax rates. 
Unfortunately, there has been little research into what actually occurs “in the field” 
wdiere decision on tax rates and tax policy objectives are made. It might be asked 
whether elected and appointed olBBcials are aware of, and actually consider, the 
issues that theory suggests are considered in the course of deciding on tax rates.
In order to test this hypothesis it was necessary to determine what factors 
drive the decision making process used in setting municipal tax rates, including 
identifying the following:
1. the issues that are considered in the course of setting tax rates;
2. the role played by participants in the decision-making process 
(primarily elected members of council, staff, and the public);
3. the decision-making process used by the participants; and
4. factors related to procedure, organizational structure or location that 
have an influence on the issues considered in setting tax rates.
The following section describes the design of the study.
Study Design
Yin suggests that there are five important components of a research design. His 
outline of the approach to designing, executing and analyzing a case study will be 
adopted for this work. The five important components identified by Yin are:
1. a study’s questions,
2. its propositions, if  any.
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3. its unit(s) of analysis,
4. the logic linking the data to the propositions, and
5. the criteria for interpreting the findings^
In this instance, the general question is: What is the basis for the setting of 
municipal tax rates, and who makes the decision? The proposition as stated in the 
hypothesis is that the choice o f tax rates is based primarily on short-term political 
considerations with local elected officials playing the dominant role in the ultimate 
decision-making process with municipal staff engaged in providing technical 
assistance. The unit of analysis is the process of establishing the 2002 municipal tax 
rates.
A review of literature identified possible theories to illustrate the basis for 
the choice of tax rates, along with theories about the respective roles of local elected 
officials and municipal staff. Analytical generalization was used to compare the 
identified theory with the empirical results and to generalize the results to a broader 
theory (if possible).^ A case study protocol dealt with the issue of documentation. A 
multiple-case design was used, with three municipalities being selected with the 
expectation that they will produce similar results. The process used to select the 
three municipalities for the case study is discussed in the following paragraphs.
'/W .,2 0
 ^For a discussion of analytical generalization, see Yin, 31-32
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Study Variables
This section describes the reasoning behind the selection of the three municipalities 
for the case studies. In considering the municipalities to be selected, a decision was 
made to avoid selecting municipalities that are part of a metropolitan area. We have 
seen in the literature review that there is an expectation that municipalities in 
metropolitan areas to compete to attract residents, business and industry, and that 
this competition may involve keeping selected tax rates low and/or enhancing 
certain types of service. In addition, municipalities in metropolitan areas in British 
Columbia are participants in a number of regional service arrangements which may 
have an impact on their tax structure. This creates a complex environment, and the 
required analysis is beyond that which can be undertaken in this research project. In 
addition, one of the objectives of this research is to give some attention to resource 
and rural communities, which have been largely overlooked in the property taxation 
literature.
Consequently, the decision was taken not to include municipalities located in 
or very close to the lower mainland of British Columbia, southern Vancouver Island, 
and the Okanagan. These three areas include all of British Columbia’s larger 
municipalities (i.e. those with a population of 50,000) except Prince George and 
Kamloops. Since Prince George and Kamloops are much larger than any of the 
other municipalities outside the three excluded areas, it was decided to exclude them 
as candidates for the case study.
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It was also decided to concentrate on municipalities that had a reasonable 
possibility of having professional administration in the form of a chief 
administrative officer and a trained financial officer. It was felt that this condition 
would be best assured by excluding municipalities having a population of less than 
5,000 (in 1992) from the study. These exclusions leave twenty-one municipalities to 
be considered. Provincial population, assessment and taxation data for these twenty- 
one municipalities was assembled, and the data was analyzed to identify:
1. growth rates;
2. the percentage of assessment derived from residential properties;
3. the percentage of taxation derived from residential properties.
Table 2 lists the municipalities considered as possible subjects for the case 
studies, and shows their population for the year 1992,1997 and 2002. The data also 
shows the percentage growth from 1992 to 2002. The municipalities were classed as 
having high, medium or low growth.'* The classification is arbitrary, and was done 
solely to facilitate comparison. It will be noted that none of the municipalities had 
any significant growth from 1997 to 2002, which is no doubt a reflection on the 
economic situation of the non-metropolitan portions of British Columbia during that 
period.
* Growth was classified as ‘high’ if the percentage change from 1992 to 2002 exceeded 22%. It was 
classified as ‘low’ if  it was less than 10%. All other were classified as “medium”
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Table 2
Summary of Municipalities by Population
1992 1997 2002
%
Change
1992-
2002
Growth
Category
Campbell River 25,687 30,701 31,437 22.4% high
Castlegar 6,626 7,307 7,427 12.1% medium
Cranbrook 16,727 19,227 19,907 19.0% medium
Dawson Greek 10,890 11,594 11,789 8.3% low
Fort St. John 13,876 15,847 17,129 23.4% high
Kimberley 6,505 6,934 7,057 8.5% low
Kitimat 11,307 11,636 11,538 2.0% low
Mackenzie 5,604 6,264 6,177 10.2% medium
Merritt 6,234 7,979 8,069 29.4% high
Nelson 9,051 9,906 9,853 8.9% low
Port Albemi 18,169 19,664 19.531 7.5% low
Powell River 12,970 13,883 13,873 7.0% low
Prince Rupert 16,715 17,452 16,924 1.3% low
Quesnel 7.853 9,031 10,920 39.1% high
Revelstoke 7,760 8,356 8,220 5.9% low
Salmon Arm 12,554 15,651 16,435 30.9% high
Sechelt 6.408 8,007 8,641 34.8% high
Smithers 5,108 5,944 6,145 20.3% medium
Terrace 11,589 13,608 13,875 19.7% medium
Trail 7,925 7.789 7,515 -6.2% low
Williams Lake 10,422 11,124 12.124 16.3% medium
Average 10,951 12,281 12,599 15.0%
Source: Table 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes and Class Proportions of Taxes 
and Assessments, of the “Municipal Statistics” published by the Ministry responsible for municq>al 
afl&irs, and available on the Ministry o f Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services’ website, and 
accessed at http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm (01/24/03). Population 
data is printed in those statistics, based on data from BC STATS.
The assessment data was then analyzed to determine what percentage of the 
assessment is within the residential class. The lower the percentage of total 
assessment that is classified as residential, the greater the percentage that is 
classified as non-residential (which is predominantly made up of the major industry 
and business/other property classes). The municipalities were classified as having a
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low, medium or high levels of residential assessment.^ This analysis is shown in 
Table 3. The data show that the percentage of assessment in the residential property 
class has been rising. This does not necessarily mean that the communities are 
being "de-indusliialized" (althou^ that may be the case). It is possible that the 
increase in the market value of residential property is greater than the increase in the 
market value of non-residential property. Such a situation could arise, for instance, 
where major industries are not renewing their physical plant, or where industries 
have changed and now require less in the way of land and buildings.
The percentage of the municipal tax levy derived from the residential 
property class was also calculated. This is shown in Table 4. The lower the 
percentage of taxation derived from the residential class, the higher the percentage 
derived from the non-residential classes. The municipalities were classified as 
having a high, medium or low percentage of taxation derived from the residential 
property class.^
* The percentage of assessment from the residential class was classified as “high” if  it was more than 
70%. It was classified as “low” if it was less than 50%. All other results were classified as
“medium.”
® The percentage of municipal tax revenue from the residential property class was classified as “high” 
if it was greater than 45%. It was classified as “low” if it was less than 25%. All other results were 
classified as “medium.”
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Tables
Percentage of Assessment 
In the Residential Property Class
1992 1997 2002
%
Change
1992-
2002
Assessment
Category
Campbell River 69.5% 77.5% 74.1% 6.5% medium
Castlegar 66.8% 65.1% 65.2% -2.4% medium
Cranbrook 76.1% 80.7% 78.3% 2.9% high
Dawson Creek 68.3% 77.8% 75.3% 10.2% medium
Fort St. John 75.0% 79.4% 75.7% 0.9% high
Kimberley 72.2% 83.5% 80.5% 11.5% high
Kitimat 37.9% 56.6% 57.3% 51.3% low
Mackenzie 40.1% 53.6% 51.1% 27.3% low
Merritt 72.5% 78.5% 75.3% 3.9% high
Nelson 79.0% 81.3% 80.4% 1.6% high
Port Albemi 64.7% 77.7% 75.7% 17.0% medium
Powell River 64.6% 79.6% 73.2% 13.2% medium
Prince Rupert 45.2% 64.1% 62.7% 38.7% low
Quesnel 36.4% 53.1% 55.0% 51.2% low
Revelstoke 73.3% 79.3% 76.1% 3.8% high
Salmon Arm 77.9% 83.0% 80.0% 2.7% high
Sechelt 68.8% 90.1% 89.3% 0.6% high
Smithers 63.0% 72.2% 68.2% 8.2% medium
Terrace 69.3% 77.1% 75.3% 8.6% medium
Trail 33.8% 50.0% 52.1% 54.3% low
Williams Lake 58.4% 66.6% 65.9% 12.9% medium
Average 63.5% 72.7% 70.8% 11.5%
Source: Table 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes and Class Proportions of Taxes 
and Assessments, of the “Municipal Statistics” published by the Ministry responsible for municipal 
affeirs, and available on the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services’ website, and 
accessed at http://www.mcaws.g0v.bc.ca/l2d/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm fO 1/24/031. Population 
data is printed in those statistics, based on data from BC STATS.
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Table 4
Percentage of Municipal Taxation 
Derived from the Residential Property Class
1992 1997 2002
%
Change
1992-
2002
Taxation
Category
Campbell River 32.8% 39.2% 40.4% 23.1% medium
Castlegar 29.8% 26.0% 26.7% -10.3% medium
Cranbrook 48.0% 55.3% 59.5% 24.0% high
Dawson Creek* 46.6% 55.5% 51.2% 9.8% high
Fort St. John* 45.5% 46.9% 45.1% -0.8% high
Kimberley* 36.9% 40.2% 63.5% 72.1% medium
Kitimat* 15.1% 13.8% 9.6% -36.4% low
Mackenzie 22.9% 24.4% 24.5% 7.1% low
Merritt 47.4% 60.6% 46.2% -2.5% high
Nelson 63.7% 66.7% 66.6% 4.6% high
Port Albemi 29.0% 34.0% 37.6% 29.8% medium
Powell River* 28.0% 30.7% 35.8% 27.9% medium
Prince Rupert 21.6% 31.5% 31.0% 43.7% low
Quesnel 13.6% 13.7% 16.1% 18.2% low
Revelstoke 45.9% 49.1% 47.7% 3.8% high
Salmon Arm 60.3% 66.5% 64.0% 6.1% high
Sechelt 73.4% 76.1% 78.2% 6.6% high
Smithers 32.4% 34.1% 34.3% 5.7% medium
Terrace 42.1% 43.2% 45.0% 7.0% medium
Trail* 20.0% 22.5% 30.8% 54.0% low
Williams Lake 41.3% 37.5% 37.9% -8.3% high
Average 37.9% 40.8% 42.5% 12.0%
Source: Table 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes and Class Proportions of Taxes
and Assessments, o f the “Municipal Statistics” published by the Ministry responsible for municipal 
affairs, and available on the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services’ website, and 
accessed at http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.cayigd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm (01/24/03). Population 
data is printed in those statistics, based on data from BC STATS.
* These municipalities use a flat tax.
Finally, the classifications shown in Tables 2, 3 and 4 are summarized in 
Table 5. The geographic location of each municipality is also shown in Table 5. 
This analysis was undertaken to identify any “outliers” among the twenty-one 
selected municipalities. While there is a wide variation in growth rates, there is
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nothing that suggests that any municipality should not be considered because of 
growth considerations. Smne municipalities have relatively low levels o f 
assessment in the residential class, such as Kitimat, Mackenzie, Prince Rupert, 
Quesnel, and Trail. These are the municipalities with mqor industries, such as 
smelting and refining of metals and pulp and paper. These municipalities also 
derive a relatively low percentage of their municipal tax revenue from residential 
properties. On average, the percentage of assessment in the residential property 
class increased at about the same rate as the average percentage of taxation derived 
from the residential property tax. However, the average conceals a wide diversity of 
apparent changes in taxation policy. For example, while residential assessments 
increased as a percentage of total assessment by 51%, the percentage of the property 
tax revenue derived from residential properties declined by 36%. A similar, but less 
dramatic change is to be found in Williams Lake. In Kimberly, the opposite 
occurred. The percentage of assessment in the residential class increased by 11%, 
but the percentage of property tax derived from the residential class increased by 
72%, indicating a significant change in the way in which taxes are levied in that 
community. One might speculate that the change is linked to the closure of the 
mines.
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Table 5
Summary of Municipalities by Characteristics
Growth Assessment Taxation Location
Category Category Category
Van.
Campbell River high medium medium Island
Castlegar medium medium medium Southeast
Cranbrook medium high high Southeast
Dawson Creek* low medium high North
Fort St. John* high high high North
Kimberley* low high medium Southeast
Kitimat* low low low North
Mackenzie medium low low North
Merritt high high high Central
Nelson low high high Southeast
Van.
Port Albemi low medium medium Island
Powell River* low medium medium Coastal
Prince Rupert low low low North
Quesnel high low low North
Revelstoke low high high Central
Salmon Arm high high high Central
Sechelt high high high Coastal
Smithers medium medium medium North
Terrace medium medium medium North
Trail* low low low Southeast
Williams Lake medium medium high North
* These municipalities use a flat tax.
Since there are sufficient potential case subjects in northern British 
Columbia, it was decided that the cases should be limited to northern municipalities. 
Limiting the case studies to northern municipalities would simplify the analysis 
since all the subjects would be subject to similar economic forces. In addition, it 
was decided not to include any of the municipalities that use the flat tax option. The 
use of the flat tax may introduce another set of variables which may be difficult to 
account for. As a result, the municipalities shown in Table 6 were considered 
eligible to be selected as a subject for the case studies.
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Table 6
Municipalities Considered 6)r Case Study
Growth Assessment Taxation
Category Category Category
Mackenzie Medium Low Low
Prince Rupert Low Low Low
Quesnel H i^ Low Low
Smithers Medium Medium Medium
Terrace Medium Medium Medium
Data for these five municipalities was reviewed for indications of any 
unusual circumstances that could make the municipality unsuitable for study. None 
were found. A review of population indicated that population trends for the five 
selected municipalities were similar to that of the average of the twenty-one 
municipalities originally considered. Figure 6^  shows that of the five. Prince Rupert 
has a slowly declining population while the population of the other municipalities 
has increased slowly, in line with the increase in the average population for the 
twenty-one municipalities. The increase in the population of Quesnel in 1999 is 
attributable to a boundary expansion.
Source of data for all figures in this chapter is Table 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes 
and Class Proportions of Taxes and Assessments, of the “Municipal Statistics” published by the 
Ministry responsible for municipal afifeirs, and available on the Ministry of Community, Aboriginal 
and Women’s Services’ website, and accessed at
http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm (01/24/03). Population data is printed 
in those statistics, based on data firom BC STATS.
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Average assessed values in northern municipalities increased more slowly 
than in southern municipalities in the years 1992 to 1998 (see Figure 7). 
Assessments have been relatively stagnant since then (with a slight and steady 
decline in the case of northern municipalities). Figure 8 compares the trend in total 
assessment for the five selected municipalities to the average for northern 
municipalities. The municipalities follow similar patterns in recent years, although 
Prince Rupert and Terrace have experienced a faster decline in total assessed value 
than have the other municipalities in the group.
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The tax distribution practices of the five municipalities were examined. The 
distribution practices of the five municipalities were found to be relatively stable 
over the past ten years. In selecting the three communities to be included in the case 
study, primary consideration was given to the relative size of the non-residential 
sector. Smithers and Terrace are similar in that their non-residential sector is 
relatively small. Mackenzie’s non-residential sector is relatively large, and Prince 
Rupert and Quesnel fall between the two extremes. It was concluded that it would 
be desirable to have variety in the size of the non-residential sector, and that the 
municipalities selected should include one municipality with a relatively small non- 
residential sector, one with a relatively large sector, and one where the non- 
residential sector falls between the two extremes. This was thought that this would 
avoid skewing the study by concentration on one extreme or the other. Ease of 
access and the possibility of face-to-face interviews were secondary considerations. 
After considering the foregoing, the following were selected for the case study:
1. Smithers.
2. Mackenzie.
3. Quesnel.
Prince Rupert and/or Terrace were considered as substitutes (in that order) in the 
event that one of the selected municipalities declined the opportunity to participate.
Before the study began, a plan for the collection and analysis of data was 
prepared. The basic data gathering instrument was the telephone interview. The 
procedures and questions involved in the interview process are described below.
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Data Gathering ImMtrumenta and Procedures
This section reviews the data gathering instruments and procedures, including 
discussion of the hallowing:
1. procedures (including determination of individuals to be interviewed, 
arranging for agreement to participate, scheduling of telephone 
interviews, obtaining relevant documents);
2. questions.*
Procedures
The first step in undertaking the case study was to identify the individuals to be 
interviewed. The individuals selected were the Mayor and the Chair of the 
municipal council’s Finance Committee (where there is such a committee), as well 
as the Chief Administrative Officer and the official responsible for financial 
administration (usually referred to as the Treasurer or Director of Finance).
A letter was sent to the Mayor of each of the selected municipalities 
requesting their agreement to participate (with a copy to the Chief Administrative 
Officer). Appointments for the telephone interviews were made in advance and the 
Municipal Clerk was asked to provide copies of reports to Council and/or its 
committees that dealt with setting the 2002 tax rates.
* For a discussion ofhow to conduct a case study, see Yin, 54 -  77.
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A record of the interviews (in the form of transcribed notes) was kept for 
subsequent analysis and for the documentation of the results of the case study. The 
record will not be published as such. Documents obtained during the course o f the 
study will be listed in an annotated bibliogrq)hy.
This research involved elected and appointed officials who were asked about 
matters that directly relate to their positions. They were not asked to appraise or 
evaluate their work or the work of others (other than to comment on the respective 
roles in the decision-making process). However, it is recognized that they may have 
been concerned about the accuracy of any comments that may be attributed to them. 
Therefore, an undertaking was given to provide an opportunity for participants to 
review any remarks or information directly attributed to them.
gwadoMs
This section outlines the general direction of the questions put to the interviewees.^ 
Questions were intended to be as open-ended as possible to elicit facts as well as the 
respondent’s opinion about the process used to determine tax rates, and the specific 
tax rate decisions, and any special insights that they may about the those matters. 
The following questions were used as a “check list” of issues that should be raised 
during the course of the interviews.
The questions have been grouped into five broad themes:
1. The process of deciding on tax rates and setting taxation goals;
The following comments about interviews are based on Yin,.84-86.
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2. Political considerations;
3. Economic considerations (including competition, building a tax base, 
economic efficiency, equity);
4. Input fiom business, industry, die media and the public;
5. The respective roles o f the elected officials and staff.
The following paragraphs elaborate on the five themes.
Process
This area of questioning is intended to elicit information about the sequence of 
events in the decision-making process, and about the types of information that is 
provided to the decision-makers. This includes ascertaining the extent to which 
various types of background information is available to the decision-makers and the 
use that is made of that information.
The following line of questioning was contemplated:
1. Can you describe, in very general terms, the process that you use to set tax 
rates?
2, Which statement best describes the overall nature of the process:
a. The budget is established, and the total tax levy is determined by the 
amount of revenue needed to balance the budget; or
b. The amount of the permissible increase in taxes is determined, and 
the budget is prepared on that basis; or
c. Some other process.
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3. During the process, is a linkage made between the cost of the service and the 
level of taxation? If so:
a. Is there a formal calculation of the cost of the service and the amount 
of taxes that would be required to pay for the service?
b. Is that calculation done by property class, or for the municipality as a 
whole?
4. During the process, is a linkage made between benefits received and the 
level of taxation?
5. Are data concerning changes in assessment compiled? Does the data:
a. Show changes in market value separately from changes resulting 
from new construction or reclassification of property?
b. Provide separate sets of data for each property class?
6. Is there a process to establish goals and priorities with respect to property 
taxation?
a. If so, is this done during the course of the budget cycle, at the 
beginning, at the end, or at some other time during the year?
b. If so, is the preparation of the tax rates and the bylaws seen generally 
as an administrative formality, working within the established 
framework, or is their substantive debate by Council or a Committee 
after the goals and priorities are set?
7. Is the decision-making process best characterized as:
a. Highly analytical?
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b. Subjective?
c. Largely consisting of polidcal bargaining?
8. Does the process involve the articulation of values (social, political,
administrative, and personal)?
9. Does the process involve an examination of cost/benefits of possible
alternatives?
Political Considerations
This area of questioning was intended to obtain information on the extent to which 
consideration is given to the effect that decisions may have on the ability to retain 
elective office, or on public opinion in general. Issues raised in the interview 
included the following:
1. Is the ability of business/industry to ‘export’ the taxes to non-residents a 
factor in decision-making?
2. Does the municipality monitor the experience of other municipalities in 
setting tax rates? If so:
a. Is the information used in the course of setting tax rates?
b. Did it result in a change in policy or approach?
3. Was consideration given, during the course of tax rate decision-making, 
to reducing (or increasing) municipal tax rates to offset changes in the 
provincial education property tax rates, or the tax rates of the regional 
district?
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4. Is there a policy that tax increases will be limited? If so, is this expressed 
by:
a. A limit in the change in the tax rate?
b. A limit in the change in the total amount of taxes raised?
c. A limit in the change in the total amount of taxes imposed on a 
typical property?
d. Some other factor?
5. Is there a conscious effort to avoid uncertainty about changes in levels of 
taxation? If so, does it involve:
a. ‘Telegraphing” possible tax increases in advance of a decision?
b. Establishing and publicizing some type of policy about tax 
increases?
c. Some other form of public information?
6. Is there any organized effort to make the public aware of the equation 
“assessed value x tax rate = taxes” and the fact that if market values rise, 
tax rates could fall?
7. Does the municipality seek to gain a “windfall” from rising assessed 
values (by “freezing” tax rates)?
8. Is there a formal or informal policy that governs the distribution of the 
tax burden among the property classes?
9. Is there a formal or informal effort to publicly link changes in tax levels 
with the level of services provided by the municipality?
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10. Is the “fairness” of the municipality’s tax structure considered during the 
course of decision-making?
11. Is the process driven by pre-determined policy objectives, or is it largely 
determined by response to current economic and political issues?
12. Would you describe the tax rate setting process as “high profile?”
Economic
This area of questioning was intended to obtain information on the degree to which 
various economic aspects of tax rates are taken into consideration in the course of 
decision-making, in order to identify municipal efforts to “compete” with other 
municipalities for new residents, business, or industry, and with any efforts that the 
municipalities may take to avoid adverse economic consequences of their tax rate 
structures. Issues raised in the interview included the following:
1. Has the municipality commissioned any studies (internal or external) 
to evaluate the impact of their property tax structure on the local 
economy?
2. Has the municipality commissioned any studies (internal or external) 
with respect to non-residential tax multiples? If so, what was the 
purpose of the study?
3. Is there a general consensus that high taxes discourage new 
development?
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4. Has the municipality commissioned any studies, or considered 
material from other sources, that attempt to determine who actually 
pays the tax burden?
5. Does the municipality compare its level of taxation and services, 
and/or its tax structure, with that found in other municipalities? If so:
a. Why?
b. How is the comparison done?
c. Who does it?
d. Are the results publicized?
e. Is the information used in the course of decision-making?
6. Were tax rates adjusted during the course of the decision-making 
process so that they would be more competitive with those imposed 
in some other municipality or municipalities?
7. Have levels of service being adjusted during the course of the 
decision-making process so that they would be more competitive 
with those imposed in some other municipality or municipalities?
8. In setting tax rates, is the objective:
a. Stability in the amount of tax levied?
b. Stability in tax rates?
c. Stability in the apportionment of taxes among property 
classes?
d. Stability in the amount of taxes paid by a typical taxpayer?
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9. Has the tax rate been adjusted as apart of a program to make the 
municipality more attractive to business or residents?
a. If so:
i. How was it done?
ii. What was the major motivation for the adjustment?
b. If not:
i. Was the possibility discussed (formally or 
informally)?
ii. Was there a reason why nothing was done?
Input
The following group of questions deals with the type of input that is received in the 
decision-making process from members of the community. The questions were 
intended to provide information on the degree to vdiich the municipality interacts 
with the community in the course of setting tax rates, as well as the degree to which 
the community (or portions thereof) try to influence the municipality’s decision­
making process. Issues raised in the interview included the following:
1. Is there any procedure to obtain public participation in the tax rate 
setting process?
2. Is the public involved in any way in considering the policy objectives 
concerning the distribution of the tax burden?
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3. What role do the media play? (monitor, critic, advocate of the views 
of some part of the community, straight-up reporting)?
4. Is the media coverage:
a. Prominent or casual?
b. Largely focussed on the size of the tax increase, or not?
c. Balanced?
d. Largely critical, in an attempt to create “news?
5. Is there an organized effort to determine public opinion on possible 
tax increases?
a. If so, does it involve:
i. Public opinion surveys?
ii. Focus groups?
iii. Consultation with key groups (such as the Chamber of 
Commerce, or ratepayers groups)?
b. If so, who is responsible for the process — staff or council?
6. Does the Council make any particular effort to take “soundings” of 
public opinion during the decision-making process?
7. Is Council lobbied by groups in the community with respect to 
taxation matters? If so, who lobbies (ratepayer groups, businesses, 
industrial associations, business associations, individuals)?
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8. Is staff lobbied by groups in the community with respect to taxation 
matters? If so, who lobbies (ratepayer groups, businesses, industrial 
associations, business associations, individuals)?
9. Does the public follow tax rate debates closely?
10. Is there much correspondence from the public concerning tax rates?
Roles
The following questions deal with the role played by the elected officials and by 
staff. Issues raised in the interview included the following;
1. What is the role of Council? For example:
a. Does Council set a specific tax guideline (in terms of percentage 
increase in tax levy, total permissible levy, or some other target) 
which staff are expected to work within?
b. Does Council actively participate in determining how the tax load is 
to be shared among property classes?
c. Is Council’s participation in the tax rate setting process largely 
formal?
2. What is the role of Staff? For example:
a. Is staffs role primarily to provide statistics and administrative 
advice?
b. Does staff participate by proposing tax increase limitations, or 
policies for the allocation of the burden of taxation?
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c. Is staff largely responsible for the calculation of the required tax rates 
for submission to and approval by Council?
d. Who plays the leadership role in determining the total tax levy?
e. Who plays the leadership role in determining the policy for the 
apportionment of the tax burden?
f. Is there any attempt to keep elected officials to considering matters of 
policy only?
g. Is there any attempt to keep staff from commenting on policy 
matters?
h. Is the tax rate setting process (and the apportionment of the burden of 
taxation) regarded as:
i. Primarily a technical exercise, which is the realm of 
administration?
ii. Primarily a political exercise, which is the realm of the 
elected officials?
iii. Some combination of the two approaches?
Data Analysis Plan
The results of the interviews were analyzed to determine whether the hypothesis has 
been proved or disproved. In undertaking this analysis, open-ended answers were 
prepared for each of the suggested questions listed above, for each of the subject 
municipalities, with references to the source of the information for the answers
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(which in most cases will be the interview n o t e s ) . T h e  answers (patterns or 
explanations for each case) were compared across the three cases to determine 
whether the pattern or explanation is replicated, and were used to prepare the case 
study report, and also to ensure that tracking of sources is accurate.
The case study report does not present the results of the individual cases. 
The cases are to be regarded as the evidentiary base for the report. The report 
attempts to synthesize the results of the case study.
Permissions and Human Subject’s Approval
Since this research involves human participants, approval was obtained pursuant to 
the University’s Research Regulations.
to This section is adapted from Yin, pp. 102 -152
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Chapter Three
Determining Tax Rates in British Columbia
— Possible Explanatory Factors
This chapter draws on the literature review and other sources to enumerate a set of 
Actors that may be considered in the course of choosing tax rates and tax policy 
objectives, as well as expectations for the decision-making process and the roles of 
the various participants. This information guided the development of the line of 
questioning for the case studies. This chapter consists of two sections. The first 
outlines factors that may be considered in the course of choosing tax rates and tax 
policy objectives. It includes reference to a wide range of issues, including political 
factors, competition for new development, stability, and benefits and costs. The 
second discusses possible decision-making processes and participants in the process. 
It includes reference to the sequence or phases of the decision-making process, and 
the nature of the relationship between elected officials and staff.
Factors Considered in Decision-Making
There are a number of factors that may be considered when municipalities engage in 
setting tax rates (including determining how the burden of taxation is to be shared in 
the community). No enumeration of these factors can be exhaustive, as some 
communities will have factors that are unique to their setting (such as local 
traditions or financial or social conditions) that have not been discussed in the 
literature. In addition, it is highly unlikely that any community would, in any one 
year, consider all of the factors that might be enumerated in this section. Some
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factors may be applicable to one community and not to another, or they may be 
applicable only once in a while. Thus, this enumeration of factors cannot be used as 
a definitive statement of what is, or what should be, considered in the course of 
establishing local property taxation policies. It is merely suggestive of factors that 
might be considered. The following factors are not presented in any order of 
priority. They include political factors, taxation of business, municipal tax 
competition, land use, and revenue requirements.
Political Factors
Since municipalities are governed by elected officials it is not surprising that 
political issues are considered in the course of setting tax rates. Indeed, it would be 
very surprising if elected officials did not take the preferences of the electorate into 
account in the course of determining tax rates and taxation policies and reflect upon 
how their political fortunes might be affected by doing or not doing certain things. 
The literature as described in Chapter One does not reveal a definitive picture of the 
nature of the political considerations. There are, nevertheless, some broad themes. 
Five have been identified.
The first theme is that the property tax is unpopular, and should therefore be 
avoided or minimized (perhaps by minimizing the impact on the majority of voters 
by shifting the incidence of the tax to non-residents or business and industry).
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Scholars identifying this theme include Brunori\ Higgins^ and Hicks/ The concept 
of visibility of the property tax is related, in that it makes its rates contentious and 
encourages municipal councils to avoid increases/ Slack wrote that the fact that tax 
rates have not increased significantly is a consequence of the visibility of the tax/ 
The second theme suggests that elected officials, with the hope of increasing their 
chances of electoral success, are biased to “favour” homeowners (who constitute the 
majority of the electorate in many municipalities) by shifting the burden of taxation 
from residential to non-residential property owners. Hicks^ is a proponent of this 
view. Both Bird^ and Slack* have written along similar lines.
The third theme involves the need for stability and predictability in the tax 
levy. In writing of this issue Reeves noted that taxpayers revolts have been 
attributed to the rapid rise of taxes which are accompanied by a perception of lack of 
control over taxes and uncertainty about what will happen next, and that surprises in 
taxation should be avoided.^ The fourth theme suggests that the property tax may be
’ David Bnmori, “Metropolitan taxation in the 21®* century,” National Tax Journal, Vol. 53, Issue 3, 
541-551.2
Donald J. H. Higgins, Local and Urban Politics in Canada, (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing 
C o^any, 1986), 93.
 ^Hicks, Donald A., “The Property Tax in a New Industrial Era” in The property Tax and Local 
Finance, ed. C. Lowell Harriss, (New York: The Academy of Political Science, 1983), 213.
* Kenneth Woodside, “An approach to studying local government autonomy: the Ontario 
experience,” Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer), 211.
* Enid Slack, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Canadian Municipalities: Current Situation 
and Prospects,” report fffepared for the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2002, at 
www.fcm.ca/newfcm/Java/slack.htm
Hides.
’ Richard M. Bird, “Local Business Taxes”, report prepared for the World Bank Institute, 2002 at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfinance/documents/fiscalfederalism Russia/Bird tax.ndf. 5-6.
* Slack, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Canadian Municipalities.”
’ Clyde H. Reeves, “Leadership ft» Change” in The Property Tax and Local Finance, ed C. Lowell 
Harriss, (New York: the Academy of Political Science, 1983), 3.
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a viable tool to encourage investment and development. A number of scholars have 
identified the tendency of municipalities to engage in tax competition to attract 
inward investment, including Brunori,*® Wilson," and Hicks. There are doubts 
about the actual viability of this approach. Brunori suggests that incentives may be 
offered because officials think they will work, or because they are unwilling to take 
the chance that they do not work." While there may be doubt about the value of 
using taxation as a tool to encourage investment, it has been included as one of the 
themes because it appears that many people believe it is so, as evidenced by the 
number of scholars studying various aspects of its use, such Chen," Hoyt," 
Wilson" and Brett and Pinkse."
The final theme is that the property tax represents the “price” for the 
provision of municipal services, implying the existence of a relationship between the 
amount of property tax paid and the cost of the services provided, and an 
accountability mechanism that informs the politicians about the electorate’s 
acceptance or rejection of that price. This theme is developed in part fi-om Fischel’s 
suggestion that service and taxation levels are set by elected officials to meet the
""Brunwi, 541-551
" John Douglas Wilson, “Theories o f Tax Competition,” National Tax JournalJVol. 52(2) (June
1999), 269 
" Hicks,. 216-7 
" Brunori, 541-551.
Xiao Chen, “Essays on Local Taxation and Urban Development,” (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 
1996).
William H. Hoyt, “Tax Competition, Nash Equilibria, and Residential Mobility,” Journal o f Urban 
EcoMoWa, 34 (1993), 358-379.
Wilson.
”  Craig Brett, and Joris Pinkse, “The determinants of municipal tax rates in British Columbia,” 
Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, No. 3, (August 2000).
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demands of the owner of the median value home.*® It is also suggested by 
Vojnovic’s suggestion that the tax structure should establish a close relationship 
between service benefits and costs, which also provides information to municipal 
officials about the standards of service desired by residents.*^ Tindal has also 
indicated that this may be the case where the municipality is following a “business 
model
More than one of these themes may be “in play” at any one time. Tax rates 
are arrived at by a municipal council so that a majority of members of council will 
support the ultimate decision. Individual members of council may have different 
motives for supporting essentially the same outcome, and the reasons for doing so 
are usually not recorded. In addition, the importance of political considerations 
relative to other factors discussed below may vary between individual members of 
council, and between municipalities. There are suggestions in the literature 
(Woodside^* and Fischel^) that political factors may be more important in smaller 
jurisdictions, which are presumably more responsive to the electorate.
The foregoing does not necessarily mean that political considerations can 
only result in attempts to minimize property taxation. Public demands for service
William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government 
Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
2001)
Igor Vojnovic, “Municipal consolidation, regional planning and fiscal accountability: the recent 
experience in two Maritime provinces,” Canadian Journal o f Regional Science, vol. 23, no. 1 (spring
2000), 49 -  72.
^  Richard C. Tindal, A Citizen’s Guide to Government. 2“' edition (Tmonto/Montreal: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson Limited, 2000).
Woodside.
^FiscbeL 87-88.
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improvements (such as the construction of new recreation facilities, or expanded 
police services) are sometimes accompanied by a willingness to pay higher taxes.
There may be a "political" element to the other factors enumerated below. 
For example, advocating a reduction in tax rates in order to compete for new 
investment in the community may be an attractive element in a political platform.
Taxation o f Business
The literature identifies three main themes that may inform the approach to taxation 
of business. First, there is a perception that business can pass property taxes on to 
others (such as tenants or customers), as noted by Reeves^ and Kitchen.^ 
Secondly, according to Bird, there is a belief that an area that is a “host” to a 
business or industrial activity is entitled to a part of the proceeds.^ Finally, there is 
a perception that property taxes imposed on business may be exported beyond the 
municipal boundaries (for example, to customers or to the investors in the business). 
Scholars putting forward this view include Slack,^^ Bird,^’Kitchen,^ and Ballentine 
and Thirsk,^^
These three themes appear to lead to a belief that there is a “benefit” to a 
municipality (or more properly, to the municipality’s residential property owners)
Reeves.
Harry Kitchen, “Municipal Finance in a New Fiscal Environment,” C.D. Howe Institute 
Commentary, No. 147 (November 2000).
^ Bird, Local Business Taxes, 5-6.
^ Slack, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations.”
^ Bird, Local Business Taxes, 5-6.
^ Kitchen, “Municipal Finance in a New Fiscal Environment,” 11.
”  J. Gregory Ballentine and Wayne R. Thirsk, Taxation without Representation: The Consequences 
o f Taxing Non-residential Property, (Ottawa; Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1982), 2.
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from the taxation of non-residential property. Whether there is, in fact, such a 
“benefif’ is another matter, and it is beyond the scope of this work to explore the 
accuracy of this belief. For the purposes at hand, it must suffice to say that one of 
the factors that may be considered in the course of setting tax rates is the belief that 
there is a benefit to the taxation of business, for one of the reasons cited above.
Municipal Tax Competition
As discussed in Chapter One, there is a significant body of literature that discusses 
the desire of municipalities to compete to attract mobile investment and/or mobile 
residents. Scholars addressing this topic include Wilson,^ ® Hoyt,^* Hicks,^^ Spry,^ 
Chen,^ Brunori,^^ Woodside,^® and Brett and Pinkse.^ Competition may be a 
significant factor in the establishment of tax rates, particularly in metropolitan areas. 
This competition can take one of two major forms:
1. the use of low tax rates to attract mobile businesses or residents who are 
motivated by low costs; or
2. the use of high levels of service, and higher tax rates, to attract businesses or 
residents who want and are prepared to pay for higher levels of service.
There may also be competition between governments for tax dollars.
^ Wilsfm, 269.
Hoyt, 358-379.
^ Hicks, 216-217.
John Arthur Spry, The Political Economy of Local Taxation: The Effects ofTiebout Mobility and 
Referenda on Local Taxes, (Ph.D. diss.. University of Rochester, 2000).
^Oien.
^Bnmon, 541-551.
^Woodside.
Brett and Pinkse.
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In competing through the use of low tax rates or high service levels, 
municipalities are attempting to market their particular combination of taxes and 
service levels to potential customers. In British Columbia, the potential for this type 
of competition is limited, as the Local Government Act restricts the ability of 
municipalities to offer subsidies or special tax rates to individual businesses. 
Competition can only occur by establishing tax rates applicable to all properties 
(both new and old) within a given tax class. If a municipality wishes to compete 
through low tax rates it must consider the cost of foregone revenue from taxation of 
existing investment compared to additional revenue that might be gained from 
increased or sustained investment.
Wilson suggests that competition between governments exists where 
governments share a tax base.^* Such a situation exists in British Columbia, as the 
province, regional and special purpose bodies and municipalities all levy property 
taxes. There may also be a degree of competition between municipal property taxes 
and federal and provincial coiporate income taxes. Property taxes on business 
properties are deductible from taxable business income. Since corporate income tax 
is a percentage of taxable business income, federal and provincial revenues are 
reduced by a percentage of the property tax paid. Municipalities, therefore, may be 
tempted to increase taxes on business properties in the belief that a portion of such 
taxes will ultimately be paid by federal and provincial governments (by reducing the
38 Wlhon, 289-291.
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amount of corporate tax that might otherwise have been paid by the business 
pmperty owner).
As we have seen in the foregoing section on “Competition,” municipalities generally 
seek to expand their tax base through additional development. This implies that 
municipalities will want to consider the effect that levels of taxation may have on 
development, regardless of the competition issue. According to Zak and Skidmore, 
the common assertion is that high property taxes threaten development. They 
suggest that this is not necessarily true.^ It is beyond the scope of this study to 
determine whether the belief is or is not correct. The existence of the belief is of 
interest, however, because it may be a factor that is considered when setting tax 
rates.
Revenue Requirements
As we have seen, property taxes make up approximately fifty percent of municipal 
revenue.'*® Thus, it is to be expected that a municipality’s need for revenue will be a 
major factor in determining tax rates. One common approach is to assume that the 
amount to be raised from taxation is simply tiie difference between desired spending
^ Jeffrey S. Zak and Mark Skidmore, “Property Tax Rate Changes and Rates of Development,” 
Journal o f Urban Economics, 36, (1994), 314-332.
^ Karin TrefF and David B. Perry, Finances of the Nation 1988, (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 
1998), 6 2
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and non-tax revenue. Approaches along this line have been described by Hicks'*’ 
and Masson and Lessage However, others, such as Graham, Phillips and 
Maslove*  ^ and Dahlberg and Lindstrom** suggest that the matter is not that simple. 
Other factors (such as those enumerated above) are also taken into consideration. 
Consideration of these factors may result in adjustments to spending plans, so that 
revenue requirements are reduced. This process will be discussed in more detail 
below.
Process and Participants
There is no clearly identified universal process used in determining tax rates or the 
tax structure. It appears probable that processes may depend on the nature of the 
relationship between councils and administration, the structure of the organization, 
and other local factors. There are, however, some characteristics of process that the 
literature suggests may be present. These deal with the sequence or phases of the 
decision-making process, and the nature of the relationship between elected officials 
and staff.
Hicks, 219.
Jack Masson with Edward C. LeSage Jr., Alberta’s Local Governments: Politics and Democracy, 
(Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1994), 326.
Katherine A, Graham, Susan D. Phillips with Allan M. Maslove, Urban Governance in Canada: 
Representation, Resources, and Restructuring,, (Toronto: Harcourt Brace & Company, Canada, 
1998), 222.
^  Matz Dahlberg and Tomas Lindstrüm, “Are Local Governments Governed by Forward Looking 
Decision Makers?” Journal o f Urban Economics, 44 (1998), 254-271.
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Turning first to the relationship between elected officials and staff, Feldman 
and Khademian'*  ^ and Svara"*® suggest a dynamic relationship between the elected 
officials and staff. While each has a defined role, the relationships are dynamic and 
reciprocal, Murphy describes a fluid, decentralized and political system, where 
political leadership is important and where outcomes depend on the skill with which 
participants use the resources at their disposal."*’ This is contrary to the popular 
conception of a distinct separation between policy-making and administration and 
suggests that, in examining actual practices, we should be looking critically at the 
inter-relationship between the elected officials and staff, seeking evidence of inter­
dependence and interaction.
Siegel suggests a three-part process, involving the development of policy, 
the adoption of policy, and the implementation of policy.'** Gould and Baker 
identify three phases of tax policy-making, similar to Siegel’s construct.*^ For the 
purposes of this work, the interest lies in the first two phases, which can be 
described as the design or policy development phase and the policy adoption or law­
making phase, Siegel also identifies ways in which the policy development occurs
Martha S. Feldman and Anne M. Khademian, “To Mæiage is to Govern,” Public Administration 
Review, Vol. 62, No. 5 (September/October 2002), 541 -  554.
^  James H. Svara, “The Myth of the Dichotomy: Complementarity o f Politics and Administration in 
the Past and Future of Public Administration,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 61, No. 2 
(March/April 2001), 176-183 
Russell D. Murphy, “Politics, Political Science, and Urban Governance: A Literature and a 
Legacy,” Annual Reviews Political Science, 2002.5:63-85 
David Siegel, “Politics, politicians, and public servants in non-partisan local governments,” 
Canadian Public Administration, Vol. 37, Issue 1 (spring, 1994), 14-15.
Andrew C. Gould and Peter J. Baker, “Democracy and Taxation,” Annual Reviews Political 
2002.5, 87-110.
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(that is, where do the policy initiatives come from).^® This is an important 
consideration for a discussion of the determination of tax rates and taxation policies. 
Based on work by Kemaghan and Langford^* consideration should be given to 
whether (and how) relevant values are articulated and reconciled, how the interests 
of those not directly involved in the decision-making process are considered and 
reconciled, whether the process is open, and whether there is an examination of the 
costs and benefits of possible alternatives. We should also be considering the nature 
of the role played by the participants, and in particular whether senior staff appear to 
play a dominant role (based on work by Tindal and Tindal^^). In doing so we should 
keep in mind the Tindals’ observation that municipal issues often do not require 
analytical solutions as much as “subjective assessments and political bargaining.”^^  
In addition, consideration should be given to whether the process is one which deals 
primarily with policy issues or one which is primarily an administrative exercise.
The nature of the policy-making process should also be considered. In 
Chapter One, reference was made to Tindal and Tindal’s outline of three theories or 
models of policy making: the rational model, the incremental model and the penny 
arcade model.^ Lindblom described the system of successive comparison, which
“  Siegel, 15-16.
Kenneth Kemaghan and John W. Langford, The Responsible Public Servant (Toronto; the Institute 
for Research on Public Policy, 1991), 49-50.
C. Richard Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada, 4* ed. 
(Toronto/Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Limited, 1995), 281-321.
301.
292 - 301
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involves a series of incremental changes,w hich is the basis of the incremental 
model described by Tindal and Tindal. It is this method that appears most likely to 
be applicable to decision-making on taxation issues. It is doubtful that 
municipalities have the capacity, or the desire, to practice the rational- 
comprehensive method partly because to do so would be an overwhelming task, but 
also because democracies “change their policies almost entirely through incremental 
adjustments.”^^  The penny arcade model as outlined by Tindal and Tindal, with its 
attention to the random, unpredictable nature of policy making, appears more suited 
to a description of the general decision making process in a municipality rather than 
to a description of one component of the broader process.
Participants in the process will obviously include elected officials and staff. 
There is no suggestion in the literature that the electorate play a significant role in 
the decision-making process. Nevertheless, Siegel^’ does suggest that attention 
should be given to whether policy initiatives come from the electorate (either as 
individuals or through community groups such as Chambers of Commerce or 
Ratepayers Associations) during the policy development phase. The source of such 
influence (where it exists) should also be identified.
The media is thought to have an influence on the discussion agenda, if only 
because of the prominent and generally negative attention given to taxation matters
Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science of ‘Muddling Through’,” in Democracy and Market System, 
(Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1988), 171-190 
182
^ Siegel, 15-16.
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suggested by Tindal and Tindal/^ According to Bl ack ,media  influence may be 
influenced by the division of interests in the community and the media’s relationship 
to other institutional actors. Where the media has an impact, it tends toward 
emphasizing the importance of the tax rate and minimizing the importance of the 
priorities that are being set It is well beyond the scope of this study to attempt to 
evaluate the impact of the media in these matters. However, attention should be 
paid to the perceptions of media influence.
Conclusions
The foregoing suggests a number of factors that might be considered in the course of 
determining tax rates. They include five broad themes concerning political 
considerations, including the avoidance or minimization of property tax due to the 
unpopularity of the tax, the suggestion that elected officials are biased to “favour” 
homeowners by shifting the burden of taxation to non-residential property in order 
to increase their chances of electoral success, the need for stability and predictability 
in the tax levy, the use of the property tax as a viable tool to encourage investment 
and development, and the use of the property tax as the “price” for the provision of 
municipal services.
A belief that there is a “benefit” to a municipality from the taxation of non- 
residential property may also be one of the factors considered in the course of setting 
tax rates. Additional factors may include the desire to use tax rates to compete to
Tindal and Tindal, 290.58
^ Black, Edwin R., Politics and the News, (Toronto: Butterworth & Co., 1982), 250.
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attract mobile investment and/or mobile residents, and the possibility that high 
property taxes threaten develo;mient. Municipal levenne lequiiements are, of
course, a major factor in determining tax rates.
There is no clearly identified universal process used in determining tax rates 
or the tax structure. There are, however, some characteristics of process that may be 
present. They concern the sequence or phases of the decision-making process, and 
the nature of the relationship between elected officials and staff.
The case study, which is discussed in the following chapter, was designed to 
compare the factors and processes identified above with the factors considered and 
processes followed in the subject municipalities. The factors and processes 
identified above were used to formulate the line of questioning outlined in Chapter 
Two.
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Chapter Four 
A Caae Study of Three MnnlcinaHtie*
As indicated in Chapter Two, three municipalities were examined using a multiple 
case study design. The intention was to compare the identified theory with the 
empirical results and to generalize the results to a broader theory (if possible). In this 
instance, the general question was: What is the basis for the setting of municipal tax 
rates, and who makes the decision? The proposition as stated in the hypothesis is 
that the choice of tax rates is based primarily on short-term political considerations 
with local elected officials playing the dominant role in the ultimate decision­
making process with municipal staff playing a supporting role in terms of providing 
technical assistance. Through a review of literature, possible theories to illustrate the 
basis for the choice of tax rates were identified, along with theories ahout the 
respective political roles played by local elected officials and municipal staff. This 
material was used as the basis for questioning respondents in the case studies. The 
methodology and the nature of the questions have been described in detail in 
Chapter Two.
This chapter presents the findings of the case study. It is divided into two 
major sections. The first reviews assessment and taxation data from the three 
municipalities, with selected comparisons to a group of similarly-sized 
municipalities, in order to provide background and context for the case study. The 
second section presents the findings of the case study, organized around five major 
themes addressed in the methodology section (the process of deciding on tax rates
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and setting taxation goals, political considerations, economic considerations, input 
into the process and the respective roles of elected officials and staff).
Background and Context for the Case Study
The three selected municipalities (the City of Quesnel, the District of Mackenzie and 
the Town of Smithers) are members of a group of twenty-one British Columbia 
municipalities that range in population from 6,000 to 31,000 (see Table 2). The 
twenty-one municipalities are all located outside of the major urban or metropolitan 
areas of British Columbia (specifically, they are not located on Southern Vancouver 
Island, the Lower Mainland, or in the central and southern Okanagan). Mackenzie is 
located 186 km north of Prince George. Quesnel is located 122 km south of Prince 
George, and Smithers is located 372 km west of Prince George. Assessment and 
taxation data for Mackenzie, Quesnel and Smithers is shown in Appendices 1, 2 and
3. The population of all three municipalities has been stagnant since 1999, and 
assessed values have tended to decline. Only Quesnel experienced significant 
growth in assessed values, much of which occurred in 2001/2 as a result of new 
development. In Mackenzie and Smithers, residential assessed values have declined 
as a percentage of total assessment since 1998. In Mackenzie, major industry makes 
up a larger percentage of total assessed value than it did in 1998, while in Smithers 
the percentage of assessment in the Business/Other class has increased. In Quesnel, 
the proportion of assessment in the business class has increased, while the 
proportion of assessment in the major industrial class declined.
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Growth in tax revenues has been modest. Total tax revenue in Mackenzie 
increased by 4.6% between 1998 and 2002. Comparable figures are 12% for 
Smithers, and 20.8% for Quesnel. Despite the change in the proportion of 
assessment in the various assessment classes, both Mackenzie and Smithers have 
maintained the proportion of taxes paid by each property class, with only minor 
changes. Quesnel, on the other hand, has gradually increased the proportion of 
taxation paid by residential and business properties, and reduced the proportion paid 
by the major industrial class. This has resulted in a shift in the incidence of taxation 
to residential properties. To a modest degree the shift was reversed in 2002 (an 
election year).
The trends in total assessment and taxation for the three selected 
municipalities are similar to the trends for the group of twenty-one medium-sized 
municipalities cited above, and for the northern members* of that group. The trends 
are illustrated in Figures 9 and 10 (below).
* The “northern members” are nine o f tiie twenty-one non-metropolitan municipalities which belong 
to the North Central Municipal Association. They include Dawson Creek, Fort St. John, Kitimat, 
Mackenzie, Prince Rupert, Quesnel, Smithers, Terrace and Williams Lake.
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Mackenzie and Quesnel have a much lower proportion of their assessed 
values in the residential property class, in comparison to the average of all twenty-
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one municipalities in the comparison group, and in comparison to the northern 
municipalities (see Table 7). Table 7 shows that percentage of total assessment in 
the residential class has been declining slightly, which (assuming little or no growth 
in either the residential or non-residential sectors) indicates that residaitial 
properties have been losing value at a faster rate than non-residential properties. 
Municipalities generally structure their tax rates so that the proportion of taxation 
paid by residential properties is significantly less than the proportion of assessment 
in the residential class. In the case of northern municipalities, the difference in 
proportions is much greater than it is for the larger group of municipalities. In 
addition, northern municipalities have held the percentage of total taxes paid by the 
residential sector relatively constant, while the group of twenty-one municipalities 
has increased the percentage of property tax paid by the residential class.
Table?
Residential Proportions 
Percentage of Assessment in Residential Class
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
All 73.73% 73.60% 73.00% 72.48% 72.13%
Northern 67.06% 67.94% 66.91% 66.33% 65.76%
Mackenzie 54.95% 54.52% 53.90% 52.33% 51.09%
Quesnel 53.54% 59.72% 58.68% 56.64% 54.97%
Smithers 70.99% 70.89% 70.85% 69.15% 68.17%
Percentage of Tax Levy from Residential Class
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
All 38.67% 39.45% 39.70% 39.82% 40.36%
Northern 31.55% 31.96% 31.84% 31.81% 30.91%
Mackenzie 24.67% 24.64% 24.53% 24.55% 24.50%
Quesnel 13.59% 17.32% 17.04% 16.47% 16.07%
Smithers 33.83% 34.33% 34.33% 34.33% 34.33%
Source: B.C. Municipal Statistics. Schedule 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes 
and Class Proportions of Taxes and Assessments, for the relevant year, published by the Ministry of 
Communities, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, accessed at 
httD://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm during February, 2003
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Overall, the taxes on a representative house  ^do not seem to be afkcted by 
this dif&rence. In 1992, the average of the taxes on a represoitative house in the
nine northern municipalities was only $11 less than the average taxes on a 
representative house in the group of twenty-one municipalities (see Table 8). Taxes 
on the representative houses in Mackenzie, Quesnel and Smithers are considerably
lower than the average.
Table 8
Taxes on Representative Houses -  2002
Representative Representative Tax
House Value House Tax Rate
Average - All $117,653 $803 6.719
Average - Northern $114,779 $792 7.239
Mackenzie $81,192 $689 8.492
Quesnel $94,500 $401 4.247
Smithers $118,620 $680 5.731
Source: Ministry of Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, Tax Rates and 
Assessments 2002. Tax Analysis, accessed at
http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/igd/srvs infra/munfin/tax2002/index.htm (February 28,2003)
It should be stressed that it is very difficult to make meaningful comparisons 
between municipalities with respect to the taxation of “typical” or “average” 
properties. There are substantial differences between communities in levels of 
market values, the potential for future gains in value, and in the type and quality of 
construction. Any statistics offering comparisons should therefore be approached 
with some caution.
Given that the proportion of municipal taxes paid by residential properties is
less than the proportion of assessment in the residential property class, it is
 ^Each municipality selects an assessed value which, in their view, is representative o f  tiieir 
ccHnmunity. The value is used by the Ministry to compile the data referred to in Table 8.
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inevitable that the reverse is true 6)r non-residential properties. The proportion of 
assessment in the business/other class in the group of twenty-one ihunicipalities (and
in the northern municipalities in that group) has grown at a slightly faster rate than 
the percentage of the tax revenue derived from that class (suggesting that there has 
been a very slight shift in the burden of taxation away from the business/other class). 
It is important to note that the taxation of the business/other class in Quesnel and 
Mackenzie is different than the average. In both cases, the proportion of the total 
tax levy paid by the business/other class is lower than the proportion of total 
assessment in that class (although the difference is much greater in Quesnel). The 
data in Table 9 indicates that Mackenzie and Smithers have followed a policy of 
keeping the proportion of taxes paid by the business/other class relatively stable.
Table 9
Business/Other Class Proportions 
Percentage of Assessment in Business/Other Class
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
All 14.68% 15.15% 15.72% 15.96% 16.34%
Northern 16.55% 16.78% 17.92% 18.35% 19.02%
Mackenzie 7.63% 7.12% 7.10% 7.03% 7.21%
Quesnel 17.76% 16.19% 16.97% 19.42% 21.64%
Smithers 24.95% 25.55% 25.%% 27.08% 28.06%
Percentage of Tax Levy from Business/Other Class
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
All 22.49% 22.93% 23.39% 23.47% 23.94%
Northern 25.14% 25.33% 26.14% 26.15% 26.18%
Mackenzie 6.56% 6.47% 6.48% 6.47% 6.48%
Quesnel 12.24% 12.02% 11.90% 13.66% 15.31%
Smithers 46.35% 48.23% 48.23% 48.23% 48.23%
Source: B.C. Municipal Statistics. Schedule 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes 
and Class Proportions of Taxes and Assessments, for the relevant year, published by the Ministry of 
Communities, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, accessed at 
httD://wwM'.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm during February, 2003
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The situation is slightly different in the case of the major industrial class. 
The northern municipalities have, on average, a greater proportion of their 
assessment base in the major industrial class than the group of twenty-one. 
Mackenzie and Quesnel have much more major industrial assessment than average, 
and Smithers has much less. In general, the proportion of the assessment base in the 
major industrial class has been declining. Mackenzie is the exception, perhaps 
because the decline in major industrial assessment is less rapid than the decline in 
other assessed values. Mackenzie and Smithers have stabilized the proportion of the 
municipal tax levy raised from the major industrial class, while Quesnel has allowed 
the proportion to decrease in line with the decline in the proportion of assessed value 
in that class, shifting the burden of taxation to the residential and business/other 
classes.
Table 10 
Major Industrial Class Proportions 
Percentage of Assessment in Major Industrial Class
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
All 10.13% 9.77% 9.69% 9.79% 9.63%
Northern 14.77% 13.72% 13.62% 13.75% 13.63%
Mackenzie 36.21% 36.99% .37.39% 38.96% 39.90%
Quesnel 27.88% 22.82% 23.11% 22.66% 22.09%
Smithers 2.30% 2.09% 2.06% 2.32% 2.31%
Percentage ofTax Levy from Major Industrial Class
1998 1999 2000 20)1 2002
All 35.28% 34.10% 33.46% 33.10% 31.67%
Northern 39.13% 38.65% 38.23% 38.21% 39.15%
Mackenzie 66.65% 66.46% 66.06% 66.05% 66.00%
Quesnel 72.90% 68.20% 68.76% 67,50% 66.19%
Smithers 13.38% 12.36% 12.36% 12.44% 12.56%
Source: B.C. Municipal Statistics. Schedule 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes 
and Class Proportions o f Taxes and Assessments, for the relevant year, published by the Ministry of 
Communities, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, accessed at 
http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/igd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm during February, 2003
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A review of tax rates and multiples 6)r the three subject municipalities
(Table 11) shows that tax rates for business/other and major industrial properties 
have been increasing steadily. However, in Mackenzie and Smithers, they have 
been increasing less rapidly than the residential tax rates. That is because these two 
municipalities have tended to provide stability in the proportion of the property tax 
paid by these two property classes. Quesnel, on the other hand, has chosen to 
stabilize the relationship between the business/other and major industrial tax rates 
and the residential tax rates.
Table 11
Tax Rates and Multiples^
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Tax Rates - Business/Other
Mackenzie 11.829 13.471 14.365 15.287 15.913
Quesnel 9.266 9.1353 9.2485 9.89632 10.27658
Smithers 16.83 17.5971 19.0642 19.2994 19.5558
Tax Multiples - Business/Other
Mackenzie 1.92 2.01 2.01 1.96 1.87
Quesnel 2.71 2.56 2.42 2.42 2.42
Smithers 3.9 3.9 3.88 3.59 3.41
Tax Rates - Major Industrial
Mackenzie 25.29 26.647 27.783 28.141 29.288
Quesnel 35.1561 36.7775 39.2373 41.91625 43.52683
Smithers 52.6549 55.0562 60.8695 57.9908 61.773
Tax Multiples - Major Industrial
Mackenzie 4.1 4.1 3.88 3.61 3.45
Quesnel 10.3 10.31 10.25 10.25 10.25
Smithers 12.2 12.2 12.39 10.78 10.78
Source; B.C. Municipal Statistics. Schedule 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes 
and Class Proportions of Taxes and Assessments, for the relevant year, published by the Ministry of 
Communities, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, accessed at 
httD://www'.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs infra/munfin/index.htm during February, 2003
 ^The tax multiple is calculated by dividing the tax rate for the class by the residential tax rate. A tax 
multiple of 2.5 indicates that the tax rate for a class is 2.5 times the residential tax rate.
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In summary, the three subject municipalities do not appear to be following 
policies that are dramatically dif&rent than those followed by other municipalities in
that they tend to tax non-residential properties to a greater extent than residential 
properties. There are, however, some differences in approach. For example, 
Mackenzie and Smithers apparently seek stability in the proportion of the tax burden 
borne by the business/other and major industrial properties, while Quesnel seeks 
stability in the relationship between the tax rates. The following section will explore 
the processes used to determine the tax rates and the tax structure, the role played by 
staff and elected officials, and the factors considered.
Findings of the Case Study
Officials at three northern municipalities were interviewed in the manner set out in 
Chapter Two -  Methodology.^ The results of the interviews are reported in this 
section, and conclusions and inferences are drawn with respect to the processes used 
to determine the tax rates and the tax structure, the role played by staff and elected 
officials, and the factors considered. This section begins with a description of the 
processes used by the three municipalities to arrive at decisions on tax rates and tax 
structures. A review of factors considered (or not considered) follows. The section 
concludes with a discussion of the roles played by the elected officials and staff.
* Interviews were conducted with the Mayor, Administrator and chief financial officer of the City o f 
Quesnel, District of Mackenzie and the Town of Smithers between February 25 and March 4,2003.
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The Decision-making Process
This section reviews the processes used by the three municipalities to determine the 
amount of money to be raised through taxation, and the way in which the tax burden 
is distributed. While there are many common factors, there are significant 
differences, mainly involving the sequence of events.
Each of the municipalities follows a different process. In Mackenzie^, the 
council sets a target for tax increases at the beginning of the budget cycle. The 
target is detennined after discussions between council and staff relating to the 
community’s expectations of the municipality, the state of the economy, the rate of 
inflation, assessment trends and local economic circumstances (including the 
prospects for employment). The council tries to “develop an understanding of where 
the community wants to go” and to “get a feel for what is important.”  ^ In short, they 
talk about “how the town is doing.”’ In recent years, due to the local economic 
conditions the target has called for a “0%” increase in taxation. As a result, the only 
additional tax revenue has been the result of new development in the community. 
The Administrator indicates that, as the council does not want to pass tax increases 
on to residents, there is “an inflation reduction adjustment in the budget.”* Staff 
prepare a budget that meets the guideline through “service cuts, use of reserves.
’ Mayor Tom Briggs, telephone interview by author, March 3,2003. Brian Ritchie, Administrator, 
telephone interview by author, February 27,2003, Warren Waycheshen, Director of Finance, 
telephone interview by author, February 27,2003 
® Briggs, interview.
’ Waycheshen, interview.
* Ritchie, interview.
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etc.”  ^The process for developing the capital budget is somewhat less constrained by 
current considerations than the process 6*r developing the operating budgeL The 
operating budget is more affected by political choices, whereas the administration 
makes more independoit recommendations on capital matters (involving sources o f 
funding, etc.).*® The budget as prepared by staff is reviewed by council. One of the 
challenges is reported to be “clarifying the difference between an increase in the 
budget and an increase in taxes."" The amount of taxation is finally determined 
when that discussion is complete. When the discussion is complete, staff then 
prepare the bylaws that are required to enact the tax rates, and submit them to 
council for enactment.
In Quesnel*^, the staff prepares a budget using a “base line” approach (a 
status quo budget plus an allowance for changes that have been approved by 
council). They use as their point of departure the tax revenue that was provided for 
in the previous budget. Council reviews the budget and the taxation requirement, 
and decides whether or not to increase taxation. This is done in March, when they 
adopt the budget in principle. After the rate of tax increase is determined, council 
determines whether the tax increase is to be “across the board” or whether the 
incidence of taxation will be shifted by having different rates of increase for
 ^Ritchie, interview 
Ritchie, interview.
" Waycheshen, interview.
Mayor Nate Bello, telephone interview by author, March 3,2003. Charles Hamilton, 
Administrator, telephone interview by author, February 26,2003. Jerry Reglin, Treasurer, telephone 
interview by author, March 4,2003.
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diOerent types of property. The staff then prepares the required bylaws for
submission to council for adoption.
In Smithers’ ,^ the administration prepares a budget for consideration by 
council. The council does not set a target before the budget development process 
begins. Administration provides council with a budget that includes the tax levy 
that is required to provide for the services that are needed. This budget involves 
consideration of the overall need of the public for services, with attention given to 
safety, health and essential services. Cost increases (such as inflation and increases 
in the taxes that the municipality pays) are factored in. The budget submission 
includes the “must do and wish list” as identified by administration.*'' A goal for 
taxation is set by council when it has had an opportunity to review the budget that 
has been prepared by administration. Through a process of budget discussions, the 
council reviews their financial resources and trims the budget as required to meet 
their taxation goal. Once the budget is established and the tax levy figures are 
known, staff prepare the tax rate bylaws for submission to council for enactment.
None of the municipalities has established a formal link between the cost of 
service to the various property classes and the level of taxation, or between the 
benefits received and the level of taxation. This is not to say that these issues are 
not considered. Responses indicate that they are considered in an informal and 
subjective way during the course of decision-making. Similarly, the articulation of
" Mayor James Davidson, telephone interview by author, February 25,2003. Wallace Mah, 
Administrator, telephone interview by author, February 25,2003. Leslie Ford, Financial 
Administrator/Collector, telephone interview by author, February 25,2003.
Davidson, interview.
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values applicable to property taxation does not seem to occur, unless there are some 
external stimuli (such as has occurred in Quesnel with respect to the level of taxation
of major industry).
Changes in assessed value are tracked annually, and the increase in the tax
base arising from new development is identified. These data are accumulated as part 
of the process of identifying the revenue that is available to finance municipal 
operations for the budget year, and as part of the process of calculating the tax 
rates.
The setting of goals and priorities for property taxation is an annual exercise. 
All municipalities are required to prepare financial plans that look forward five 
years. As a result, some forecasting of tax revenues is required. Forecasts seem to 
be limited to projecting total tax requirements, and not to projecting the way in 
which the taxes might be raised, although some officials in Quesnel are now 
thinking of the advisability of developing a taxation plan.*’ The preparation of 
forecasts and the drafting of the tax rate bylaws are seen as an administrative 
responsibility, with administration working with the guidelines or policy decisions 
established by council during the budget process. In most years, the tax rate bylaws 
are not subject to much debate as they generally follow along on past practice. 
However, debate arose in Quesnel over the 2003 distribution of the tax burden, due 
to concerns about the taxation of major industry in that community. Quesnel is
" Mah, Ford, Ritchie, Waycheshen, Hamilton and Reglin, interviews. 
Local Government Act R.S.B.C., Chapter 323,1996, Section 327 
Bello, interview.
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examining the possibility of shifting the incidence of taxation as there is some 
concern that their taxation policy is "somewhat heavy on industry."^* That is not,
however, an uncontested view of the situation as some members of council “have 
conflicting views” on the issue.
The decision-making process is largely subjective. None of the 
municipalities appear to do any extensive research or analysis on tax policies aside 
from estimates of the new tax revenue that will be derived from new construction, 
estimates of the impact of tax changes on average or typical properties, and limited 
comparisons of tax rates with other municipalities. Decisions about the targets or 
goals for taxation are the result of council discussions, and are based on council’s 
view of the state of the local economy, the needs of the community, and the amount 
of taxation that local property owners will accept. Council’s view includes 
consideration of many factors which can be considered “political.” They are 
reviewed in the next section.
Political Considerations
This section focuses on the question of whether consideration is given to the effect 
that decision may have on the ability to retain elective office, or on public opinion in 
general. This involves factors such as comparisons with other municipalities, 
moderating the impact of tax decisions made by other governments, predictability of
** Hamilton, interview. 
Hamilton, interview.
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changes in taxation, policies governing the distribution of the tax burden, and the 
extent to which decisions are detennined by established policy objectives.
As discussed in Chapter Three, scholars^ suggest that municipalities may 
seek to “export” taxes by imposing higher taxes on business or industrial properties, 
thereby giving tax relief to residents. While all three municipalities tax business and 
industrial properties at higher rates than residential properties, none of the 
municipalities has given consideration in recent years to the issue of who actually 
pays municipal taxes. While it may be that a portion of the municipal tax burden is 
effectively exported to persons who are resident outside the municipal boundaries 
(customers or shareholders, for example), there is no evidence to suggest that it is 
the result of a deliberate policy.
All of the municipalities monitor tax rates in other municipalities. They do 
this by conducting their own surveys using municipalities that they consider 
appropriate for comparison, or by using the statistics prepared by the Ministry of 
Community, Aboriginal and Women’s Services. It seems that the comparisons are 
used as guideposts, and as a way of justifying the municipality’s tax position. In 
Smithers, the comparisons are used to assure civic officials that they are not getting 
out of line with other municipalities. Since Smithers’ tax rates tend to fall in the low
 ^ Richard M. Bird, “Local Business Taxes,” report prepared for the World Bank Institute, 2002 at 
httD://www.worldbank.org/wbi/publicfmance/documents/fiscaifederalism Russia/Bird tax.pdf. Enid 
Slack, “Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations and Canadian Municipalities; Current Situation and 
Prospects,” report prepared for the Federation of Canadian Municipalities, 2002, at 
www.fcm.ca/newfcm/Java/slack.htm. Harry Kitchen, “Municipal Finance in a New Fiscal 
Environment,” C.D. Howe Institute Commentary, No. 147, November 2000. J. Gregory Ballentine 
and Wayne R. Thirsk, Taxation without Representation: The Consequenses o f Taxing Non-residential 
Property, (Ottawa: Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation, 1982), 2.
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end in the comparisons, they have not used the comparisons as a basis for decision- 
making. However, if the (xmipaiisons showed that they were high in relation to 
others, they might take corrective action?*
Mackenzie uses the comparisons during the budget setting process, giving 
consideration to how their tax rates compare to the tax rates of other municipalities. 
They try to make sure that their rates are “in the ball park”^^  (i.e. not extremely high 
or low in comparison to the rates at other municipalities) although they do try to 
keep their residential rates at the high end of the range of other municipalities. This 
means that their residential taxes are based on comparative data “as well as an 
ability to pay more."^ Mackenzie would like to keep their industrial tax rates at 
competitive levels in order to obtain primary employment, and they have a desire to 
moderate tax rates for business properties because of the current economic 
difficulties.^ In the past (1997), Mackenzie raised business tax rates because their 
surveys showed that they were low in comparison to the rates charged in other 
municipalities.^^ In recent years, the comparisons seem not to have been influential 
as they have tended to follow past practice in setting tax rates, rather than making 
adjustments to reflect their competitive position.
Quesnel has undertaken the comparisons in the past to illustrate to taxpayers 
how the Quesnel rates compare (which has been particularly advantageous given the 
relatively low residential tax rates in Quesnel). The comparisons, which until 2003
Ford, interview.
“  Waycheshen, interview. 
^ Ritchie, interview.
^ Ritchie, interview.
^ Waycheshen, interview.
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focussed only (w residential taxation, have not been used to drive the decision­
making process, although that may change in reqxinse to the desire to have more
competitive industrial tax rates?^
There is no indication that the municipalities seek to adjust their tax rates to 
compensate for changes in property tax rates imposed by other organizations (such 
as the provincial education tax).
None of the municipalities have established tax rate policies that would 
provide-on going guidance with respect to limits for changes in the tax rate, in the 
total amount of taxes raised, or some other factor relating to tax rates. These types 
of decisions are taken on an annual basis. They do, however, recognize the 
desirability of avoiding uncertainty by making information about potential tax 
increases available during the budget preparation cycle. Mackenzie makes its target 
known at the beginning of the budget cycle. Quesnel also makes their intentions 
known during the budget cycle, by releasing information about the tax implications 
of the budget. Smithers also makes information available in advance of the final 
decision, through the media and through public meetings, various advisory 
committees and newsletters.
While the municipalities have not established taxation policies, they do have 
traditions or precedents that serve much the same purpose. Smithers tends to base 
their tax rates on historical relationships between the property tax classes, with some 
adjustment of the incidence of taxation to meet external requirements (such as the
26 Bello, Hamilton and Reglin, interviews.
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limitation on the tax multiples and tax rates for the utility property class). They try 
to achieve stability in the share of taxation paid by each property classes. There is
reportedly “no political will to charge business more.” ’^ If change is necessary they 
try to implement it incrementally.^® The Mayor indicated that it was his opinion that 
“it is generally a bad thing not to keep up with actual costs."^ He takes the position 
that it is better to have a slow, steady, and modest increase, than to have to make 
major changes in taxation every few years to overcome serious financial pressures.
Mackenzie takes the position that the tax contribution from the major 
industries “gives industry the community that it needs to provide for its 
employees.” ®^ They feel that the mills have a need for the community (for without it 
they would not have productive employees) and the community has a need for the 
mills (for without them there would be no need for employees). Traditionally, they 
have regarded the tax base as having three components (divided roughly one-third 
for each of the two mills, and one-third for the residential and business properties). 
This division has been in place for a long time, and is well accepted.^* They have 
had to adjust tax rates to keep the proportion of tax burden assigned to the various 
classes stable, due to “huge swings in assessments.”^^  They recognize the need for 
stability, and that “they can’t rape and pillage in one area to save in another area.”^^
Ford, interview.
Ford, interview.
Davidson, interview.
^ Ritchie, interview.
Briggs and Ritchie, interviews. 
Waycheshen, interview.
^ Briggs,interview.
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In Quesnel, for many years the guiding principle was that residential taxes 
should average $1 per day per household.^ Inflationary pressures led to a slight 
increase in average household taxation in recent years (it was $401 in 2002, as 
shown in Table 8). This approach shifted the tax burden to major industrial 
pmperdea. It is now under review, for reasons that will be discussed below. In (he 
Mayor’s opinion, “the tax rate for residential is artificially low,” a factor that has 
impacted on QuesneTs ability to provide municipal inftastructure/^
All three municipalities have had stagnant or declining assessed values. 
Therefore, they have not been faced with the difficulties that often accompany rapid 
increases in assessed values, especially when municipalities gain a “windfall” in tax 
revenue by maintaining tax rates in the presence of increasing property values. 
Where tax increases have occurred, Quesnel and Mackenzie have attempted to 
establish a Link between changes in tax levels and changes in levels of service.^^
“Fairness” of the tax structure “hasn’t been discussed much in recent years” 
in Mackenzie.^’ There appears to be a relatively high degree of acceptance of 
current taxation practices.^* The situation is similar in Smithers, although there is 
reported to be a feeling in the business community that residential properties should 
shoulder more of the tax burden.^^ Quesnel is now actively discussing the fairness 
of the system, although they have not developed a definition of what is “fair.” It
Bello, interview.
”  Bello, interview.
^ Hamilton and Bellow, interviews.
Briggs, interview 
”  Briggs, Ritchie and Waycheshen, interviews. 
Mah, interview.
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appears that comparisons with other municipalities will be a significant factor in 
determining wiiat is *y&if" in Quesnel.^
Location, and the role of the media, seems to determine whether the process 
of setting tax rates is regarded as “high profile.” From an administrative point of 
view, the process is not seen as being high profile, providing that an acceptable 
balance between taxation and service levels can be found. There are, however, 
indications that the process can be “driven by the political weight of the 
homeowners.”'*^ Media attention can raise the profile of the process, particularly in 
the minds of the elected officials. The Mayor of Quesnel indicated that the process 
was a high profile exercise, as the “papers play it up.”'*^  On the other hand, the 
media can be helpful in getting information to the public so that they can provide 
meaningful input.'*^
Econome Aspects o f Tax Rates
This section deals with the extent to which economic aspects of tax rates are taken 
into consideration, with specific reference to efforts to “compete” with other 
municipalities for new residents, business or industry, and with any efforts that 
municipalities may take to avoid adverse economic consequences of their tax rate 
structures. In practice, the municipalities do not give much, if any, formal 
consideration to the economic aspects of tax rates. They have not undertaken
^ Reglin, interview. 
Waycheshen, interview
42
Mah, interview.
Bello, interview.
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studies to determine the economic impact of property taxation in their jurisdictions, 
nor have they undertaken studies to determine iwiio actually pays their tax levies.
They are, however, concerned about the impact of taxation. Another respondent 
indicated that they “are worried about the level of prosperity, and don’t want to 
make the situation worse” by changes in the tax structure.^ One respondent 
indicated that they “are worried about the level of prosperity, and don’t want to 
make the situation worse” by changes in the tax structure.'*  ^As discussed above, a 
certain amount of comparison is done to determine how local tax rates compare with 
those of other jurisdictions, but these are done for “justification” or “comfort”, and 
not as data that could inform a policy for tax competition.
Only two examples of adjusting rates because of competitive factors could 
be found, and they are contradictory. In 1997 Mackenzie determined that surveys 
indicated that their rates on business/other properties were low in comparison to 
other municipalities, and adjustments were made to increase the rates.^ Quesnel is 
currently evaluating their rates for major industry as comparisons indicate that they 
are too high."*’
Input Into the Decision-Making Process
One area of interest is the degree to which the municipality interacts with the 
community in the course of setting tax rates, as well as the degree to which the
** Bello, interview.
Bello, interview.
^  Waycheshen interview. 
Hamilton, interview..
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community (or portions of the community) try to influence the municipality’s 
decision-making process. Community approaches to public input into the budget 
process (which includes the process of determining taxation) vary. Smithers makes 
extensive provisions for public input, providing opportunities for the public to 
comment on budget matters after the budget is created, but before tax rates are 
finalized. Matters of taxation are not the primary focus, but discussion of tax issues 
is not precluded.'** Quesnel also has a process for public participation through the 
budget process, but no specific process for public input into the tax rate setting 
process.'*® Mackenzie’s provisions for input are intended to meet the basic 
requirements of the Local Government Act for public consultation on the financial 
plan. They “advertise the budget and put together a simple public information 
package.” ®^ Staff members indicated that a small group of people follow budget 
issues, and perhaps fifteen members of the public attended the required public 
meeting.^* None of the municipalities had a process that involved the public directly 
in discussions of taxation policy.
Formal processes are not the only way of obtaining input. Mackenzie 
obtains input from organizations that receive funding fi’om the municipality. A 
committee of council members meets with the organizations to discuss their grant 
applications. They feel that this process provides an opportunity for public input.^^ 
Smithers uses community surveys to obtain input, and a quarterly newsletter to
^ Davidson, Mah and Ford, interviews. 
^ Hamilton, interview.
^ Waycheshen, interview.
Waycheshen, interview.
“  Briggs, interview.
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convey information to their residents. Quesnel is considering the use of public 
opinion surveys.
Lobbying on tax issues is not a major factor. All of the municipalities report 
considerable lobbying on budget issues such as grants and specific services. 
Lobbying with respect to taxes is much less common. Smithers reports some 
lobbying by the Chamber of Commerce and downtown merchants, and some behind 
the scenes lobbying by major businesses. Such lobbying is, however, rather low 
key.^  ^ In Quesnel, industrial taxpayers did ix)t eiqness concerns for many years. 
They now meet periodically with the municipality, asking for a review of the City’s 
practices regarding taxation of industry (their position being that the share of the 
property tax paid by major industry is too high in relation to the share paid by 
residential properties).^ QuesneTs industries have been “lobbying quite a bit” but 
in a “private and quiet” way.^  ^ In Mackenzie, there is some lobbying from business, 
mainly to seek information on the basis of taxation. The municipality meets with 
major industry periodically. Representatives of industry have pointed out the efforts 
that they have made to control costs in a very difficult market environment, and 
have sought information on what the municipality has done in that regard.^ In 
Mackenzie, staff are “conscious of the impact of change on business,” and “stability 
is given a high value.”^^
”  Ford, interview
^  Bello, Hamilton and Reglin, interviews. 
^ Bello, interview.
^  Briggs and Waycheshen, interviews. 
Waycheshen, interview.
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The role played by the media varies from community to community. In 
Mackenzie, the local media consists o f a weekly newqxg)er, vvticdh generally limits 
its coverage to straightforward reporting. The media coverage is not extensive.^® In 
Smithers, the media provides extensive coverage of the budget process. They are 
said to provide a balanced presentation, emphasizing the provision of information.^^ 
The situation in Quesnel seems to be different. The media tends to focus on the tax 
increase, and the coverage tends to be controversial.^
The public does not seem to follow tax rate issues very closely, regardless of 
media coverage. The municipalities report that they receive very little 
correspondence on taxation matters, and very few personal complaints. On the 
whole, it appears that there is essentially no public dialogue about municipal 
taxation, except that which may occur if there is an exceptional increase in the level 
of taxation. Quesnel may be an exception, given that they are just commencing a 
review of their tax structure.
Clearly, there is a separation between the role of the elected and appointed officials 
at each municipality. In most cases, in the policy development stage, there is a high 
degree of interaction between the municipality’s appointed officers and council 
members. The appointed officers are looked to for information, and for
** Waycheshen, interview 
”  Davidson, Mah and Ford, interviews. 
Bello and Reglin, interviews.
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recommending options for council to consider. The policy enactment stage is 
clearly the domain of the elected officials. As one respondent indicated: “staff 
advises -  Council endorses." Insofar as taawatwoiitlecisicHis are concerned, the key 
dbecisioiifqpENsars to be the establishment of Ae taxation target or gnideliae. In all
cases, there is a degree of interaction between senior staff and council prior to the 
setting of the taxation target or guideline for the budget year. In Mackenzie, that 
consists of discussions between the Mayor and Administrator about the advisability 
of impacting the taxpayer with property tax increases. Staff may also be involved in 
bringing forward information for consideration by council during the course of their 
deliberations about the taxation target. In Smithers and Quesnel staff prepare more 
extensive budget materials for consideration by council. In all cases, the council 
makes a determination about the allowable tax increase, and administration seeks to 
implement the decision by bringing forward budgets and taxation bylaws that 
comply with the guideline.
The process of preparing the tax bylaws is largely an administrative one. In 
Mackenzie, it is described as being “largely technical, working with the guidelines 
set by council.”^  That process involves analysis of assessment data, and calculation 
of tax rates. A certain amount of discretion and judgement is involved as there are 
certain adjustments that must be made to provide, for example, for the impact of 
new construction (an addition to the tax base), reclassifications from one assessment 
class to another, assessment appeals and changes in market values. It appears that.
** Mah, interview.
62 Ritchie, interview.
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so long as past practice is being followed, this is largely the realm of the appointed 
ofGcials.
It appears that the setting of tax rates is a relatively routine matter, and is not 
one wtddiis tbeieanikcyfisxteiuMife analysis. Rather, decisions seem to be made on 
the basis of subjective evaluation of a number of factors in an incremental manner. 
Indeed, one respondent noted that “the overriding concern is the increase over last 
year -  not other f a c t o r s . T h e  process can, in many ways, be regarded as an 
example of “muddling through.” The reasons for this, and the implications, will be 
explored in the next chapter.
63 Ford, interview.
124
Chapter Five
Analysis of Findings and Conclusions 
As stated in Chapter Four, three municipalities have been examined with the 
intention of using analytical generalization to compare the identified theory with 
empirical results, and to generalize the results to a broader theory (wherever 
possible). In this instance, the general question was: What is the basis for the setting 
of municipal tax rates, and who makes the decision? The proposition as stated in the 
hypothesis is that the choice of tax rates is based primarily on short-term political 
considerations with local elected officials playing the dominant role in the ultimate 
decision-making process with municipal staff playing a supporting role in terms of 
providing technical assistance. A set of possible explanatory factors was developed 
in Chapter Three. The practices of three municipalities (Mackenzie, Quesnel and 
Smithers) have been discussed in Chapter Four. This Chapter discusses the findings 
of the case studies in the context of the explanatory factors. Conclusions are offered 
about the applicability of the explanatory factors, implications for municipal finance 
are identified, and a broader theory of the basis for the setting of municipal tax rates 
is suggested. Finally, the proposition as stated in the hypothesis is discussed.
Explanatory Factors and Process -  Conclusions and Implications
Chapter Three is divided into two sections. The first outlines factors that may be 
considered in the course of choosing tax rates and tax policy objectives. The second 
discusses possible decision-making processes and participants in the process. This
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division has also been adopted in this section. Before embarking on a discussion of 
the Actors and processes, and the findings of Ac case study, it is necessary to
acknowledge the limitations inherent in this work. Firstly, the case study involves 
three non-metropolitan, resource-oriented, northern municipalities. A case study 
involving other types of municipalities (such as municipalities in large metropolitan 
areas, or very much larger municipalities) may not yield the same results. Secondly, 
this study may not have identified all of the factors that are considered. Since it 
deals only with one type of municipality, it is not known if there are factors, such as 
isolation from major centers, the degree of mobility of residents, or levels of 
education or income, that may have an influence on decisions relating to taxation 
levels and policies. Finally, this study was written during a time of considerable 
economic uncertainty in the three communities referred to in this study. They are all 
impacted by the forest industry, which in turn has been impacted by the trade 
dispute over softwood lumber and by the uncertainty over the future of Skeena 
Cellulose. As noted in Chapter Four, growth in the three communities has been 
stagnant over the past five years. Therefore, there is no evidence relating to 
decision-making in growing municipalities. It is possible that communities with 
vibrant, growing, economies may approach taxation decisions differently.
Factors Considered in Decision Making
A number of factors were identified in Chapter Three, dealing with political 
considerations, the taxation of business, competition between municipalities, land
126
use, and revenue requirements. These categories were created for organizational 
purposes. While it might be argued that everything related to the setting of tax rates 
has a political connotation or connection, for the purposes of this w oit the 
"political" category is concerned with Actors that are primarily related to increasing 
the chances for electoral success. The category dealing with the taxation of business 
is concerned with factors that lead to the perceived “benefit” to the municipality’s 
residential property owners fiom taxing non-residential property. Competition 
among municipalities for new investment is thought to be important. The extent to 
which tax rates are used for this purpose is discussed under the category of 
“competition with other municipalities.” The use of tax rates to influence land use 
decisions is discussed in the “land use” category, while the influence of the 
municipality’s revenue requirements on tax rates is discussed in the “revenue 
requirements category.”
Political
Five broad themes concerning factors that might be considered political in nature 
have been identified. They are:
1. The property tax is unpopular, and should therefore be avoided or minimized 
(perhaps by minimizing the impact on the majority o f voters by shifting the 
incidence of the tax to non-residents or business and industry);
2. Elected officials, with the hope of increasing their chances of electoral 
success, are biased to "Avouf" homeowna-s (who consfihite Ae m^oiity of
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the electorate in many municipalities) by shifting the burden of taxation fi’om 
residkaotHdto rwar i^tawtLgnjialjproixarty owners;
3. There is a need for stability and predictability in the tax levy (based on the 
premise that uncertainty is a primary cause of discontent about property 
taxation);
4. The property tax may be a viable tool to encourage investment and 
development;
5. The property tax represents the “price” for the provision of municipal 
services, implying the existence of a relationship between the amount of 
property tax paid and the cost of the services provided, and an accoimtability 
mechanism that informs the politicians about the electorate’s acceptance or 
rejection of that price.
Tummg first to the proposition that the property tax is unpopular, and should 
be avoided or minimized (perhaps by minimizing the impact on the majority of 
voters by shifting the incidence of the tax to non-residents or business and industry), 
evidence from the case study is, at first glance, supportive of the proposition. The 
municipalities (and in particular Quesnel) have tended to minimize residential 
taxation by raising a disproportionate share of the tax levy from non-residential 
properties. In 2002 (which was an election year), Mackenzie and Smithers had no 
increase in general taxation. However, if the property tax is truly unpopular, 
pressure to minimize the property tax and to avoid increases in residential taxation 
would be expected. The fact is that the municipalities report relatively little interest
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in property tax issues and very little correspondence complaining about the property 
tax. The municipalities have also increased per capita residaitial taxes and total per
capita taxes over the last five years (see Appendices 1,2 and 3). In fact, in Quesnel, 
percaphareadenfiaiüDudKMihashMaeasedrnudhfaüerfiMüiüüalpercaphataxaüon 
(see Appendix 2). This suggests that either the taxpayers have come to regard protest 
as a lost cause, or they are at least accepting of the need for a reasonable amount of 
taxation. In addition, no respondent in the case study raised the issue of opposition 
to the property tax, per se. It is concluded that, at least at this moment in time, the 
unpopularity of the property tax is not a consideration in the setting of tax rates.
The second broad theme is that elected officials are biased to “favour” 
homeowners, with the hope of increasing their chances of electoral success. The 
data support this proposition. In the three selected municipalities the tax rates are 
structured so that non-residential properties pay a disproportionate share of the tax 
burden. However, it is not clear that this is due to attempts to increase electoral 
success. In all three municipalities there has been a pattern of following “tradition” 
in setting the tax rates. Figure 11 illustrates the distribution of the tax burden in 
Mackenzie over the past 10 years. The proportion of taxes paid by non-residential 
properties has declined slightly in that period, while the proportion of taxation paid 
by residential properties has increased slightly. Similar patterns are to be found in 
Smithers and Quesnel, as shown in Figures 12 and 13.
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The origins of the current distribution of the tax burden may be rooted in the 
system of taxation which existed before the current variable tax rate system was 
established. Current decision-making appears to be oriented toward maintaining the 
status quo, or at best making incremental changes. If that approach has persisted for 
some time, it may be that current patterns simply reflect a tax structure that was 
mandated by the province decades ago. Support for this position may be found in 
the lack of discussion of the principles underlying the tax distribution policy. The 
case study indicated that councils did not engage in a detailed policy debate about 
such matters. The exception is Quesnel where, as a result of representations by 
major industry, consideration is being given to the "fairness" of their policy. In that 
instance, it appears that the policy changes may in fact result in increasing the
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burden of taxation on residential properties^ which is contrary to the proposition of
a bias toward homeowners. As a result, it is concluded that the validity of this 
proposition has not been established.
The third theme concerns the need for stability and predictability in the tax 
levy (based on the premise that uncertainty is a primary cause of discontent about 
property taxation). A review of figures 11,12 and 13 above indicates that, at least in 
terms of the distribution of taxation, stability is a significant factor. Total taxation, 
as shown in Figure 10, has also been stable (although there have been slight 
increases from year to year). Although the municipalities have no official policies 
that call for stability, their adherence to traditional practices probably provides for a 
high degree of stability. Care should be taken not to place too much significance on 
the stability that has been observed. As noted earlier the three subject municipalities 
have been in a period of stagnation. It is possible that it is stagnation, and not 
stability, that is being observed.
Strong practices for financial planning with respect to tax rates might be a 
means of providing predictability in taxation matters. Unfortunately, according to 
the municipal financial officers, the municipalities do not engage in such planning.^ 
They do, however, provide for predictability in two ways. Firstly, they follow 
essentially the same tax distribution policies from year to year. In this regard, they 
are undoubtedly aided by the stable (or stagnant) state of their local economies.
' A final decision had not been taken at the time of writing.
 ^Warren Waycheshen, Director of Finance, District o f Mackenzie, telephone interview by author, 
February 27,2003. Jerry Reglin, Treasurer, City of Quesnel, telephone interview by author, March 4, 
2003. Leslie Ford, Financial Administrator/Collector, Town of Smithers, telephone interview by 
author, February 25,2003.
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Secondly, they take steps to avoid surprising property owners with une^qiected tax
increases. All of the municipalities take steps to publicize their budget situation and 
their taxation objectives dunng their budget processes. On the basis of the 
foregoing, it is concluded Aat the municipalities do recognize the need for stability
and predictability in taxation, and that it is one of the factors that they consider in 
setting their tax rates.
As pointed out in Chapter Three, the literature suggests that the property tax 
may be a viable tool to encourage investment and development.^ The case study 
shows no evidence that this use of the property tax is considered. While the three 
municipalities do compare their tax rates with those of other municipalities, there is 
no evidence that this is done for the purpose o f setting rates to “undercut” other 
municipalities, for the purpose of attracting investment. Their major concern in 
comparing tax rates is to make sure that their municipality is not “out of line” with 
the others (i.e. that they are neither too high nor too low). About the best that can be 
said is that they want to be sure that their tax rates are not so high as to discourage 
investment.
The final theme is that the property tax represents the “price” for the 
provision of municipal services, implying the existence of a relationship between the 
amount of tax paid and the cost of the services provided, and an accountability 
mechanism that informs the politicians about the electorate’s acceptance or rejection 
of the price. The case study revealed that none of the municipalities has established
' See Chapter Three, pp. 80 -81
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a formal link between the cost of service to the various property classes and the level 
of taxation, or between the beneGts received and the level of taxation. There were
few attempts to determine the electorate’s view of the “price” of the services. 
Smithers was an exception in that regard, in that they undertook a survey in 2002 
that asked respondents to indicate whether the expenditures should be increased, 
maintained or decreased (the survey form included information about the amount of 
property tax allocated to each service). The respondents chose stability, 70% 
seeking to have expenditures maintained, 11% seeking an increase, and 19% seeking 
a decrease.^
It is tempting to argue that the municipalities do, in fact, regard the taxes as 
the price that property owners pay for a basket of municipal services. Each of the 
municipalities has a mechanism which allows council to weigh community 
aspirations and needs against the cost of providing services and the impact on 
taxpayers. They have various arrangements to provide them with input from the 
community. Finally, the size of the communities probably allows members of 
council and staff to be familiar with the views of a range of community members. 
The budget process, in effect, becomes a process in which trade-offs are made 
between the desire for constraint in taxation and the desire for an acceptable range of 
municipal services. Through this process the councils determine, on the basis of 
their subjective opinions, how much taxation the residents are prepared pay. The 
result may range from no increase in taxation (which would likely require reductions
* Town o f Smithers, Service Survey Results, 2002
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in selected services or activities) through to an increase in taxation (which would 
likely result in expanded or inqiroved municipal services). This is, however, not the 
same as establishing a “price” as there is really no linkage between the services 
provided and the taxes levied. No attempts are made to calculate either the cost o f 
servicing certain types of property, or of the benefits that are received by those 
properties.
In conclusion, of the five themes identified, only one appears to be major 
factor in the determination of tax rates, as evidenced by the case study. That is the 
premise that stability and predictability in the tax levy is a requirement. The 
evidence is, however, insufficient to allow outright rejection of the first two themes 
referred to above (minimizing residential taxation because of the unpopularity of the 
property tax and favouring homeowners to enhance electoral success). There is no 
indication that tax rates are used in a political way as a tool to encourage investment 
and development. Taxation of non-residential properties is, nevertheless, thought to 
be an important issue, as will be seen in the following paragraphs.
Taxation of Business
Chapter Three identified three main themes that may inform the approach to taxation 
of business. They are:
1. a perception that business can pass property taxes on to others (such as
tenants or customers);
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2. a belief that an area that is a “host” to a business or industrial activity is 
entitled to a part of the proceeds;
3. a perception that property taxes imposed on business may be exported 
beyond the municipal boundaries (for example, to customers or investors in 
the business who live outside the municipality).
These three themes are thought to lead to a belief that there is a “benefit” to the 
municipality’s residential property owners from taxing non-residential property.
The case study indicates that these are issues that are not explicitly addressed 
during the decision-making process. None of the respondents identified any of the 
three themes as factors that they considered when determining how the burden of 
property taxation is to be shared. It may be that the belief that there is a “benefit” to 
be gained from taxing business/industry disproportionately is so much part of the 
system of local government values that it inhibits consideration of any tax structure 
other than the traditional. Determining whether that is the case is beyond the scope 
of this study.
Competition With Other Municipalities
As noted in Chapter Three, a significant body of literature suggests that 
municipalities compete against other municipalities to attract mobile investment 
and/or mobile residents.* This may take the form of competition through the use of 
low tax rates, or the use of high levels of service. In each case, the objective is to
* See Chapter Three, 84 - 85
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increase investment in the community. The case study indicates that the 
municipalities regularly compare their tax rates with those of other municipalities.^ 
However, there was no evidence that tax rates are deliberately man^ulated to 
improve their competitive position vis-à-vis other municipalities. The purpose of
monitoring the tax rates of other municipalities is to make sure that the 
municipality’s taxation is “in line” with the practices of other municipalities.’ It 
appears that adjustments are made if taxes are either too high or too low in relation 
to other municipalities. For example, Mackenzie increased the tax rates for 
business/other properties in 1997 because they were considered to be too low in 
comparison with rates charged by others.* Quesnel is considering adjustments to 
their rates for major industry because they are comparatively high.^ However, these 
are exceptions. In general, the comparisons do not result in corrective action being 
taken on an annual basis, as would be expected if the municipalities were using tax 
rates for competitive purposes.
None of the municipalities indicated that competition with other 
municipalities was a consideration in setting their tax rates. The major concern was 
to ensure that their rates were not “out of line.” Presumably, being too high (or too 
low) would be make it more difficult to justify their taxation levels to those few who 
might inquire or complain about property taxation. Being too high would likely be
* See Chapter Four, 106.
’ Ford, interview. Waycheshen, interview.
* Waycheshen, interview.
 ^Mayor Nate Bello, telephone interview by author, March 3,2003
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seen as discouraging new investment in the community. Being too low would likely 
be seen as giving an unfair break to a property class.
Competition between governments for access to the same tax base also 
occurs. In British Columbia municipalities, regional districts, the Assessment and 
Finance Authorities, and the provincial government all impose property taxes on the 
same properties that are subject to municipal taxation. There is no indication that 
there is active competition on the part of the municipalities for the property tax base. 
Interviews with the municipal officials indicate that the tax rates levied by other 
agencies are not a factor in their decision-making. They do not make adjustments to 
their tax rates to compensate for changes in the rates imposed by other governments. 
While competition for the tax base may be played out at other levels (for example, 
between the Union of British Columbia Municipalities and the provincial 
government), it is not, under existing circumstances, a factor that is taken into 
consideration when determining tax rates at the municipal level.
Land Use
The effect of taxation on development is thought to be a factor for consideration in 
setting tax rates, as suggested in Chapter Three*®. Respondents in the case study 
recognized that high tax rates might be a deterrent to development. There was, 
however, no indication that this was a factor that was specifically taken into account 
in determining rates.
See Chapter Three, 85-86
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Revenue Requirements
As suggested in Chapter Three, revenue requirements are a major factor in 
determining the tax rate requirements/^ Each of the municipalities had a process to 
reconcile the needs of the community with the community’s ability (or willingness) 
to pay (as determined subjectively by the municipal council). While some may 
suggest that the amount to be raised from taxation is simply the difference between 
non-tax revenue and spending, the matter is not that simple in actual practice. There 
are other factors that have to be taken into account, as discussed above. 
Consideration of other factors often leads to adjustments to both spending plans and 
taxation objectives. The balancing of the various competing considerations takes 
place within the process of determining tax rates, which is discussed in the 
following section.
The Process o f Determining Tax Rates
In Chapter Three it was determined that the characteristics of the decision-making 
process would include;
1. A dynamic relationship between elected officials and staff. While each has a 
defined role, the relationships are dynamic and reciprocal.
2. A three-part process, involving the development of policy, the adoption of 
policy, and the implementation of policy.
" See Chuter Three, 86-87
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Insofar as the process is concerned, it was suggested that the following points should 
be considered:
1. The origin of policy initiatives;
2. Whether (and how) relevant values are articulated and reconciled;
3. How the interests of those not directly involved in the decision-making 
process are considered and reconciled;
4. Whether the process is open, and whether there is an examination of the 
costs and benefits of possible alternatives;
5. The nature of the role played by the participants, and whether senior staff 
appear to play a dominant role;
6. Whether the process is one which deals primarily with policy issues or is one 
which is primarily an administrative exercise;
7. Whether policy initiatives come from the electorate (either as individuals or 
through community groups such as Chambers of Commerce or Ratepayers 
Associations), and the source(s) of influence;
8. The role played by the media.
A review of the processes used by the three municipalities shows that there 
is, indeed, a dynamic relationship between elected officials and staff. Staff are 
looked to for input into the development of policy in a variety of ways, yet the 
adoption of policy clearly remains the prerogative of the elected officials. The 
process of setting tax rates can be broken down into three stages. While the 
sequence of events varies, in each municipality there is a process of reviewing
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community requirements and constraints, leading to the setting of policy with 
respect to the budget and/or the taxation objectives for the year.^^ This is the policy 
development stage, which involves an exchange of information and views between 
elected and appointed officials. It leads to the preparation of budget and taxation 
bylaws that are ultimately enacted by the council (adoption of policy). Municipal 
staff proceed with the implementation stage, which for the present purposes is the 
levying and collection of taxes.
In each of the municipalities, staff play a key role in providing policy 
initiatives for spending (either capital or operational) and for the financing of 
spending (which may involve borrowing, leasing, the use of fees and charges, or 
appropriations fi-om surplus or reserves as well as taxation matters). Policy 
initiatives also come fiom council, in particular with respect to their subjective 
evaluation of the community’s willingness or ability to pay increased taxes. All of
the municipalities have a public input process, but it is not clear that these processes 
are the origin of policy initiatives. They appear to be, in the main, opportunities for 
the public to critique municipal financial plans and to lobby for their particular 
interests.
The decision-making processes used in the municipalities are not elaborate. 
The processes are relatively open (accessible to the press and the public). Insofar as 
taxation is concerned, there seems to be little discussion of principles and values.
^ In Mackenzie this occurs at the beginning o f the budget cycle, in Quesnel and Smithers it occurs 
after council has reviewed the proposed budget. See Chapter Four, 101-103 
" See Chapter Four, 101-103 
" See Chapter Four, 112-113
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For the most part the decisions are incremental and follow past practice. The major 
issue (insofar as property taxation is concerned) is the determination of the amount 
of tax increase (if any). This a^iears to Ibe tbKsnssult of "sRibgeK;thre aaawBssmaits 
and political bargaining" as suggested by Undal.^^ Those twiw) are not directly 
involved in the decision-making process must rely on the participants to consider 
and reconcile their interest. It is possible, of course, for interested citizens to follow 
the course of discussions and to seek an audience with council, or lobby council 
members or staff, or appear at a consultation meeting.
The media appear not to be a significant factor in Mackenzie and Smithers, 
at least in terms of influencing taxation decisions. Respondents in Mackenzie and 
Smithers indicated that the media restrict themselves to informational reporting. 
Their influence, if any, may lie in the provision of information to those members of 
the community who wish to use it. The indications are that the media in Quesnel 
may have more impact. According to one source the Quesnel newspaper likes to 
generate controversy, and tends to put things in a negative light. However, as noted 
in Chapter Three, it is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to evaluate the 
impact of the media in these matters.
C. Richard Tindal and Susan Nobes Tindal, Local Government in Canada;^  4* ed. 
(Toronto/Montreal: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1995), 301 
Waycheshen, interview. Mayor James Davidson, telephone interview by author, February 25, 
2003. Ford, interview.
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Setting Municipal Taxes -  A Theoretical Explanation
The foregoing analysis suggests that there are six components to the basis for setting 
municipal tax rates:
1. Local economic conditions, especially as they affect the ability and 
willingness of property owners to pay for municipal services;
2. Community desires for services and facilities;
3. The financial requirements of the municipality, as identified by civic 
administrators;
4. The past taxation practices o f the local government;
5. The need for stability and predictability in the tax levy
6. The taxation practices of other local governments.
These components are brought together in a three-stage decision-making process 
that has, as a principal characteristic, a relationship between elected officials and 
staff where roles are defined and where the relationship between the two is dynamic 
and reciprocal. The process, it is suggested, is highly incremental in nature. This 
suggestion will be explored in more detail below.
The case study suggests that local economic conditions are an important 
consideration in setting tax guidelines to be followed by municipal staff. In 
Mackenzie, it is reported that discussions about setting the target for taxation 
involves consideration of the community’s expectations of the municipality, the 
state of the economy, the rate of inflation, assessment trends and local economic
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circumstances.*’ Similar considerations are encountered in Smithers and Quesnel.** 
Rates of unemployment, prospects for growth and development, the health of the 
business community, and the state of the supporting resource industries (if any) are 
important factors, as they affect the ability of property owners to bear the burden of 
increased taxation, and their willingness to pay. The local economic conditions are 
balanced against the community’s desire for service and facilities (and, in particular, 
their desire for improvements in quality or for additional facilities and services). 
The local economic conditions are also balanced against the municipality’s financial 
requirements, as identified by civic administrators. It is the civic administration that 
advises council on the expenditures required for the coming year to provide the 
services desired by the residents, in line with council policies and in compliance 
with a wide variety of regulations. It is also the civic administration that identifies 
various ways of financing for both operational and capital expenditures. In each of 
the municipalities, the councils left the task of preparing budget proposals to staff.*** 
It is the task of the municipal council, with input jfrom their senior staff, to 
arrive at a conclusion about the amount of taxation that is to be imposed to meet the 
municipality’s financial needs. When that decision is made, consideration must then 
be given to the way in which the burden is to be distributed among the property 
classes. Deciding on the distribution of the burden of taxation, it is clear, involves
Briggs, Ritchie and Waycheshen, interviews.
** Bello and Mah, interviews.
See Chapter Four, 101-103
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three major components: past taxation practice, monitoring the taxation practices of 
other municipalities, and stability and predictabili^.
In the absence of evidence of a need for change, the municipality will adopt 
the prior year's taxation policies in determining the distrikition of die tax burden. 
That is, they will opt for stability in the proportion of tax paid by the various 
property classes or they will opt to maintain the relationships between the residential 
tax rate and the non-residential tax rates. Figures 11,12 and 13 illustrate the stability 
in the distribution of the tax burden in the three municipalities.
New construction or development, which results in new tax revenue, may be 
evidence of a need for change. For example, where past practice calls for stability in 
the allocation of the tax burden between classes, if an expansion of the retail sector 
adds five percent to the tax roll, a decision may be made to alter the traditional 
relationship to increase the proportion of taxes paid by the business/other property 
class (to reflect the larger size of that component of the community). Unfortunately, 
neither Mackenzie nor Smithers (the two municipalities which seek stability in the 
distribution of the tax burden) have enjoyed significant growth fi-om new 
development in the recent past, so this point could not be verified.
None of the municipalities experienced a significant loss of investment (that 
is, the destruction of a major component of their tax base). Therefore, there is no 
indication of what approach might be taken in such an event. The tendency to 
incremental change and stability could be taken to suggest that expenditure levels 
would be reduced to offset all or part of the loss. That suggests that a change in the
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distribution of the tax burden would occur. It should be noted that the closure of a 
business or industry does not result in the immediate loss of the tax base. Taxes 
continue to be collected from the owner until such time as the improvements are 
removed (unless, of course, the municipality becmnes the owner of thw; property 
because of non-payment of taxes).
Unfavourable comparisons with the taxation practices of other municipalities 
may also be cause for change. The three municipalities report that they monitor the 
taxation practices of other municipalities. Such monitoring does not result in a 
change to past practices so long as taxation practices are “in line” with those of other 
municipalities. When the practices diverge too far (that is, the tax rates become too 
low or too high in comparison to other municipalities) the municipality will institute 
a change to past practice. Such a change will be undertaken in an incremental 
fashion, in order not to create instability and uncertainty about tax levels.^® 
Different classes of property owners may, from time to time, lobby for a change in 
taxation practices. For example, representatives of major industry may seek tax 
concessions when the business environment is challenging. They are unlikely to 
gain such concessions unless they can demonstrate that the municipality’s taxation 
policies are “out of line” with those of comparable municipalities.
The third major component is stability and predictability. It is the need for 
stability and predictability in taxation matters that inhibits change unless there is a 
very good reason for change. The level of interest in municipal taxation matters is
^ Ford, Waycheshen, interviews.
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generally low. Unexpected significant changes are likely to awaken interest. 
Therefore, it is in the interest of both elected and appointed officials to make sure 
that the taxpayers are not “surprised” by change, and to seek to undertake change in 
an incremental manner.^*
All of these factors are brought together in a three-part decision making 
process. The first part involves the development of policy. This involves 
considerable interaction between the elected and appointed officials. The elected 
officials bring to the process their subjective views of the local economic conditions 
and community desires for services and facilities, and their evaluation of the way in 
which municipal operations are conducted. Staff bring the expert and intimate 
knowledge of the operation of the municipality (in short, their professional 
expertise), and specific proposals for revenues and expenditures and taxation (in the 
form of budget proposals). They also bring their own subjective views of the 
various issues up for discussion. Eventually, the second part of the process is 
reached, and the municipal council is in a position to adopt policy.
Policy may, in fact, be adopted in stages; For example, the council may 
adopt a policy for the taxation targets for a given year (leading to the development 
of a budget document). Then die budget may be adopted, followed by the bylaws 
imposing property taxes. Finally, when policies have been adopted, the 
administration can begin implementation.
This might be described as the “let sleeping dogs lie” approach.
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According to the foregoing, the setting of tax rates does not involve 
consideration of economic factors of property taxation (such as economic 
inefficiency or disincentives for development), and consideration of issues of 
fairrwass and equity (except as they may arise as the result of un&vourable 
comparisons with other municipalities). That is, there is no evidence that the 
municipalities give consideration to the principles underlying their taxation policies. 
The primary concern is to find an acceptable balance between local economic 
conditions (especially as they affect the ability and willingness of property owners to 
pay for municipal services), community desires for services and facilities, and the 
financial requirements of the municipality. Having done that, the tax burden is 
distributed largely by taking into consideration the past taxation practices, the need 
for stability and predictability, and the taxation practices of other local governments.
It is evident fi-om the case studies that changes in taxation structure occur 
infrequently, and generally incrementally. Indeed, changes in the level of taxation 
also tend to occur incrementally. For example, it is reported that Smithers tries to 
make changes that may be required in its tax distribution policy incrementally.^ 
Figures 11, 12 and 13 indicate that changes in the tax distribution policies are 
incremental. Figure 14 indicates that changes in the amount of property tax levied 
occur incrementally. In that figure, it is evident that taxation levels in Quesnel have 
increased substantially over the past ten years. However, they have done so in an
22 Ford, interview.
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incremental fashion. Change has been rapid, but it has not taken the form of 
periodic "great le ^ ."
Figure 14
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The emphasis on past practice and stability may lead to stagnation or near- 
stagnation in policy. It seems that policies governing the distribution of taxation 
change only when some kind of external stimulus is applied. Otherwise, past 
policies are continued. The implications for municipal finance are significant, and 
are discussed in the next section.
Implications for Municipal Finance
Property taxation is an important source of revenue for municipalities. In 1997, 52.8 
per cent of municipal revenue in British Columbia came from property taxation and
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grants in lieu of taxes.^ That does not include property taxes levied by other 
agencies but collected by municipalities for transmittal to the agencies. Therefore, it 
is in the interest of municipalities to maintain a system of taxation that has the 
support of the populace and that does not create any urmecessary economic harm. 
There is no evidence from the case study that would support a conclusion that the 
system is not generally accepted by property owners. However, the study does raise 
issues related to the lack of analysis and tax policy development, the potential for 
taxation practices that are economically inefficient, and the potential for erosion of 
municipal autonomy.
When the current tax legislation was introduced the Ministry of Municipal 
Affairs, Recreation and Culture stated that “[tjhese changes address the fundamental 
belief that, although market values are generally accepted as a reasonable base for 
property taxation, there is a need for the property tax burden to change more 
gradually than would result from the response to rapid changes in market 
conditions."^ This implies that the government expects that property taxation will 
be based on assessed values, but that it accepts that rapid changes would not be 
acceptable. It expects that change will be implemented gradually. That is, if the 
assessed value of a particular class increased significantly relative to the values of 
the other classes (for reasons other than new construction), the associated shift of the 
tax burden would occur over time, and not all in one year. However, the
^ Robert L. Bish and Eric G. Clemens, Local Government in British Columbia, 3"* ed., (Richmond; 
Union of British Columbia Municipalities, 1999), 150 
Province of British Columbia, Ministry of Municipal Affairs, Recreation and Housing, Municipal 
Financial Services Branch, A User’s Guide to Local Property Taxation in British Columbia, 
(Victoria: January 1993), 3
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government expects that there will, in the end, be a shift in the distribution of the 
burden of taxation to reflect the relative change in assessed values.
Two of the three municipalities in the case study (Mackenzie and Smithers) 
have adopted the practice of stabilizing the distribution of the tax burden. As a 
result, while the proportion of assessment in the major industrial class increased 
from 36.2% in 1998 to 39.9% in 2002 in Mackenzie^, the percentage of the total tax 
levy paid by major industry declined from 66.7% to 66%. In Smithers, while the 
percentage of assessment in the business/other class increased from 25.6% in 1989 
to 28.1% in 2002, the percentage of the tax levy paid by diat class remained constant 
at 48.23%.^ This approach upsets the relationship of assessments to property 
taxation. Stabilizing the proportion of the tax base paid by a property class, 
regardless of the change in assessed value in that class, means that market value is 
used only to determine the allocation of the property tax within the property class. It 
“freezes” the relationship between property classes, and eventually distorts the 
relationship between the amount of the tax paid and the value of the property. This 
is illustrated in Table 12, below.
“  See Appendix 1 
“  See Appendix 3
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Table 12
Changing Relationship between Assessed Value 
and Taxation
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Assessed Value -  House $100,000 $105,000 $110,000
Assessed Value -  Store $200,000 $210,000 $220,000
Assessed Value -  Major Industry $200,000 $195,000 $190,000
Taxes to be levied each year $10,000 $10,000 $10,000
% of Assessment Total -  House 20% 20.6% 22%
% of Assessment Total -  Store 40% 41.2% 40%
% of Assessment Total -  Major Industry 40% 38.2% 38%
% of Tax Burden -  House 10% 10% 10%
% of Tax Burden -  Store 30% 30% 30%
% of Tax Burden -  Major Industry 50% 50% 50%
Taxes -  House $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Taxes-Store $3,000 $3,000 $3,000
Taxes -  Major Industry $5,000 $5,000 $5,000
Tax Rate -  House $10 $9.52 $9.09
Tax Rate -  Store $15 $14.29 $13.64
Tax Rate -  Major Industry $25 $25.64 26.32
Tax Multiple -  Store 1.5 1.5 1.5
Tax Multiple -  Major Industry 2.5 2.69 2.9
This example assumes a very simple municipality with one house, one store, and one major 
industrial fecility. The Tax Rate is shown as $1 per $1,000 o f assessed value.
The above example shows that as major industrial assessment declines the 
tax rate rises. While the amount of tax paid by major industry is unchanged, its 
relationship to the residential and business taxes changes, as indicated by the 
increase in the tax multiple. In the example, the taxes remain the same from year to 
year. However, if taxes were related to market value, the taxes on the major 
industrial property would have declined, while the taxes on the store increased. The 
property assessment would no longer be the basis for the allocation of taxes between
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property classes. As these types of discrepancies grow, the system will become more 
difficult to explain.
The difficulty in explanation is compounded by the fact that the 
municipalities do not have property taxation policies that explain the principles 
underlying their tax rate structures. The lack of explanation will, in the view of the 
author, make the system less understandable. That, in turn, could result in an 
erosion of confidence in the system.
A review of the major industrial tax rates and tax multiples reveals that there 
is a trend to higher tax multiples for that class. As is shown in Table 13 the average 
major industrial tax rate in communities with significant major industrial assessment 
has climbed from $37.5 to $39.5/$1,000, and the multiple has risen from 6.1 to 7.0. 
The average, however, is influenced by very significant changes in Kimberly. If 
Kimberly is excluded, the average major industrial tax rate for the communities with 
significant major industrial assessment has increased firom $32.09 to $41.45/$1,000, 
and the multiple has risen from 4.7 to 7.1. The increases have been as significant in 
non-major industrial centers, where tax rates for the major industry class have 
increased from an average of $31 to $48.7/$l,000, and multiples have increased 
from an average of 3.5 to 7.2. (Municipalities were classed as major industrial 
centers if more than 10% of their assessment was in the major industry class in 
1992. The data was drawn from the group of twenty-one municipalities referred to 
in Chapter Two.) Considerably more research would be required to determine
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whether this is the result of following traditional patters of tax burden distribution, 
or some other factor.
Table 13
Major Industrial Tax Rates and Multiples
Municpality Tax Rate Tax Multiple Tax Rate Tax Multiple
1992 1992 2002 2002
Campbell River** 36.775 7.5 51.595 9.460
Castlegar** 41.970 5.7 27.926 6.490
Cranbrook 42.610 3.7 59.069 5.540
Dawson Creek* 31.500 4.320
Fort St. John* 12.500 2.030
Kimberly** 80.883 17.2 24.008 6.830
Kitimat** 31.067 50.2 50.717
Mackenzie** 19.757 2.3 29.288 3.450
Merritt 36.827 4.2 45.240 7.850
Nelson 26.108 2.0 15.522 2.000
Port Alberni** 58.723 5.2 75.891 7.510
Powell River** 43.067 6.7 48.000 11.620
Prince Rupert** 25.384 3.0 39.997 4.000
Quesnel** 17.787 4.1 43.527 10.250
Reveistoke 30.584 3.9 45.558 6.260
Salmon Arm 27.922 3.5 42.347 5.860
Sechelt*
Smithers 24.570 4.0 61.773 10.780
Terrace 40.538 3.7 66.293 8.130
Trail** 13.259 3.4 15.387 3.680
Williams Lake 30.511 3.1 64.205 9.420
Average
Non-Major Industrial
Centers 31.008 3.5 48.705 7.2
Major Industrial Centers 37.512 6.1 39.513 7.0
* denotes no major industrial tax rates in 1992
** denotes a major industrial center (a community with more than 10% of its assessments 
in the major industrial property class in 1992 
Note; The averages for the Major Industrial Centers does not include Kitimat. Kitimafs 
2002 tax structure makes comparison with other municipalities difficult due to the lack 
of a residential tax rate.
Note: The average for the non-major industrial centers excludes Sechelt, Dawson Creek, 
and Fort St. John, as they had no major industrial tax rates in 1992
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There is a further hazard to simply increasing tax rates to offset assessment 
declines to maintain a certain tax distribution. Assessments on industrial properties 
tend to decline as time goes by, as the industrial plant decreases in value due to 
depreciation and obsolescence. While increasing tax rates on existing industrial 
plants may not cause any real hardship for existing plants (as their taxes would not 
increase to the same extent as the tax rate), it may result in a disincentive to new 
investment. New investment would be faced with a higher rate than would have 
been the case if tax distribution policy recognized the decline in the relative worth of 
the existing plants.
As illustrated in the above table, there is significant variation in the tax rates 
for major industrial communities, and in the tax multiples. Assessment of major 
industrial properties involves the use of rates and/or costs prescribed by the 
Assessment Commissioner.^^ Thus, the assessed value of similar plants will be 
similar regardless of location (except for land values). However, rates vary by a 
factor of six between communities (the lowest rate being $12.5/$1,000 and the 
highest being $75.89/$!,000). No literature could be found on the point, but it 
seems reasonable to expect that such differences may have a distorting effect on 
decisions relating to investment and re-investment. As discussed in Chapter One, 
Bird and Ballentine and Thirsk have suggested that the taxation of business and 
industry at higher rates than residential properties is economically inefficient. ^
Val Drebet, Assessment Training, unpublished manuscript dated May 2001, 29 
Richard M Bird, “Local Business Taxes,” report prepared for the World Bank Institute, 2002 at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/Dublicfinance/documents/fiscalfederalism Russia/Bird tax.pdf. pp.
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This aspect is not something that is regularly considered in setting municipal tax 
rates. Further research to determine what ef&ct, if any, this might be having on the 
economies in northern British Columbia may be warranted.
British Columbia has already seen one instance where the provincial 
government intervened to curb what was deemed to be excessive municipal taxation 
of the utility property class.^ ® The province has now restricted utility taxation to the 
greater of $40/$ 1,000 or 2.5 the tax rate for business/other property (subject to 
certain exemptions for specific municipalities).^® That suggests that the multiple for 
utility taxation could be in the area of 6 (2.5 times the provincially-set 
business/other class multiple of 2.45). The average tax rates and tax multiples for 
the major industrial class are approaching the levels that the province found to be 
too high for the utility class (and some individual rates are considerably higher). 
Are those rates harming the province’s economy? Will that result in provincial 
action to restrict municipal autonomy to set industrial tax rates? Answers to these 
questions are beyond the scope of this study. They are, however, important to local 
government. Few other jurisdictions have given municipalities the degree of 
autonomy with respect to taxation structures that is found in British Columbia. It 
would be distressing if British Columbia’s municipalities stumbled into a situation
5-6. J. Gregory Ballentine and Wayne R. Thirsk, Taxation without Representation: The 
Consequences of Taxing Non-residential Property, (Ottawa: Canada Mortgage and Housing 
Corporation, 1982), 2.
Bish and Clemens, 155
Local Government Services and Infiastructure, Ministry o f  Community, Aboriginal and W omen’s 
Services, Province o f  British Columbia. Property Taxation -  Provincial Class Multiples for 2002 and 
Municipal Taxation Rate Cap for Class 2 Property for 2002. Circular No. 02:08, (Victoria: March 
18,2002), accessed at http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs infra/cir/cir0208.html on March 9.
2003.
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where the province compelled to deal with perceptions of over taxation of m ^or
industry as it did with railway and utility taxation.
It is, however, possible that the incremental nature of changes to tax rates 
and taxation policies, together with the fact that municipalities compare their tax
rates to make sure that they are “in the ball park”, will act as a “corrective” device. 
As Lindblom observed, “every important interest or value has its watchdog. And 
these watchdogs can protect the interests in their jurisdiction in two quite different 
ways: First by redressing damages done by other agencies; and, second, by
anticipating and heading off injury before it occurs.” *^ In the hypothetical case cited 
above, it might be expected that the owner of the major industry would, if he felt 
aggrieved, make representations to have the tax distribution policy changed to 
reflect the changes in the assessed value of his plant. The municipality would 
respond if their review of the tax practices of other municipalities indicated that they 
were no longer “in the ball park” in their taxation of major industry. Incremental 
changes to policy would be made until they were more in line with the practices of 
other municipalities. This, in fact, appears to be what is taking place. In Chapter 
One a policy change with respect to the allocation of the burden of taxation was 
identified. Table 1 indicated that municipal councils have been moderating the 
taxation of major industrial properties and utility properties, while shifting the tax 
burden slightly to business/other and residential properties.
Charles E. Lindblom, “The Science o f  ‘Muddling Through’,” in Democracy and Market System, 
(Oslo: Norwegian University Press, 1988). First published in Public Administration Review, Vol. 19, 
No 2 (Spring 1959). 182
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The process of “mutual adjustment” identified by Lindblom^^ may, in fact, 
be an argument for maintaining the autonomy that municipalities enjoy with respect 
to taxation distribution policies despite the trends noted in Table 13. A 
decentralized system may be more responsive than a highly centralized one, 
especially in a province as diversified as British Columbia. Municipalities where 
major industrial tax rates and tax distribution policies are problematic may be lead to 
change their policies, if they can be convinced of the need for change. The need for 
change is likely to be driven by local economic circumstances and the relationship 
between the municipality’s taxation policies and those of other municipalities. The 
change is likely to occur incrementally, so as not to create instability and 
unpredictability in taxation matters.
The Hypothesis
At the outset, this thesis addressed the hypothesis that the choice of tax rates is 
based primarily on short-term political considerations with local elected officials 
playing the dominant role in the ultimate decision-making process (although 
municipal staff is engaged in providing technical support). It is now time to 
consider whether the facts support the hypothesis or not. Much, of course, depends 
on what is meant by “short-term political considerations.” For the present purposes, 
this is taken to mean that the time horizon is limited to the current budget cycle, and
Ibid., 183-185
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that the principal consideration is the impact that taxation decisions may have on 
electoral success.
The research that has been done supports a conclusion that the considerations 
are short-term. There is little, if  any, evidence to suggest that Irmger term
considerations are given a great deal of attention. There is less support for the 
proposition that the principal consideration is the impact that taxation decisions may 
have on electoral success. Electoral considerations, no doubt, are present whenever 
an elected official is asked to make a decision. However, the case study does not 
support a conclusion that electoral considerations are the principal factors. As 
discussed in this chapter, the case studies suggest that local economic conditions 
(especially as they affect the ability and willingness of property owners to pay for 
municipal services), community desires for services and facilities, the financial 
requirements of the municipality, and the need for stability and predictability receive 
the most consideration.
Contrary to the expectations raised in the literature, the case studies did not 
support a conclusion that the unpopularity of the property tax, the desire to seek 
favour with residential taxpayers by shifting taxation to non-residential properties, 
or the desire to have competitive tax rates to attract new investment were considered 
in setting tax rates. Also, the case studies did not indicate that property taxes are 
regarded as the “price” for municipal services.
Insofar as the second part of the hypothesis is concerned, there is no doubt 
that the elected officials play the dominant role in the decision-making process.
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although municipal staff is engaged in providing technical support. The case studies 
indicate that, although staff are expected to provide a wide variety of information to 
council, and in fact prepare budget and taxation material for covmcil’s ratification, it 
is council that makes the final determination about the allowable tax increases. 
Therefore, it is concluded that the hypothesis is only partly true.
Lessons for Municipalities
A number of lessons can be drawn from the analysis of the case study and the 
literature. These lessons generally involve more attention to strategic planning for 
tax rate policy and the policies implicit in tax rate choices, and to monitoring the tax 
policies actually implemented by municipalities. Specifically:
1. Municipalities should be giving more attention to the linkage between 
assessment and taxation, with particular emphasis on equity between 
property classes, as well as within property classes.
2. Municipalities should document the assumptions and policies underlying 
their policies for property taxation and, in particular, for the distribution of 
the tax burden among the property classes.
3. There should be more explicit discussion of municipal tax distribution 
policies.
4. More comprehensive comparisons of municipal tax rates and tax rate policies 
should be undertaken.
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5. Municipalities should include more detailed tax rate planning in their five- 
year financial plans.
6. Municipalities should be considering the economic implications of their tax 
rate policies.
Municipalities in the case study tended toward stability in the apportionment 
of the burden of taxation among the property classes. Stability in the apportionment 
of the burden of taxation among property classes would, if carried on long enough, 
distort the relationship between the amount of tax paid and the value of property. 
Distortion of this relationship will make it more difficult to explain the principles 
underlying the property tax system. The difficulty of explanation will be 
compounded by the lack of documented property taxation policies. It is feared that 
the result could be an erosion of confidence in the system. In a time of increased 
emphasis on accountability and on the opportunity for the public to participate in the 
policy-making process, it seems inconsistent that policies affecting the single most 
important source of municipal revenue are not documented, publicized, and 
discussed. These policies should be documented as part of the five year financial 
plan. Allowances for additional revenue from new construction are commonly taken 
into account in the preparation of financial plans. Allowance for declining assessed 
values due to the depreciation or obsolescence of major industrial plan is less 
common. It should be included in the financial planning.
A wide variety of statistics on municipal finance, assessment and taxation are 
made available by the Ministry of Communities, Aboriginal and Women’s Services.
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These are used for municipal comparisons. Despite the availability of data, there 
does not appear to be any centralized or commonly available analysis dealing with 
matters of property taxation policy. It is left to each municipality to undertake its 
own analysis, alone or in partnership with other municipalities. The discussion of 
municipal tax distribution policies would be facilitated by a comprehensive 
comparison of tax rates and tax rate policies.
Finally, the way in which property taxes are imposed can have economic 
implications for a community. The case studies indicated that, aside from 
considering the ability of the community (or sectors of the community) to pay 
additional taxes, municipalities give little consideration to the economic impact of 
their taxation policy choices. Different tax distribution choices will affect the local 
economy (and indeed the provincial and national economies) in different ways. 
Consideration of the economic consequences of municipal tax policy might help 
municipalities avoid sub-optimal tax structures.
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Appendix 1
Assessment and Taxation Data -Mackenzie
A ssessed Values 
Residential 
Major Industry 
Light Industry 
Business/Other 
Other Classes
Total
% of A ssessed Values 
Residential 
Major Industry 
Light Industry 
Business/Other 
Other Classes
Tax Revenue 
Residential 
Major Industry 
Light Industry 
Business/Other 
Other Classes
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
$195,545,600 $182,143,000 $173,075,400 $161,117,800 $147,607,400
$128,855,100 $123,574,196 $120,060,400 $119,964,150 $115,278,100
$3,689,600 $4,060,100 $4,678,500 $4,686,700 $4,680,500
$27,135,950 $23,795,650 $22,783,250 $21,633,700 $20,838,050
$647,600 $508,200 $492,400 $503,500 $529,600
$355,873,850 $334,081,146 $321,089,950 $307,905,850 $288,933,650
54.95% 54.52% 63.90% 52.33% 51.09%
36.21% 36.99% 37.39% 38.96% 39.90%
1.04% 1.22% 1.46% 1.52% 1.62%
7.63% 7.12% 7.10% 7.03% 7.21%
0.18% 0.15% 0.15% 0.16% 0.18%
$1,206,516 $1,220,905 $1,238,354 $1,254,947 $1,253,482
$3,258,745 $3,292,882 $3,335,638 $3,375,911 $3,376,265
$88,772 $104,816 $132,182 $133,501 $136,689
$320,991 $320,551 $327,281 $330,714 $331,596
$14,636 $15,354 $15,573 $16,074 $17,879
$4,889,660 $4,954,508 $5,049,028 $5,111,147 $5,115,911
24.67% 24.64% 24.53% 24.55% 24.50%
66.65% 66.46% 66.06% 66.05% 66.00%
1.82% 2.12% 2.62% 2.61% 2.67%
6.56% 6.47% 6.48% 6.47% 6.48%
0.30% 0.31% 0.31% 0.31% 0.35%
6,264 6,250 6,260 6,177 8,177
$56,813 $53,453 $51,374 $49,847 $46,776
$31,217 $29,143 $27,692 $26,084 $23,896
$20,571 $19,772 $19,210 $19,421 $18,662
$4,332 $3,807 $3,645 $3,502 $3,373
$781 $793 $808 $827 $828
$193 $195 $198 $203 $203
$520 $527 $534 $547 $547
$51 $51 $52 $54 $54
Total
% of Taxation 
Residential 
Major Industry 
Light Industry 
Business/Other 
Other Classes
Population
Assessment Per Capita
Residential 
Major Industry 
Business/Other 
Taxation Per Capita
Residential 
Major Industry 
Business/Other
Source: B.C. Municipal Statistics. Schedule 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes and Class 
Proportions ofT axes and Assessments, for the relevant year, published by the Ministry o f  
Communities, Aboriginal and W omen’s Services, accessed at 
http://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgdysrvs infra/munfin/index.htm during February, 2003
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Appendix 2
Assessment and Taxation Data -  Quesnel
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total A ssessed Values
Residential $295,695,501 $385,992,683 $360,859,283 $353,595,883 $339,387,379
Major Industry $153,992,500 $147,516,700 $142,094,400 $141,420,500 $136,406,000
Light Industry $3,630,700 $4,584,100 $4,120,500 $4,309,000 $4,381,700
Business/Other $98,099,000 $104,668,100 $104,342,778 $121,242,245 $133,620,295
Other Classes $870,200 $3,615,700 $3,520,700 $3,666,900 $3,659,100
Total A ssessed Values $552,287,901 $646,377,283 $614,937,661 $624,234,528 $617,454,474
% of A ssessed Values
Residential 53.54% 59.72% 58.68% 56.64% 54.97%
Major Industry 27.88% 22,82% 23.11% 22.66% 22.09%
Light Industry 0.66% 0.71% 0.67% 0.69% 0.71%
Business/Other 17.76% 16.19% 16.97% 19.42% 21.64%
Other Classes 0.16% 0.56% 0.57% 0.59% 0.59%
Total Taxation
Residential $1,009,327 $1,377,492 $1,381,369 $1,445,991 $1,441,215
Major Industry $5,413,776 $5,425,295 $5,575,401 $5,927,817 $5,937,321
Light Industry $73,959 $88,785 $82,750 $92,511 $97,687
Business/Other $908,985 $956,174 $964,805 $1,199,852 $1,373,160
Other Classes $20,758 $107,068 $104,642 $115,867 $120,085
Total Taxation $7,426,805 $7,954,814 $8,108,967 $8,782,039 $8,969,468
% of Taxation
Residential 13.59% 17.32% 17.04% 16.47% 16.07%
Major Industry 72.90% 68.20% 68.76% 67.50% 66.19%
Light Industry 1.00% 1.12% 1.02% 1.05% 1.09%
Business/Other 12.24% 12.02% 11.90% 13.66% 15.31%
Other Classes 0.28% 1.35% 1.29% 1.32% 1.34%
Population 9,031 10,589 10,589 10,920 10,920
Assessment Per Capita $61,155 $61,042 $58,073 $57,164 $56,543
Residential $32,742 $36,452 $34,079 $32,381 $31,079
Major Industry $17,052 $13,931 $13,419 $12,951 $12,491
Business/Other $10,862 $9,885 $9,854 $11,103 $12,236
Taxation Per Capita $822 $751 $766 $804 $821
Residential $112 $130 $130 $132 $132
Major Industry $599 $512 $527 $543 $544
Business/Other $101 $90 $91 $110 $126
Source: B.C. Municipal Statistics. Schedule 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes 
Proportions ofTaxes and Assessments, for the relevant year, published by the Ministry of 
Communities, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, accessed at
httD://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs inffa/munfin/mdex.htm during February, 2003
and Class
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Appendix 3
Assessment and Taxation Data -Smithers
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Total /M e sse d  Values
Residential $246,790,900 $245,262,700 $232,209,697 $225,163,397 $211,376,897
Major Industry $8,003,000 $7,239,400 $6,746,400 $7,569,300 $7,173,500
Light Industry $1,253,300 $1,110,800 $1,083,800 $1,043,900 $1,010,600
Business/Other $86,755,400 $88,386,500 $84,056,450 $88,179,300 $87,021,251
Other Classes $4,861,170 $3,974,000 $3,631,350 $3,672,650 $3,506,650
Total A ssessed V a lu ^ $347,663,770 $345,973,400 $327,727,697 $325,628,547 $310,088,898
% of Assessed Values
Residential 70.99% 70.89% 70.86% 69.15% 68.17%
Major Industry 2.30% 2.09% 2.06% 2.32% 2.31%
Light Industry 0.36% 0.32% 0.33% 0.32% 0.33%
Business/Other 24.95% 25.55% 25.65% 27.08% 28.06%
Other Classes 1.40% 1.15% 1.11% 1.13% 1.13%
Total Taxation
Residential $1,065,495 $1,107,165 $1,140,707 $1,211,424 $1,211,422
Major Industry $421,397 $398,574 $410,650 $438,950 $443,129
Light Industry $71,088 $65,879 $70,009 $74,349 $74,349
Business/Other $1,460,093 $1,555,346 $1,602,469 $1,701,808 $1,701,770
Other Classes $131,795 $97,997 $98,844 $102,141 $98,000
Total Taxation $3,149,868 $3,224,^1 $3,322,679 $3,528,672 $3,528,670
% of Taxation
Residential 33.83% 34.33% 34.33% 34.33% 34.33%
Major Industry 13.38% 12.36% 12.36% 12.44% 12.56%
Light Industry 2.26% 2.04% 2.11% 2.11% 2.11%
Business/Other 46.35% 48.23% 48.23% 48.23% 48.23%
Other Classes 4.18% 3.04% 2.97% 2.89% 2.78%
Population 5,944 6,069 6,069 6,145 6,145
Assessment Per Capita $58,490 $57,007 $54,000 $52,991 $50,462
Residential $41,519 $40,412 $38,262 $36,642 $34,398
Major Industry $1,346 $1,193 $1,112 $1,232 $1,167
Business/Other $14,585 $14,564 $13,850 $14,350 $14,161
Tajation Per Capita $530 $531 $547 $574 $574
Residential $179 $182 $188 $197 $197
Major Industry $71 $66 $68 $71 $72
Business/Other $246 $256 $264 $277 $277
Source: B.C. Municipal Statistics. Schedule 61, Assessments, Tax Rates, Municipal Taxes and Class 
Proportions ofTaxes and Assessments, for the relevant year, published by the Ministry of 
Communities, Aboriginal and Women’s Services, accessed at 
httD://www.mcaws.gov.bc.ca/lgd/srvs mfra/munfin/mdex.htm during February, 2003
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